



Fachkommission
Fluchtursachen

Preventing Crises, Creating Prospects, Protecting People

Report by the Commission on the Root Causes
of Displacement





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Dear Readers!

“Human dignity shall be inviolable” – this was and is the guiding principle of the 24 women and men appointed by the German government in 2019 to the Commission on the Root Causes of Displacement. Identifying and reducing causes of displacement – not to prevent migration per se – was our task. This was also the guiding principle of the initiators of the establishment of such a Commission.

Migration is an immanent factor in human history; it has always existed and without it, our modern world would be unthinkable. But many who leave their country and thus their homeland do not do so of their own free will. Conflicts, natural disasters and hopelessness are often the drivers of displacement and irregular migration. Physical, economic, social and political security are basic prerequisites for people to see prospects for themselves and their families in their home country.

Germany has a long tradition of welcoming refugees, but also many Germans and Europeans have left their country over the centuries until today. In 2015 and 2016, Germany took in a large number of refugees in a very short time and made enormous efforts to integrate them. This was and is a great achievement. However, the high numbers have also led to fierce domestic political disputes. Among other things, there was and is the question of whether there are limits to the absorption and integration capacity, where these might lie, and how Germany can contribute more to reduce the root causes of displacement and irregular migration.

Compared to 2015 and 2016, even if the topic of displacement and migration is no longer in the foreground of political debates, the reduction of the root causes of displacement and irregular migration remains an ongoing political task. We affirm: Reasons why people leave their homeland can not only be found in the home countries, but even developed countries such as the EU member states contribute to this.

Over a period of 18 months, the Commission conducted a dedicated process of work and discussion to gather scientific findings and political recommendations for action. Unfortunately, we had to conduct most of the meetings digitally. The diversity of knowledge and experience of the Commission members has made active – and also controversial – discussions among themselves and with guests possible. These discussions were characterised by mutual appreciation and tolerance. For this energetic commitment, which was professionally and humanly enriching, we thank you from the bottom of our hearts. Our thanks is also extended to the external experts who contributed their specialised knowledge, and especially to those who made the work behind the scenes possible: the secretariat of the Commission, the editorial advisor, the editor, and the graphic designers of the agency.

A fair response that is in line with the major challenges was our goal. We hope that this report will contribute to an objective debate on politics, science and civil society and become a basis for political decision-making.



Bärbel Dieckmann

Bärbel Dieckmann



Gerda Hasselfeldt

Gerda Hasselfeldt

Chairwomen of the Commission on the Root Causes of Displacement

At a glance: The findings



The independent Commission on the Root Causes of Displacement was mandated by the German government in July 2019 to identify the main causes of displacement and irregular migration and to develop approaches for effectively mitigating them. In its report, the Commission presents recommendations for Germany’s future activities at the national, European and international levels to the German government and the German parliament (Bundestag). This summary outlines the findings of the first chapters of the report and concludes with 15 key recommendations to be prioritised in the upcoming legislative term.


There is often more than just one reason why people leave their home regions

War, persecution, hardship or a lack of prospects are the most familiar causes of displacement, and are often cited by those seeking protection as the reason for their flight. However, there is often more than just one reason why people leave their home regions or countries.

The following figure provides an overview of the key drivers of displacement and irregular migration, which are usually linked by complex interdependencies. Conflict and persecution, failing governments and institutions, poverty and a lack of prospects are factors that are for the most part direct triggers of displacement and irregular migration. Other issues with an aggravating effect, such as the impacts of climate change or the demographic pressure in many developing countries, are triggers that are mainly indirect. In addition to these primary causes of displacement and irregular migration, there are other factors influencing the route and the destination country chosen, such as smuggling networks and a lack of protection and reintegration systems in countries of transit and origin, which may trigger further migratory movements.

There is no clear hierarchy as to the reasons why people feel forced to leave their home countries or regions. The Commission therefore rejects any approaches that focus on a single reason and instead proposes an array of measures that aim to tackle the root causes of displacement and irregular migration in a comprehensive and coherent manner.

The most important factors for displacement and irregular migration



Displacement has increased over the last decade

The number of refugees has been growing for years, showing that the international community needs to scale up efforts aimed at mitigating the root causes of displacement. Between 2010 and 2019, the number of refugees who fall under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or have been recognised by other countries as refugees almost doubled, increasing from 10.5 million to 20.4 million people. This increase is primarily due to a few crisis hotspots (Syria, South Sudan, Myanmar, Venezuela). There are also protracted conflicts causing displacement, for instance in Afghanistan. Moreover, the number of internally displaced persons trying to escape conflict and seeking refuge inside their own countries saw a considerable increase between 2010 and 2019, going from 24.9 to 45.7 million people. In addition, a number of people – quite how many exactly is hard to estimate – are forced to leave their home regions because of natural disasters.

The large majority of these people do not try to reach the European Union (EU). Instead they become internally displaced persons within their own countries or seek refuge in neighbouring countries. After a sharp increase in irregular entries into the EU via the Mediterranean up until 2015, the numbers have since declined, also as a result of more restrictive border policies and mobility restrictions in connection with the Covid-19 pandemic. Any projections about where, when and how many people will decide to migrate and which destinations they will choose are subject to a high level of uncertainty. It is, however, safe to assume that the economic and social impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic will further exacerbate the structural drivers of displacement and irregular migration.

The German government and the German Bundestag should introduce closely coordinated measures in five fields of action:

1. Preventing crises and resolving conflicts: The German government should enhance its strategic capability in order to prevent crises more effectively and to


resolve existing conflicts. Violent conflicts are a central cause of displacement. However, options for intervention are usually limited as conflicts are becoming more and more complex and increasing numbers of actors are involved. Two examples illustrating this point are Syria and Afghanistan, the two countries that the most refugees in Germany come from. With its guidelines “Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace” adopted in 2017, the German government has established a framework for its political engagement in this field. Drafting clear and coherent strategies for individual conflicts and implementing them using a comprehensive approach remains a central task, however.

In concrete terms, this means that the German government should pool and expand existing analytical capacities. In order to enhance its strategic processes, it should set up a “Council for Peace, Security and Development” that involves independent institutions and civil society in exploring and identifying possible options for action. Moreover, Germany should strengthen its role in implementing civil approaches for crisis prevention and conflict regulation by enhancing its capacities for mediation and humanitarian diplomacy. Arms exports and security cooperation initiatives should be examined carefully so as to stop them exacerbating conflicts further or increasing the risk of human rights violations.

2. Securing livelihoods and creating new opportunities for development: The German government should work towards improving the overall conditions for national development and prospects for individuals in current and potential countries of origin of refugees and irregular migrants. It should support state institutions and local administrations in providing basic services for all and give more attention to inclusive urban development. A particular focus should be on sustainable food security, quality education and health systems and on building and strengthening social protection systems. The German government should also promote sustainable economic development and greater diversification in the industrial and service sectors, putting special emphasis on favourable conditions for investment, vocational training and fair trade relations.

3. Halting climate change and coping with its impacts in a spirit of solidarity: The German government should take ambitious steps to advance climate

Content from Chapter 3 (Fields of action and recommendations for action)



action and environmental protection in Germany and worldwide. Climate change is exacerbating water scarcity, extreme weather events and the extinction of species, jeopardising agricultural production and negatively affecting the livelihoods of many people. It can also exacerbate conflicts of use and, together with other factors, become a driver of displacement and irregular migration. Industrialised and emerging countries have a special responsibility in the climate crisis: they are the biggest emitters of greenhouse gases but poorer countries are particularly affected by the negative consequences. The German government should develop a mechanism with which to provide significant support, in addition to climate protection investments in Germany, for climate change mitigation measures in developing countries and emerging economies (climate matching). These measures should be aimed at encouraging the further development and implementation of the respective national climate change mitigation targets and the use of renewables. In addition, Germany should provide targeted support to the most vulnerable countries, helping them to adapt to changed climatic conditions, cope with damages and losses that have already occurred, and protect themselves against future climate risks.

Moreover, the German government should lobby for the international community to recognise climate-induced displacement and support the people affected, for example through regional protection agreements and climate passports.

4. Supporting displaced persons and host countries:

The German government should not only try to alleviate acute hardship but also seek to identify long-term solutions for people who have already been forced to leave their home countries. Possible solutions include voluntary repatriation, integration in the host country, resettlement or an otherwise secured transfer to third countries. The German government should support host countries by way of multi-annual compacts. At the same time, it should take in more refugees via orderly resettlement procedures and, to that end, forge an alliance with like-minded states. Right now, a relatively small number of countries receive the bulk of global refugees. The international community has so far failed to provide sufficient support to host countries, despite the commitments made in the Global Pact on Migration and Refugees in 2018.

The German government should also make internal displacement more of a political focus and contribute to mitigating its impacts, because the people concerned often do not have the same rights as their fellow citizens who are not affected by displacement. That is one of the reasons why the internally displaced persons of today are often the refugees of tomorrow.

5. Managing German and European refugee and migration policy in a humane and coherent manner: The German government should urgently work towards designing its migration, asylum and refugee policy in such a way as to ensure that refugees and irregular migrants are treated with dignity. This is not just a matter of human decency; it is also necessary in order to give Germany credibility when calling on other countries to comply with international standards. The German government should step up its existing efforts to ensure compliance with the law at the EU's external borders and on EU territory. In addition, it should strengthen legal migration routes, both by creating safe refugee routes and by expanding labour and education migration. It also needs to do more to promote return in order to reduce incentives for irregular migration, and, in particular, invest in voluntary return and reintegration. All this will only be possible if the German government makes an effort to build fair partnerships with other countries.

In order to achieve these five goals, the government will need not only to demonstrate its political will but also to ensure **sufficient, multi-annual, flexible and targeted funding**. The Commission calls on the German government to scale up its funding for mitigating the root causes of displacement and irregular migration and to support countries that are particularly affected. It expressly encourages the government to merge its financing instruments and procedures and make them more effective. The Commission is aware that the Covid-19 pandemic is placing an additional burden on public budgets in all policy fields. It is, however, convinced that tackling the root causes of displacement and irregular migration by means of efforts to prevent conflict and strengthen resilience will cost less overall than dealing with the aftermath.

The next steps: 15 courses of action for the upcoming legislative term

Mitigating the root causes of displacement and irregular migration is a task for the international community that is as urgent as it is enduring and must be tackled in global solidarity. Some measures can be implemented quickly, but most require perseverance. The German government must now set the course for all of them. The following 15 recommendations, in particular, should be part of the negotiations to form a new government in autumn 2021 so they can already be implemented during the next legislative term.

- 1 The German government should set up a **Council for Peace, Security and Development** as an interministerial decision-making body at the federal level, with a view to enhancing its own strategic capability and increasing its contribution to global crisis prevention.
- 2 In its partner countries, the German government should support **strong state institutions** that aim to protect people's rights and meet their needs so as to ensure the provision of basic services for the population and improve investment conditions, which will help create new job and employment opportunities.
- 3 The German government should consistently involve **women** as independent actors in all of its strategies and measures and protect their rights, since self-determination, equal rights and higher levels of female participation have a positive impact on crisis prevention, peacebuilding and sustainable development.
- 4 In order to reduce poverty in a sustainable way, the German government should push for the establishment of adaptive **social protection systems** in the partner countries of German development cooperation and, in particular, in fragile contexts.

- 5** The German government should massively scale up its support for the **expansion of basic health care structures** and formulate a long-term approach that also extends to displaced persons, stateless persons and irregular migrants.
- 6** The German government should make **quality basic and secondary education** a top priority of its development cooperation in order to improve life and career opportunities through quality education for girls and boys alike. Digital education opportunities should be expanded and digital literacy strengthened.
- 7** In addition to pushing climate change mitigation action in Germany and Europe, the German government should provide massive support for **countries of the Global South to assist them in the climate-smart transformation of their economies**, with a view to mitigating climate change as a driver of displacement and irregular migration, and strengthening countries in their sustainable development and modernisation efforts.
- 8** The German government should step up more targeted support for ways to **adapt to climate change** so as to stop the impacts of climate change from forcing people to leave their homes.
- 9** The German government should step up its support for **sustainable urban development** in developing countries in order to improve the living conditions in poor urban districts and create viable prospects outside of refugee camps.
- 10** The German government should place more political emphasis on the situation of **internally displaced persons** and affected countries, with the aim of creating prospects for the people concerned in their home countries.
- 11** The German government should support **host countries** that are particularly affected by refugee movements, particularly in crisis regions, in order to create prospects for a sustainable future for the people and the host communities.
- 12** The German government should initiate an **Alliance for Resettlement** with a view to ensuring that at least the members of that alliance permanently take in a certain quota of recognised refugees every year. Moreover, the German government should expand the **issuing of humanitarian visas** so as to provide swift support for people in acute crisis situations. In addition, the German government should explore possibilities for asylum applications from third countries outside the EU.
- 13** The German government, together with other EU member states, must work towards ensuring **compliance with the applicable law at the EU's external borders** so that violations of human rights obligations cease.
- 14** The German government should conclude **substantial migration partnerships** with relevant countries of origin in order to create more safe migration routes and jointly manage migration. For the purpose of making a strategic selection of debatable countries, discussions should be held during annual summits on asylum and migration in coordination with the partners who are involved in integrating refugees, i.e. civil society including diaspora organisations, the private sector, the federal states and local authorities.
- 15** The German government should step up its efforts to come up with **German strategies** on mitigating the root causes of displacement and irregular migration that are coherently coordinated between the federal ministries, and should make available sufficient **human resources** for mainstreaming these strategies more effectively in European and international discussions. The German government should increase funding and improve its own strategic capabilities by improving the coherence of its **financing**.

Introduction

1



1.1 Mission and vision of the Commission on the Root Causes of Displacement

Under the title “Every displacement has a reason. Addressing the root causes of displacement!”, more than 150 recipients of the Federal Cross of Merit called for the establishment of an Enquete Commission on the causes of displacement before the 2017 German parliamentary elections.¹ The initiative received broad support from the public, non-governmental organisations and political parties. This also applied to its demand to examine the extent to which Germany itself contributes to the root causes of displacement and how this can be avoided.

The CDU, CSU and SPD took up the proposal in the coalition agreement of 12 March 2018 and decided to set up a Commission on the “Root Causes of Displacement”. The Commission was appointed as an independent commission by the German cabinet in July 2019. It was mandated by the government to look not only at displacement but also at irregular migration, to identify the main causes of both and to develop approaches for more effective mitigation. The Commission was expected to submit proposals for the future involvement of the German government, including effective cooperation within the European Union (EU) and with international organisations.

The Commission appointed by the German government consisted of 24 independent experts from science and practice. (→ [Annex 1](#)). An independent secretariat established within the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) supported the Commission’s work, with the participation of the Federal Foreign Office (FFO) and the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (BMI) as well as other federal ministries.

Guiding principles of the Commission on the Root Cause of Displacement

The Commission’s proposals are based on four guiding principles:

¹ Beck, R., Töpfer, K. und Zahrnt, A. (2017) Aufruf von 150 Trägerinnen und Trägern des Bundesverdienstkreuzes: Enquete-Kommission „Fluchtursachen“ einsetzen.

1. Displacement and migration have always existed in the history of mankind.

Displacement and migration are deeply rooted in human history and are not phenomena of the modern age.² Displacement has always represented a human catastrophe and fundamental break for those affected.³ The underlying causes should therefore be reduced as far as possible. Migration, on the other hand, can have both positive and negative effects for those affected, for the countries of origin and for host countries.

The effects are particularly positive if self-determined migration is based on fair agreements between countries of origin and host countries and if the rights of migrants are respected. It can thus be an important driving force for individual and social development. Emigration and return migration can contribute to intercultural understanding and knowledge transfer, and remittances from migrants can contribute to the development of countries of origin. Well-regulated migration can, not least, contribute to the fact that countries like Germany, which are dependent on immigration for demographic reasons, can maintain their level of prosperity.

Negative effects occur particularly when migration takes place in an irregular, disorganised and unsafe manner. Just like refugees, irregular migrants may have to face human rights violations, torture and even death. Countries of origin lose productive members of their population. Host countries are concerned about a possible overburdening of their institutions and risks to social cohesion, especially if migration (perceived or actual) increases in a disorderly and rapid manner.

It is therefore in the interest of the people who have to embark on an often unsafe and dangerous journey as well as of the international community, to reduce the causes of displacement and irregular migration to the extent possible in a preventive manner. In order to promote the positive consequences of migration and mitigate the negative consequences, a balanced, pragmatic policy based on fundamental human values is needed in order to enable people to live in their

² Oltmer, J. (2018) Globale Migration: Geschichte, Gegenwart, Zukunft. The article explains how migration has changed over time.

³ Cf. Kossert, A. (2020) Flucht – Eine Menschheitsgeschichte. The book describes this human catastrophe very impressively with many examples from all regions of the world.

home countries in safety, dignity and with good prospects. The proposals of the Commission are intended to serve this goal.

2. Displacement and irregular migration will continue to exist in spite of improved mitigation of their causes. The international community has invested in reducing the root causes of displacement and irregular migration. Nonetheless, displacement situations have been shown to last longer and longer. This is especially true for displacement from complex conflict situations such as in Syria or Afghanistan. This poses major challenges for transit and host countries in receiving and caring for people, which they often cannot shoulder alone. The upheavals resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic are likely to lead to even more people seeing no future in their home countries in the coming years and seeking better prospects in other parts of the country or in other countries.

The Commission on the root causes of displacement therefore stresses that reducing the causes of displacement and irregular migration is a longer-term goal that not only concerns the countries of origin, but also requires cooperation with transit and host countries. The proposals developed to accomplish this task will only have an impact in the medium to long term. They require a lot of patience and the interplay of different policy areas.

3. Reducing the causes of displacement and irregular migration requires changes in Germany and other industrialised countries, because our economic practices and lifestyle contribute to the causes. Displacement and irregular migration are often an expression of wealth disparities within regions and globally. Despite the progress in reducing poverty until the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, social inequality in income, development opportunities and access to technological innovations threatens to increase globally. Many poorer countries, for example, have fewer possibilities to cope with the effects of climate change – which industrialised countries and emerging economies have played a major role in causing.⁴ This often makes them

more vulnerable to conflict.⁵ In 2015, the global community set *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs) to address inequalities within and amongst countries under the pledge “Leave No One Behind”.⁶ The SDGs thus form an important framework for action to reduce the causes of displacement and irregular migration.⁷ The Commission’s proposals therefore include not only necessary changes in the countries of origin, but also in the industrialised countries.

4. Germany and the EU have a responsibility and must take action. The EU is an important target of displacement and irregular migration, even if it is affected to a much lesser extent than other regions of the world. Germany and the EU are endeavouring to defend international human rights principles and to shape multilateral solutions. It is therefore the responsibility of Germany and the EU and in their own interest to play an active role both in reducing the root causes of displacement and in supporting refugees and host countries. The EU sees itself as a community of values and advocates democracy and the rule of law. This should include respecting and implementing the rights of refugees and irregular migrants.

The Commission emphasises that a strong EU is necessary to respond to the global challenges posed by displacement and irregular migration. Given the challenges which the EU internally and democracies around the world are facing, Germany needs to build partnerships and alliances with like-minded countries inside and outside the EU and seek the support of other countries.

Based on these guiding principles, the Commission on the Root Causes of Displacement has developed recommendations for action that are intended to increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of Germany’s actions in this area. It is aware that many factors and drivers of displacement and irregular migration can be influenced only to a limited extent. With its report, the Commission wants to contribute to an objective public discussion. To this end, it offers impetus for a fact-

⁴ Salb, C., Gül, S., Cuntz, C. et al. (2018) Klimaschutz in Zahlen: Fakten, Trends und Impulse deutscher Klimapolitik, p. 11 f.

⁵ Cf. i. a. UN DESA (2020) World Social Report 2020: The Challenge of Inequality in a Rapidly Changing World.

⁶ See DGVN: Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): <https://t1p.de/htz4>; UN: The 17 Goals: <https://sdgs.un.org/goals>.

⁷ Cf. Foresti, M., Hagen-Zanker, J., Dempster, H. et al. (2020) Migration, Development and the 2030 Agenda.

based debate and, with its recommendations, provides the government with comprehensive approaches.

The first chapter explains the concepts and legal bases underlying the report and outlines five current trends in displacement and irregular migration on the basis of the available data. The second chapter describes the causes of migration and offers an outlook on future developments. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic as a driver of displacement and migration is taken into account. Recommendations for action are developed from this analysis in the third chapter. It takes into account what the German government is already doing in these areas and where improvements are possible. The fourth and final chapter formulates 15 key recommendations that the Commission believes should be addressed as a priority in the next legislative term.

1.2 Legal bases and international cooperation

A crucial legal and political distinction is that between migrants on the one hand and refugees on the other. At its core, this distinction is based on the idea that refugees are forced to migrate, while migrants choose this option (→ **Box 1**). The Commission on the Root Causes of Displacement adopts this differentiation in this report because it is decisive for the international legal regulations and institutional responsibilities. The distinction is relevant for the question of who is responsible for protecting these people and who exercises which mandate. It may be vital for people concerned, because refugees are under the special protection of international refugee law – the intake of migrants, on the other hand, is largely a sovereign decision of the states.⁸

The foundation of international refugee law is the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention (GRC), supplemented by the 1967 Protocol, which extended the temporal and geographical scope of the Convention.⁹ These two conventions define the concept of refugee and oblige the contracting states to comply with minimum standards

of refugee law. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible for ensuring compliance with these standards, developing the international refugee law, and seeking durable solutions for refugees.¹⁰

In case of migration, on the other hand, countries are in principle free to determine the terms and conditions regarding whom they can allow access to their territory. However, international law now provides an increasingly comprehensive legal framework for migration. These include human rights guarantees and rules about economic freedom of movement, for example under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) or the agreements of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Regional treaty regimes in Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East, in particular, contain varying degrees of freedom of movement and migration regulations, which, however, do not create a universal right to freedom of movement as a whole. In the area of migration, the key international actor is the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which became part of the UN system in 2016. It implements programmes on behalf of governments to manage and organise migration and supports returnees with reintegration and other assistance.

Displacement and irregular migration are not always clearly distinguishable

The distinction between displacement and migration is not always clear-cut in practice. There are clear overlaps.¹¹

Against the historical background of the Second World War, the GRC primarily regulated individual or group-specific persecution by state actors. In the meantime, however, other causes of displacement have gained in importance, especially violence and persecution by non-state actors. In addition, more people are setting off because their economic or environmental

⁸ Angenendt, S. (2014) *Flucht- und Migrationsursachen: Entwicklungspolitische Herausforderungen und Handlungsmöglichkeiten*.

⁹ United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951; UNHCR: The Geneva Refugee Convention: <https://www.unhcr.org/dach/de/ueber-uns/unser-mandat/die-genfer-fluechtlingskonvention>.

¹⁰ UNHCR (1950) Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

¹¹ Cf. Angenendt, S. and Koch, A. (2017) *Global Migration Governance and Mixed Flows: Implications for Development-Centred Policies*, p. 7 et seq.; Carling, J., Horwood, C. and Gallagher, A. (2015) *Beyond Definitions: Global Migration and the Smuggling-Trafficking Nexus*, p. 1.

livelihoods are being destroyed. These include people who, as a result of natural disasters or the gradual consequences of climate change, have left their home countries for short or longer periods of time. These motives are not considered as causes of displacement in the existing system of protection under international law; they are regarded as reasons for migration. For people who have to leave their homes as a result of climate change, we therefore refer to them in this report as “climate displaced persons” in order to make it clear that they have left involuntarily, but do not meet the GRC criteria for international protection.¹²

Further overlaps between refugees and migrants arise from the fact that both groups often use the same migration routes and the help of smugglers. This is not least due to increasing immigration restrictions between states,¹³ which make legal entry more difficult for refugees and migrants. Once they have arrived in the destination country, irregular migrants often apply for asylum in the hope of remaining in the country legally. This puts additional pressure on already strained asylum systems and bears the risk of undermining the legitimacy of asylum policies.

A distinction must be made between refugees who have left their country in search of protection and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (→ **Box 1**). These are people who are fleeing from conflicts, violence, natural disasters, or general human rights violations within their own countries. Unlike refugees, internally displaced persons do not receive international protection; there is no protection system for them that would be

equivalent to the GRC. In many cases, they are denied their civil rights or are unable to exercise them.

The protection of refugees and irregular migrants

Refugees and migrants are often exposed to great dangers on irregular routes. However, international protection under the criteria of the GRC is only available to those who can prove that they have been victims of persecution in their home country. Beyond protection under the GRC, however, people in Germany may be eligible for subsidiary protection as per § 4 of the German Asylum Law if they face serious harm in their country of origin, such as the death penalty, torture, inhumane treatment or serious threats to life or limb in the context of an armed conflict¹⁴ (on the essential features of the German protection system in Germany → **Chap. 2.7**). Furthermore, human rights guarantees are applicable indiscriminately to refugees as well as migrants.

The most important guarantee for the protection of both refugees and migrants is the principle of non-*refoulement* under international law. As laid down in the GRC, the principle of non-*refoulement* prohibits the deportation or extradition of refugees to states where they fear persecution or torture. The principle is part of customary international law, which is why even countries that have not acceded to the GRC must comply with the prohibition. As part of various human rights and other international agreements, the prohibition of *refoulement* also protects migrants from deportation in certain cases. In addition to constitutional requirements, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in particular, and the prohibition of torture contained therein prohibit the deportation or extradition of people to countries where they are threatened with cruel, humiliating or other inhumane treatment, regardless of their residence status.

Entry is also subject to a number of fundamental and human rights requirements that do not distinguish between refugee and migrant status. These include procedural guarantees such as the right to effective legal protection, the prohibition of collective forced expulsion and the prohibition of arbitrary detention.

¹² The frequently used term “climate refugee” is legally incorrect and is not used in the report. However, in addition to the legal situation of climate displaced persons, there may be situations where climate displaced persons may be recognised by the refugee criteria of the GRC or by broader criteria of regional measures of refugee law, for example when a drought-induced famine is linked to situations of armed conflict and violence – a phenomenon referred to as “nexus dynamics” (→ **Chapter 3.3.3**). In early 2020, the UN Human Rights Committee determined that the effects of climate change could in principle lead to a violation of the right to life and the prohibition of inhumane treatment, and thus may entail the principle of non-*refoulement* (→ **p. 10**). See UNHCR Climate Change and Disaster Displacement: <https://www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html>; OHCHR (2021) Historic UN Human Rights Case Opens Door to Climate Change Asylum Claims.

¹³ Angenendt, S., Kipp, D. and Meier, A. (2017) *Gemischte Wanderungen: Herausforderungen und Optionen einer Dauerbaustelle der deutschen und europäischen Asyl- und Migrationspolitik*, p. 8; Endres de Oliveira, P. (2016) *Legaler Zugang zu internationalem Schutz – zur Gretchenfrage im Flüchtlingsrecht*, p. 171 et seq.

¹⁴ IOM (2019a), p. 97: Humanitarian Visa.

Box 1

Key terms

- › **Refugees:** According to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention (GRC), a refugee is a person who is outside his/her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution.¹⁵
- › **Internally displaced persons (IDPs):** The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons, published in 1989, define IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border.¹⁶ The Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons have received widespread support from the international community – many countries have implemented them in their national law. Many of the rules contained in the Guiding Principles are part of international human rights guarantees and international humanitarian law.
- › **Displaced persons:** The term is not legally defined and does not contain any claims for protection. The triggers of cross-border displacement correspond to those of internal displacement (s. a.) and thus go beyond the causes defined for refugee status in the GRC, in particular by taking natural disasters into account. In this report, the terms displacement/displaced persons are used accordingly in an overarching manner and include internal displacement as well as cross-border displacement.¹⁷
- › **Migrants:** According to IOM, a migrant is a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. For example, the term includes migrant workers as well as international students. The term “migrant” is not defined under international law.¹⁸
- › **Irregular migration:** There is also no universally accepted definition of irregular migration. IOM defines irregular migration as “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving country”.¹⁹ Irregular migrants enter another country, for example, with false documents, they do not enter a country at an official border checkpoint, or they stay there without a valid residence permit.²⁰
- › **Secondary migration:** This refers to the migration of refugees or irregular migrants who, for various reasons, leave the country they first entered in order to seek protection or permanent resettlement elsewhere.²¹

¹⁵ See UNHCR: Refugees: <https://t1p.de/6y8y>.

¹⁶ See UNHCR: Internally displaced persons: <https://t1p.de/0sr4>.

¹⁷ IOM (2019a) International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration, p. 51, p. 55, p. 109: Disaster displacement/Displacement/Internally Displaced Persons.

¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 132: Migrant.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 116: Irregular Migration: “Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination”.

²⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 132: Migrant.

²¹ EMN (2018) Asylum and Migration Glossary 6.0: A Tool for Better Comparability Produced by the European Migration Network, p. 348: Secondary movement of migrants.

International law on human trafficking and smuggling, in particular the so-called Palermo Protocols (“Convention against Transnational Organised Crime”) of 2000, protects refugees and migrants alike.²² Due to an effort of the United Nations, protective provisions for migrants were also included in these treaties.

The right to respect for family life is included in numerous human rights treaties. In particular, it has become an important basis for regulating family reunification of migrants and refugees in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

Finally, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of 2016 is a politically important step. The United Nations General Assembly adopted it with the aim of improving the way the global community deals with large-scale displacement and migration. In doing so, two independent processes were initiated, resulting in 2018 in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact for Refugees (GCR) (→ **Box 2**). These express the international community’s shared conviction that global migration needs to be governed and managed better. They represent a strong commitment to international refugee protection and international cooperation. Both pacts are important political declarations of intent, but they are not international treaties and thus not legally binding: Their implementation by UN member states is not legally enforceable.

European cooperation in the field of asylum and migration policy

In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam communitised EU asylum and migration policy and the protection of the EU’s external borders. As a result, the Union shares responsibility for the “area of freedom, security and

justice” with the EU Member States²³. Since European Union law takes precedence over national law, its provisions in the form of directives and regulations limit the scope of national legislators.

The EU’s framework for refugee law is the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)²⁴, which determines EU-wide common standards for the execution of asylum procedures and the accommodation and care

Box 2

The Global Compacts on displacement and migration of 2018

Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM): With the GCM, the international community has agreed for the first time on a comprehensive framework to improve international cooperation in the area of on cross-border migration. On 19 December 2018, the UN General Assembly adopted the GCM with five votes against. The GCM sets out a series of principles and standards for member states on international migration in all its dimensions. These include reinforcing safe, orderly and regular migration channels and increasing cooperation on border management, as well as reducing the root causes of irregular migration, for example by improving living conditions in countries of origin.

Global Compact for Refugees (GCR): Building on the Geneva Refugee Convention, the GCR assures countries that the protection of refugees and the support of host countries are a shared international responsibility and cannot be shouldered by the countries concerned alone. The GCR was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 17 December 2018 with the votes of 181 states. It provides the basis for ensuring that host countries and communities receive rapid, predictable and sustainable support. This includes development cooperation as well as humanitarian aid.

Progress in implementing the two pacts is to be reviewed every four years globally and, in addition, at the regional level.

²² The Supplementary Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime entered into force on 25 December 2003. Until now, 177 countries and the EU have expressed their consent to be bound by the Supplementary Protocol. The Supplementary Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air entered into force on 28 January 2004; 149 countries and the EU have expressed their consent to be bound by the Supplementary Protocol. See UN (2000) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime.

²³ Art. 4 (2) lit. j in conjunction with Title 5, Chap. 2 TFEU; European Parliament (2021a) Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

²⁴ See SVR (2017) Opportunities in Crisis: The Future of Refugee Policy in Germany and Europe, Annual Report 2017, p. 23 et seq.

of asylum seekers. The CEAS currently consists of two regulations (Eurodac and the Dublin Regulation) and three directives (Qualification, Reception Conditions, Asylum Procedures Directive). The purpose of the CEAS is to align the asylum systems of the EU member states in order to ensure equal treatment of all asylum seekers, regardless of the state in which they apply for asylum.

The CEAS, which also regulates responsibility for processing asylum applications via the Dublin III Regulation, is dysfunctional. This was demonstrated once again in 2015 and 2016, when a particularly large number of people seeking protection arrived on EU territory, but only a handful of member states had to cope with the enormous influx. Even before 2015, the member states at the EU external borders felt left alone in the reception of refugees and criticised the lack of solidarity within the EU. Since then, the polarisation between the external border states and the member states willing to take in refugees on the one hand and the member states not willing to take in refugees on the other has intensified. This has blocked the reform efforts of the EU Commission as well as various member states in the Council and stalled the reform process.

With its proposal for a new EU migration and asylum package, the so-called Pact for Migration and Asylum, the EU Commission made an attempt in September 2020 to overcome this blockade.²⁵ The central proposals include preliminary examinations of asylum procedures at the EU's external borders and a new division of labour among the member states, which are supposed to have a choice between accepting protection seekers and returning rejected asylum seekers. In addition, the EU Commission wants to place a stronger focus on cooperation with third countries. The potential for political conflict among EU member states and the adverse human rights implications of these proposals are enormous.²⁶

Destination countries, transit countries and countries of origin

Media and political discourse often divides countries into destination, transit and origin countries. In addition, host countries or countries of first reception are often used to refer to neighbouring countries of countries in crisis where people find refuge.

However, these terms do not reflect the fact that countries' migration profiles are rarely one-dimensional and can change rapidly and extensively. For example, while the United States or Canada are considered classic destination countries, the Balkan states have tended to be transit countries since 2015, India or Gambia are countries of origin, and Jordan has been a first country of reception in recent years. However, countries that were considered countries of origin for decades can become transit or host countries in the course of a few years, as is the case with Mexico and Colombia. Conversely, former destination countries can become transit and source countries for migrants, such as when violent conflicts erupt (for example, Libya) or the economy collapses (for example, Lebanon). It is not uncommon for countries to have triple migration profiles, i.e. to be countries of origin, transit and destination at the same time, as is currently the case for Morocco or Turkey. It is not uncommon for the public perception of a country's migration profile to lag years behind reality, and the wrong conclusions are drawn for asylum and migration policy. For the work of the Commission, this means that in most cases recommendations do not refer to individual countries, but to specific transnational challenges.

In addition, there is the legal categorisation of transit and destination countries as so-called first asylum states – the states in which a refugee first finds protection – or safe third countries. These terms originate from the EU Asylum Procedures Directive and German asylum law. According to German asylum law, an application is inadmissible if another EU member state has already granted protection or if a safe third country – currently only Switzerland and Norway fall under this category by legislative definition – or another third country is ready to readmit a refugee. According to § 29 Sec. 1 No. 2, 3 and 4 of German Asylum Law (Asylgesetz, AsylG), another third country or a first country of asylum is a country that is not a member state of the EU, is different from the country of origin of the person

²⁵ European Commission (2020a) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

²⁶ Angenendt, S., Biehler, N., Bossong, R. et al. (2020) The new EU migration and asylum package: Breakthrough or admission of defeat?

concerned and in which the applicant was already safe from political persecution.

1.3 Displacement and irregular migration: Five current trends

In order to understand the root causes, it is important to understand global trends in displacement and irregular migration. In the following, the Commission describes five developments that have defined the last decade.

These form the basis for the considerations and recommendations for action. For a detailed account, please refer to the relevant statistical reports, such as IOM's World Migration Report²⁷, UNHCR's Global Trends Report²⁸, the annual report of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)²⁹ and the annual migration report of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF).³⁰ Possible future trends are discussed in Chapter 2.8.

Trend 1: The number of UNHCR refugees worldwide has doubled in the last decade

The number of refugees (under UNHCR mandate and recognised by states) has increased from 10.5 to 20.4 million people between 2010 and 2019³¹ (→ Fig. 1). In fact, the doubling even took place in just five years – between 2012 and 2017.

The increase in refugee numbers can be traced back to a small number of trouble spots³² (→ Fig. 2):

- › the war in Syria, which broke out in 2011 and within a short period of time led to the largest global refugee catastrophe in the last decade³³
- › The disputes in South Sudan that broke out in 2013, two years after the country's independence, and continued until 2018 (→ Chap. 2, Box 4)³⁴

- › The displacement of nearly 800,000 Rohingya from Myanmar, particularly in the summer of 2017 (→ Chap. 2, Box 5)³⁵

In addition, wars and conflicts are lasting longer and longer or are increasingly flaring up again.³⁶ Increasingly often, these are intrastate conflicts,³⁷ in which non-state actors are involved³⁸ and which are thus more difficult for the international community to influence.³⁹ One example is Afghanistan, with 2.7 million refugees at the end of 2019.⁴⁰ Venezuela is also added to these trouble spots: 3.6 million Venezuelans have found protection in neighbouring countries by the end of 2019, mainly in Colombia (→ Chap. 2, Box 7).

UNHCR's figures also include so-called long-term refugees, i.e. people who have been in a displacement situation for more than a decade. In 2019, about over half of the refugees recorded had this status. It is striking that in some countries the number of refugees has remained consistently high for decades, while there are no long-term refugees in European countries, the USA and Canada. This can be explained by different documentation categories: For the latter countries, recognised refugees are listed in the UNHCR statistics for only ten years, whereas in China, Pakistan, Iran or African countries they are listed for many decades.⁴¹

²⁷ IOM (2019b) World Migration Report 2020.

²⁸ IDMC (2020a) Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020.

²⁹ UNHCR (2020a) Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019.

³⁰ BAMF (2020a) Migration report of the Federal Government.

³¹ See Refugee Data Finder: <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=E1ZxP4>.

³² Syria, Afghanistan and South Sudan are considered extremely fragile states. All ten main countries of origin of international displacement are fragile contexts. See OECD (2020a) States of Fragility 2020, p. 35.

³³ At the beginning of 2021, there were nearly 6.6 million refugees and asylum seekers from Syria worldwide. Approximately 6.7 million people are refugees within their own countries. See UNHCR Germany: A decade of violence: <https://www.uno-fluechtlingshilfe.de/hilfe-weltweit/syrien>.

³⁴ 2.2 million people have fled to neighbouring countries, and approximately 1.7 million South Sudanese are refugees in their own country. See UNHCR Germany: Violence and hunger in South Sudan: <https://www.uno-fluechtlingshilfe.de/hilfe-weltweit/suedsudan>.

³⁵ See UNHCR Germany: Rohingya in Myanmar: <https://www.uno-fluechtlingshilfe.de/hilfe-weltweit/myanmar>.

³⁶ Bellal, A. (2019) The War Report – Armed Conflicts in 2018; Strand, H. and Buhaug, H. (2017) Tracing Armed Conflict Over Time: A Reversal of the Recent Decline?

³⁷ Palik, J., Rustad, S. and Methi, F. (2020) Conflict Trends: A Global Overview 1946–2019; Slim, H. and Lopes Morey, A. (2016) Protracted Conflict and Humanitarian Action: Some Recent ICRC Experiences.

³⁸ Cotter, C. (2019) From Operation Iraqi Freedom to the Battle of Mosul: Fifteen Years of Displacement in Iraq; Rudolf, M. (2020) Immobilisation, Restricted Spatial Mobility and Displacement in Violent Conflict: Humanitarian Needs of Confined Communities in Colombia.

³⁹ Policinski, E. and Kuzmanovic, J. (2019) Protracted Conflicts: The Enduring Legacy of Endless War; On the methodological challenges of refugee documentation, see FICSS, Scott, P. (2018) Are Refugee Numbers the Highest Ever?

⁴⁰ See UNHCR Germany: Refugees in Afghanistan: <https://www.uno-fluechtlingshilfe.de/hilfe-weltweit/afghanistan/>.

⁴¹ For example, in the Global Trends report, 300,000 Vietnamese refugees appear each year, which China took in from Vietnam in 1979. Cf. UNHCR (2020a), p. 72, p. 77.

Box 3

How does UNHCR categorise forcibly displaced persons?

At the end of 2019, UNHCR recorded almost 80 million people worldwide as refugees and displaced persons – nearly double as many as ten years before. **Figure 1** shows how this number is composed: Apart from refugees (→ **Trend 1**), also internally displaced persons (→ **Trend 3**) and persons applying for asylum (asylum-seekers) are recorded (→ **Trend 4**).

UNHCR distinguishes between three major groups of refugees: 20.4 million registered refugees under the UNHCR mandate as well as people recognised as refugees by states; 3.6 million displaced Venezuelans abroad, who have found protection outside the country⁴²; and 5.6 million Palestinian refugees under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)⁴³.

Fig. 1: Forcibly displaced persons worldwide, 2010 to 2019



Source: UNHCR (2020)⁴⁴

Trend 2: Most refugees do not come to the EU, but remain in their neighbouring countries and regions.

When refugees flee across their country’s borders, they remain in their neighbouring country in the vast majority of cases: Around three quarters of all refugees (73 percent) were living in a country neighbouring their country of origin at the end of 2019 (→ **Fig. 2**).

According to UNHCR, the countries with the most refugees in absolute numbers worldwide as of 2019 are Turkey (3.6 million people from Syria)⁴⁵, Colombia (1.8 million people, mainly from Venezuela), and Pakistan and Uganda (with around 1.4 million people each from Afghanistan and South Sudan, respectively). With 1.1 million refugees, Germany ranked fifth⁴⁶ and is the only EU member state among the ten main receiving countries. In proportion to their populations, the three

⁴² The UNHCR report (2020a) lists Venezuelans who left their country due to local grievances, poverty, and famine separately from refugee numbers.

⁴³ UNRWA (2020) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

⁴⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴⁵ This figure only includes registered Syrians with temporary Turkish protection status, but not 356,000 non-Syrian asylum seekers, including many Afghans, and an unknown number of irregular migrants of other nationalities (estimates put the figure at two million people without legal status) (→ **also Chap. 2, Box 12**).

⁴⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 3.

countries neighbouring Syria – Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey – took in the most refugees in 2019.⁴⁷

Trend 3: The number of internally displaced persons has increased significantly in the last decade

According to IDMC, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) displaced by crises and conflicts within their country rose from 24.9 to 45.7 million⁴⁸ between 2010 and 2019, reaching a new peak. Alongside Syria, Colombia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the civil war country of Yemen has the highest number of internally displaced persons (→ Fig. 3).⁴⁹

International organisations and institutions such as UNHCR, IOM and IDMC collect the total number of internally displaced persons to the best of their knowledge, but this is significantly more difficult than for cross-border displacement. There are several reasons for this: First, the fact that internally displaced persons are often scattered in host communities and remain statistically invisible. Second, the political interests of the governments concerned, which are keen to influence the perception of the displacement situation in their favour, and third, the already discussed unresolved question of when exactly individual displacement situations should be considered to have ended.⁵⁰

In addition, the number of internally displaced persons is influenced by the immigration policies of the countries bordering conflict countries. This is exemplified by the case of Syria: From 2011 to 2015, most neighbouring countries (Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan) largely allowed all those who had to flee into their country. In the summer of 2015, Turkey began building a border fortification, and Lebanon and Jordan also changed their policies and sealed themselves off. As a result, an estimated 3.1 million internally displaced persons now live in northwestern Syria directly on the Turkish border.

Historical data collected by IDMC shows that year after year, more people are newly displaced due to natural disasters than to violent conflict.⁵¹ IDMC cites 24.9 million people who were displaced due to natural events during 2019, most of them temporarily.⁵²

Trend 4: The number of asylum applications has fluctuated significantly over the past decade

UNHCR also records the number of asylum applications in its annual reports. This has increased significantly over the last ten years. Globally, within five years, the number of applications quadrupled from around 830,000 in 2010 to 3.1 million in 2015, and then dropped in recent years to just over 2.0 million.⁵³ This trend can also be observed for Germany and the EU. After the significant EU-wide increase between 2010 and 2015, the number of asylum applications filed in the EU declined rapidly in the following years, not least due to the more restrictive border policy and the EU-Turkey declaration.

In Germany, a good 720,000 asylum applications were filed in 2016, whereas it was only 140,000 in 2019.⁵⁴ Just under 45 percent of all initial applications in 2019 were filed by people from Syria (around 39,000), Iraq (just under 14,000) and Afghanistan (just under 10,000).⁵⁵ In 2020, the number of initial asylum applications has fallen further to around 100,000, partly due to the Covid-19 pandemic.⁵⁶ Without newborns in the statistics, the number of asylum applications would be even lower: 26,520 (around 25 percent) of the initial applications filed in 2020 were for children born in Germany to asylum seekers.⁵⁷

⁴⁷ UNHCR (2020a), p. 3, p. 9.

⁴⁸ IDMC (2020a), p. 2. In addition, for 2019, there are 5.1 million people who were displaced due to natural disasters and extreme weather events.
⁴⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁰ Schetter, C. (2020) *Flucht und Gewaltkonflikte*, Presentation to the Commission on the Root Causes of Displacement; Koch, A. (2020); IDMC (2020a) cites a total of 33.4 million people who were at least temporarily displaced during the year (p. 1), in addition to the 5.1 million internally displaced persons at the end of 2019 (p. 2). On the run in their own country. The role of development cooperation in the context of internal displacement.

⁵¹ Koch, A. (2020), p. 11.

⁵² IDMC (2020a), p. 1.

⁵³ See Refugee Data Finder: <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=Pw2xhW>.


⁵⁴ BAMF (2021b) *Current Figures (12/2020)*, p. 6.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*


⁵⁶ BAMF (2021b), p. 5; German Federal Statistical Office: *Migration January to October 2020: Sharp decline in registered inflows and outflows as of March 2020*: <https://t1p.de/sxpc>.

⁵⁷ BAMF (2021), p. 3.

Fig. 2: The five main countries of origin and the most important host countries of refugees, asylum seekers as well as Venezuelans displaced abroad, status as of end of 2019




Source: UNHCR (2020)⁵⁸





⁵⁸ Interactive graphic at <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019>, detailed data UNHCR Refugee Data Finder.

Fig. 3: Countries with the most internally displaced persons owing to conflicts and violence as well as natural disasters, status as of end of 2019




Source: IDMC (2020a) Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020



Countries with the most internally displaced persons

As of end of 2019

Fig. 4: Asylum applications in EU, 2010 to 2020



Source: Eurostat (2021) and UNHCR (2020). The number of asylum applications worldwide for the entire year of 2020 will be presented by UNHCR in June; the number was 580,000 in the first half of 2020.⁵⁹

Almost 80 percent of all asylum applications in the EU in 2020 were lodged in five countries: Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Greece (→ Fig. 4). Germany continues to receive the most asylum applications in absolute numbers. Spain and France are in second and third place, with Spain moving into second place for the first time in 2020. In terms of population size, the figures are highest in Cyprus, Malta and Greece.⁶⁰

However, it is important to distinguish between the countries in which asylum applications were filed and those in which international protection was actually granted through asylum and subsidiary protection. The UNHCR figures show the prominent position of Germany, France, the U.S. and Sweden.⁶¹

Trend 5: The number of irregular entries into the EU has fallen

The exact number of people living irregularly in Germany and the EU, i.e. without a valid residence status, cannot be determined.⁶² However, it is clearly recorded that the number of people who entered the EU irregularly via the Mediterranean Sea initially grew very strongly until 2015, only to fall again just as quickly, not least due to the more restrictive border policy and the EU-Turkey Statement. According to UNHCR, the number of recorded attempted entries in 2015 was over one million, but has since fallen rapidly, dropping to below 100,000 in 2019 (→ Tab. 1). Data collected by Frontex on registered border crossings also confirm this clearly declining trend.⁶³

⁵⁹ Eurostat: Asylum Statistics: Number of Asylum Applicants (Non-EU), 2008–2020 (Status as of 25.03.2021): <https://t1p.de/nz16>; annual UNHCR reports Global Trends 2010–2019: <https://www.unhcr.org/search?comid=56b079c44&cid=49aea93aba&tags=globaltrends>; UNHCR (2020b) Mid-Year Trends 2020: <https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5fc504d44/mid-year-trends-2020.html>.

⁶⁰ European Commission: Overall Figures of Immigrants in European Society (Status as of 22.01.2021): <https://t1p.de/r3zc>.

⁶¹ Knaus, G. (2020) Welche Grenzen brauchen wir? Zwischen Empathie und Angst – Flucht, Migration und die Zukunft von Asyl, p. 45 et seq. and annual UNHCR Global Trends reports 2010–2019.

⁶² Since immigration policies differ from country to country, and thus the documentation criteria also diverge, it is difficult to establish a uniform methodological approach worldwide. IOM tracks migration of all kinds, including displacement, in different regions of the world using the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). For an overview of estimates of irregular migration, see UNHCR: Mediterranean Situation: <https://t1p.de/o3ib>; IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM): <https://dtm.iom.int>; GMDAC (2020) Irregular Migration: Types of Migration; Rietig, V. (2019a) Der Disput um nicht-autorisierte Migranten: Deutschland braucht eine Strategie, keine Panikmache.

⁶³ Frontex (2020) Risk Analysis for 2020.

Irregular migration across the sea is extremely dangerous: In the last decade, the Mediterranean Sea has been the world's deadliest border. Initiated after boat accidents off the Italian island of Lampedusa in October 2013, IOM's Missing Migrants Project aims to record the numbers of dead and missing persons on migration routes worldwide.⁶⁴ From 2014 to 2020, more than 20,000 people drowned while trying to reach Europe via the Mediterranean Sea or the Canary Islands (→ Tab. 2).⁶⁵

In summary, trends 4 and 5 show that the number of asylum applications and irregular migration in the EU can be reduced with a restrictive border policy.⁶⁶ However, this does not achieve a reduction in the underlying causes that complies with human rights.

Table 1: Irregular attempts to enter via the Mediterranean, 2014 to 2020⁶⁷

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Entire (2014–2020)
Spain (including the Canary Islands)	4,552	5,312	8,162	22,103	58,569	26,168	40,326	124,866
Italy	170,100	153,842	181,436	119,369	23,370	11,471	34,154	693,742
Greece	41,038	856,723	173,450	29,718	32,494	59,726	9,714	1,202,863
Total	215,690	1,015,877	371,210	171,190	114,433	97,365	84,194	2,021,471

Table 2: Recorded deaths and missing persons in the Mediterranean, 2014 to 2020⁶⁸

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Entire (2014–2020)
Eastern Mediterranean Route	59	803	434	62	174	71	104	1,707
Central Mediterranean Route	3,165	3,149	4,581	2,853	1,314	1,262	983	17,307
Western Mediterranean Route	96	102	128	224	811	552	330	2,243
Total	3,320	4,054	5,143	3,139	2,299	1,855	1,417	21,257

⁶⁴ See IOM: Missing Migrants Project: <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/about>.

⁶⁵ See UNHCR: Mediterranean Situation: <https://t1p.de/o3ib>.

⁶⁶ Knaus, G. (2020), p. 37 et seq.

⁶⁷ Source: UNHCR: Mediterranean Situation: <https://t1p.de/o3ib>.


⁶⁸ Source: IOM Missing Migrants Mediterranean, Deaths by Route: <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean>.

What drives people into displacement and irregular migration?

2



Fig. 5: The most important factors for displacement and irregular migration



Source: own research

War, persecution, hardship or a lack of prospects – these are the most familiar causes of displacement, and are often cited by those seeking protection as the reason for their flight. However, there is often more than just one reason why people leave their home regions or countries. The causes of displacement and irregular migration are far more complex.⁶⁹ Therefore, to mitigate them, one must not only understand the reasons

that drive people to set out for an uncertain future, but also understand how different factors interact with and reinforce each other.

Some causes are structural and long-lasting, such as economic hardship, social inequality, environmental degradation, non-transparent and ineffective state structures, and poor governance. Others are acute, such as a precipitous economic collapse, a major outbreak of violence, or a natural disaster. Developments such as climate change can fundamentally alter dynamics. In the short term, the Covid-19 pandemic has led to fewer people leaving their homes because borders have been

⁶⁹ For a more in-depth discussion of migration causes and their interplay, cf. Kuhnt, S. (2019) Literature Review: Drivers of Migration. Why Do People Leave Their Homes? Is There an Easy Answer? A Structured Overview of Migratory Determinant; IOM (2018) Enabling a Better Understanding of Migration Flows (and Its Root-Causes) From Iraq Towards Europe.

closed and transport routes disrupted. In the medium and long term, it is expected that the economic consequences of the current pandemic in particular will further increase the pressure to emigrate.

Ultimately, however, it is mostly inequalities that trigger or promote displacement or irregular migration, disparities in every respect: In terms of stability, security and risks to life and limb, in terms of prosperity and quality of life, access to education and development opportunities.

Figure 5 provides an overview of what the Commission considers to be the most important factors for displacement and irregular migration, which this chapter discusses individually, but always with a view to the complex interplay between them. No clear hierarchy of the reasons that lead people to leave their homes can be derived. The decision also depends on individual, family and social factors, including level of education, age and individual personality traits such as courage or ambition.⁷⁰

2.1 Armed conflicts and persecution

As described in chapter 1.3, many displacement movements are triggered by violent conflicts. The fact that people are displaced is not exclusively a consequence or side effect of armed conflicts. Displacement is also used as a strategy in armed conflicts.⁷¹ Human rights violations, such as the systematic persecution of individuals or groups and repression by authoritarian regimes, represent another crucial reason for displacement and migration. Repression and violent conflicts are often interdependent.⁷²

⁷⁰ Kuhnt, S. (2019).

⁷¹ Hägerdal, N. (2019) Ethnic Cleansing and the Politics of Restraint: Violence and Coexistence in the Lebanese Civil War; Ibanez, A. (2009) Forced Displacement in Colombia: Magnitude and Causes; Lichtenheld, A. (2020) Explaining Population Displacement Strategies in Civil Wars: A Cross-National Analysis; Steele, A. (2018) IDP Resettlement and Collective Targeting During Civil Wars: Evidence from Colombia.

⁷² Müller-Koné, M., Schmitz-Pranghe, C. and Schetter, C. (2017) Flucht und Binnenvertreibung in Asien: Ansatzpunkte für und Grenzen der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, p. 11; Schraven, B., Trautner, B., Leininger, J. et al. (2015) How can development policy help to tackle the causes of flight?

Intrastate and interstate conflicts

Conflicts within a state, including those involving external actors (“internationalised intrastate conflicts”), play a particularly decisive role in displacement.⁷³ The number of armed insurgencies, civil wars and other violent conflicts has long been far higher than the number of interstate wars in the traditional sense.⁷⁴ Many conflicts now involve non-state actors. These include armed groups such as militia, gangs, and drug cartels.⁷⁵ The number of conflicts involving nonstate actors rose sharply between 2010 and 2018. They are increasingly claiming more fatalities – even amongst the civilians. Criminal violence, high murder rates, assaults, or kidnappings displace people within the state or across borders in some regions of the world.⁷⁶ Lastly, the economic and social consequences of violent conflict drive people into displacement: Their livelihoods are destroyed, and health or education services are limited, no longer available, or no longer accessible.

Displacement in the course of long-lasting and cyclically resurgent violent conflicts often means that those affected are forced to remain in their place of refuge for a long time and, if necessary, to migrate further. Cases of protracted displacement have increased in recent years, as has their duration.⁷⁷ This is the case, for example, for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, for members of various ethnic groups from Myanmar on the Thai-Myanmar border, in North East India and Bangladesh (→ **Box 5**), for South Sudanese refugees in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya (→ **Box 4**), and Venezuelans in Colombia and other countries in South America (→ **Box 7**).⁷⁸ Studies indicate that displacement triggered by civil war increase the risk of violent conflicts

⁷³ Weiner, M. (1996) *Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry Into the Causes of Refugee Flows*; Weiner, M. and Münz, R. (1997) *Migration, Flucht und Außenpolitik*, p. 212.

⁷⁴ BICC, PRIF, IFSH et al. (2020) *Peace Report 2020: In the Shadow of the Pandemic: Europe’s Last Chance*, p. 48 f.

⁷⁵ Kan, P. (2011) *Mexico’s “Narco-Refugees”: The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security*; Bridgen, N. (2012) *Like a War: The New Central American Refugee Crisis*, p. 7–11.

⁷⁶ BICC, PRIF, IFSH et al. (2020), p. 48 f.

⁷⁷ According to a UNHCR definition, which should, however, only be understood as a rough guideline, a situation of “protracted displacement” exists if 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality have been living in the host country for at least five consecutive years. See UNHCR (2009) *Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations*.

⁷⁸ UNHCR (2019) *Funding Update Global Overview*: <https://www.unhcr.org/Seddeb394>; Rudolf, M. and Schmitz-Pranghe, C. (2018) *Beyond Aid: The Continuous Struggle to Cope With Displacement in Myanmar and Thailand*; on Palestinian refugees, see www.unrwa.org.

at the place of refuge. In particular, the prolonged presence of large numbers of refugees can lead to infrastructure and supply bottlenecks for the local population and to shifts in the ethnic and religious

Box 4

Persistent displacement from South Sudan

The civil war over South Sudan's independence lasted decades. In contrast, the post-independence peace in 2011 lasted only two years. After a civil war broke out within South Sudan in 2013, a peace agreement was reached in 2015, which – after new disputes broke out in the summer of 2016 – was finally renewed in September 2018. Currently, the peace process based on the agreement is being shaken by local violence in many places. The insecurity associated with this violence is causing more people to flee their homes or preventing the return of those who have already fled.

The civil war not only led to the loss of livelihoods for many people and to displacement. The country has been deeply divided ever since and is dominated by local armed groups in many places. The outbreaks of violence associated with the entire conflict triggered massive displacement within the country and in neighbouring countries. The refugee camps in northern Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya are now among the largest of their kind in the world.⁷⁹ In many places, refugees have returned to the same camps and refugee settlements where they had sought protection several times before. Some have lived in the camps for decades. In South Sudan, not only are the prospects for a sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons currently dim, but extreme weather events such as floods (2020), droughts, and spurs of the locust plague (2020), in addition to the Covid-19 pandemic, are further exacerbating the situation in the country.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Hale, E. (2020) The 7 Largest Refugee Camps in the World; Strochlic, N. (2019) In Uganda, a Unique Urban Experiment Is Under Way; UNHCR (2019a) Ethiopia: Fact Sheet, February 2019.

⁸⁰ UNHCR: South Sudan Refugee Crisis Explained: <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/south-sudan-refugee-crisis-explained/>.

composition, thus causing or fuelling conflicts or resulting in secondary displacement. The refugees themselves may be fleeing violent conflicts, but if they belong to one of the conflict parties, they can use their networks to fuel the existing conflict in their country of origin or carry it into the host country.⁸¹

Germany has increasingly acknowledged its international responsibility in recent years and is involved in a number of conflict resolution processes. Examples include Colombia, Ukraine and Libya. In other countries, it supports governments in the fight against extremist terrorist groups, for example in Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali. Germany has also recently become much more restrictive in its arms exports. Nevertheless, German weapons continue to be found in the hands of repressive regimes and war and conflict parties that fuel conflicts and spread violence. German arms deliveries can thus potentially contribute to prolonged and more intense conflicts and thus increase displacement.⁸²

Violations of international humanitarian law as a means of warfare

Armed conflicts are often characterised by targeted and serious violations of the protective norms of international humanitarian law applicable in these conflicts.⁸³ Such rights infringements include direct attacks on civilians, mass executions, targeted destruction of important civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, abduction or forced recruitment, ill-treatment and torture, sexual violence and (sexual) slavery, especially of girls and women, and systematic displacement. Sexualised violence is used worldwide to intimidate the civilian

⁸¹ Bohnet, H. (2015) Risky Locations: Refugee Settlement Patterns and Conflict; Salehyan I. and Gleditsch, K. (2006) Refugees and the Spread of Civil War; Mogire, E. (2011) Victims as Security Threats: Refugee Impact on Host State Security in Africa.

⁸² For example, Bickel, M. (2017) Die Profiteure des Terrors. Wie Deutschland an Kriegen verdient und arabische Diktaturen stärkt. Hüllinghorst, Y. and Roll, S. (2020) German Arms Exports and the Militarisation of Arab States' Foreign Policies.

⁸³ ICRC (2019a) International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Recommitting To Protection In Armed Conflict On The 70th Anniversary Of The Geneva Conventions; UN Security Council (2020) Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General; Schetter, C. (2020).

population, humiliate opponents and destroy the social cohesion of society.⁸⁴

The conflicts in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and South Sudan bear witness to this. Here, serious violations of international humanitarian law are occurring on a large scale and often in a systematic manner, such as direct attacks on civilian objects, starvation of the civilian population, or the use of chemical weapons. Several conflicts are further exacerbated by the fragmentation of non-state armed groups and the involvement of third countries.⁸⁵ Systematic disregard for international humanitarian law and related crimes, particularly genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (Art. 5 Sec. 1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ICC), can fuel the decision to escape.⁸⁶

Even when refugees have escaped violence in their country of origin, they are often not yet safe. Violations of refugee or human rights also occur in the course of displacement and in refugee shelters and camps. This includes, for example, systematically obstructing humanitarian assistance to refugees, impeding access to health care, or forcing refugees to relocate to unsafe areas. Violations of international humanitarian law and refugee law (→ **Chap. 2.7**) further exacerbate the plight of refugees and increase the likelihood of secondary displacement.

Political persecution

Political persecution is on the rise worldwide. According to the latest data from Civicus Monitor, a platform of international civil society organisations, 87 percent of the world's population currently lives in 114 countries where freedom of expression, assembly and association are restricted or suppressed

– or do not exist at all. The latter is more prevalent in countries in the Middle East and Africa.⁸⁷ Overall, restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly and limitations on the rule of law have increased in recent years, even in once-stable democratic systems.⁸⁸ Information – including that disseminated through social media – is increasingly becoming subject to censorship.⁸⁹

In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, already repressive governments in particular have taken the opportunity to further restrict citizens' freedoms, especially freedom of assembly and information.⁹⁰ Algeria and Nicaragua, but also democracies such as India, have restricted press freedom under the pretext of preventing false reporting and scaremongering.⁹¹ In Uganda, the police have also taken action against people with same-sex or diverse sexual orientation or gender identity as part of the lockdown surveillance.⁹² This population group is considered criminal in Uganda, as in many other countries, and is also persecuted in some countries that have no legal basis for this (→ **also subsection on “Gender-related persecution”**).⁹³

When restrictions on these freedoms, political discrimination and persecution make living conditions difficult or even threaten the safety of life and limb, the only way out for those affected is often to escape.

⁸⁴ Ahram, A. (2019) Sexual Violence, Competitive State Building, and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; Akhtar, R. (2019) The Neglected Boys of War: Trapped in a Vicious Cycle of Slavery and Sexual Abuse; Baaz, M. and Stern, M. (2013) Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond; Wieringen, K. van (2020) To Counter the Rationality of Sexual Violence: Existing and Potential Policies Against the Genocidal Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the Democratic Republic of Congo, p. 8; Sverdlov, D. (2017) Rape in War: Prosecuting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and Boko Haram for Sexual Violence against Women; Tubiana, J. (2005) Le Darfour, un conflit identitaire?

⁸⁵ ICRC (2019a).

⁸⁶ ICRC (2019b) Displacement in Times of Armed Conflict: How International Humanitarian Law Protects in War and Why It Matters.

⁸⁷ See Civicus: World Map, Monitor: <https://monitor.civicus.org/>.

Compared with the previous year, the situation has deteriorated than improved in many countries: Eleven countries were downgraded by one category, including Niger, the Philippines and Iraq, and only two were upgraded (Sudan and DR Congo).

⁸⁸ Donner, S. (2020) Widerstand gegen Demokratieabbau und autoritäre Herrschaft wächst – Globale Entwicklungen Demokratie.

⁸⁹ Pew Research Center (2019) A Closer Look at How Religious Restrictions Have Risen Around the World.

⁹⁰ See International IDEA: Global Monitor of Covid-19's impact on Democracy and Human Rights: <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices/#/indices/world-map>.

⁹¹ Countries with fake news regulations, see IPI Covid-19: Number of Media Freedom Violations by Region: <https://ipi.media/covid19-media-freedom-monitoring/>.

⁹² Civicus (2020) Civic Freedoms and the Covid-19 Pandemic: A Snapshot of Restrictions and Attacks.

⁹³ UNO Refugee Aid (2021) LGBTQI – when sexual orientation or gender identity compels displacement; see ilga world: Maps – Sexual Orientation Laws: <https://ilga.org/maps-sexual-orientation-laws>.

Religiously and ethnically motivated persecution

According to the Pew Research Centre, in 2018 there were high or even significant government restrictions on freedom of religion and belief in 56 countries, i.e. around a quarter of all countries. In 53 countries, people experienced social exclusion or significant hostility because of their religious affiliation.⁹⁴ Particular dangers arise from, inter alia, blasphemy laws, which are often aimed at restricting the rights of religious, non-denominational or atheist population groups in the respective country. More than 70 countries around the world have corresponding laws in various forms.⁹⁵ Laws that prohibit the change from one religion to another (conversion) or the abandonment of religion (apostasy) are often directed against religious or other minorities.⁹⁶ Restrictions on freedom of religion and belief often occur in conjunction with severe restrictions on other human rights, such as freedom of expression or gender equality.⁹⁷ Violence, forced displacement or threats of forced conversion restrict freedom of religion and belief, especially when groups based on a religious ideology are involved in internal armed conflicts. Violations of the human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as well as religiously motivated intolerance, discrimination or violent attacks often lead to displacement (→ **Box 5**).⁹⁸

Gender-related persecution

The spectrum of gender-based violence is broad. According to the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), it includes rape and female genital mutilation (FGM), dowry-related violence, domestic and sexual violence, trafficking, and other human rights violations such as forced sterilisation, abortion, and marriage. All of these are acts that cause psychological and physical suffering and are used

Box 5

Ethnic-religious discrimination and violence in Myanmar

The example of Myanmar illustrates that causes of displacement cannot usually be clearly separated from one another. Many ethnic groups in the country have been fighting for autonomy, in some cases militantly, since independence in 1948. The government has systematically marginalised these groups for decades and denied them civil rights; it strives for religious-cultural unity, centralised control and security. The ethno-religious conflicts in Myanmar have, among other things, economic aspects: Deliberate neglect is resulting in poverty and underdevelopment, and access to land and raw materials is often at stake.⁹⁹ Armed conflicts and military attacks are occurring repeatedly. Hundreds of thousands of people have fled.

Serious human rights violations have particularly affected the majority Muslim Rohingya in northern Rakhine State.¹⁰⁰ In 1982, they were declared stateless by law.¹⁰¹ The Myanmar army responded with massive violence following a 2017 attack on military posts by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), an armed group from among the Rohingya. More than 870,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh and have not been able to return home to date.¹⁰²

⁹⁴ Pew Research Center (2020) In 2018, Government Restrictions on Religion Reach Highest Level Globally in More Than a Decade: Authoritarian Governments Are More Likely to Restrict Religion.

⁹⁵ FFO and BMZ (2020) The Federal Government's Second Report on the Global Status of Freedom of Religion: Reporting period 2018 to 2019, p. 15.

⁹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 31 et seq.

⁹⁷ Cf. Reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Ahmed Shaheed of 5 March 2019 (A/HRC/40/58) and of 24 August 2020 (A/HRC/43/48), see UN (2019) Freedom of Religion or Belief – Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief; UN (2020a) Gender-Based Violence and Discrimination in the Name of Religion or Belief: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief.

⁹⁸ Cf. FFO (2016) Bericht der Bundesregierung zur weltweiten Lage der Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit; GBC and EKD (2017) Ökumenischer Bericht zur Religionsfreiheit von Christen weltweit: Das Recht auf Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit: Bedrohungen – Einschränkungen – Verletzungen.

⁹⁹ Kivimäki, T. and Pasch, P. (2009) The Dynamics of Conflict in the Multiethnic Union of Myanmar: PCIA – Country Conflict-Analysis Study, p. 21, p. 44 f.

¹⁰⁰ UN General Assembly, Resolution 73/264 of 22 January 2019 (UN General Assembly of 22 December 2018); UN General Assembly (2018a) Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar.

¹⁰¹ See Human Rights Watch: Rohingya: <https://www.hrw.org/tag/rohingya>.

¹⁰² See UNHCR: Refugee Response in Bangladesh: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar_refugees.

by state and non-state actors alike.¹⁰³ Gender-related persecution also includes discrimination based on gender, such as bans on girls' education, or on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity (LGBTTIQ¹⁰⁴), especially when the state cannot protect those affected from exclusion or assault or deliberately tolerates discrimination.¹⁰⁵

The situation for girls and women in crises and conflict areas is particularly serious, as existing patterns of violence and exploitation are usually exacerbated here, with serious consequences for physical and mental integrity, ensuring means of subsistence or access to education. Time and again, women and LGBTTIQ persons leave their home countries due to gender-related violence and persecution – and are not spared from this even during their displacement.¹⁰⁶

2.2 Failing governments and state institutions

Lack of protection against injustice, persecution and violence

Avoiding violence and resolving social conflicts without resorting to violence is the core task of governments and state institutions. It is also the responsibility of the state to protect the population from persecution and violence in times of conflict as well as in times of peace and to assert human rights. Governments that disregard their human rights obligations contribute significantly to migration and displacement. This is also the case when human rights violations and crimes are not punished or when the state does not enforce its monopoly on the use of force against armed non-state groups or criminal organisations such as drug cartels –

either because it is unable to do so, because it does not want to, or because it is itself involved.¹⁰⁷

Weak state efficiency and mismanagement

Political stability is essentially based on the acceptance of the state and its institutions by the population. In many countries of origin of refugees and irregular migrants, however, the basic conditions for this are lacking. In some places, heads of state have come to power through electoral manipulation or coups, or they change the constitution to circumvent term limits; such governments lack legitimacy.

Ultimately, the acceptance of government and state institutions by the population depends to a large extent on whether they provide basic services and infrastructure and convey the feeling that their actions are geared to the welfare of the people. In countries where this is not the case – where people are denied access to medical care and schools, to energy and drinking water, for example, and where they cannot be sure of always being able to feed themselves adequately – political stability is at risk. In these situations, price increases for food, electricity or public transport regularly lead to riots, with which people want to draw attention to precarious supply situations (→ [Chap. 2.3](#)).¹⁰⁸ Existing or emerging armed conflicts over land, droughts and other climate-related extreme events, or international food crises can exacerbate the supply situation and jeopardise social protection – and thus also the conditions for people to stay in their home country. Often, mismanagement and non-transparent allocation of state resources, which disregards social needs, impair basic provision. Inefficient and corrupt systems generate comparatively low tax revenues, resulting in a lack of funds for urgently needed infrastructure investments and public services.¹⁰⁹ Development or investment funds disproportionately often do

¹⁰³ UNHCR (2002) UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-based persecution in the context of Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, p. 4, p. 6.

¹⁰⁴ Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, transsexual, intersex and queer (LGBTTIQ).

¹⁰⁵ Weinbrenner, S. (2015) Geschlechtsspezifische Verfolgung; Rabe, H. (2018) Geschlechtsbezogene Verfolgung – Rechtlicher Schutz; UNICEF (2020) Child Marriage: Child Marriage Is a Violation of Human Rights, but Is All Too Common.

¹⁰⁶ Çalışkan, p. (2018) Warum Frauen fliehen: Ursachen, Bedingungen und politische Perspektiven; BAMF (2020c) Rückzugsort und Austausch für geflüchtete LSBTTIQ Menschen: Internationaler Tag gegen Homophobie.

¹⁰⁷ Kuhnt, S. (2019).

¹⁰⁸ BBC (2019) Zimbabwe Protests after Petrol and Diesel Price Hike; Dufumier, M. and Hugon, P. (2008) Piques et polémiques les „Emeutes de la faim“: Du sous investissement agricole à la crise sociopolitique; Smith, T. (2013) Food Price Spikes and Social Unrest in Africa.

¹⁰⁹ Akitoby, B., Honda, J. and Primus, K. (2020) Tax Revenues in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States – Why Are They Low and How Can We Raise Them?

not reach the places where they are needed.¹¹⁰ Under such conditions, it is hardly possible to sustainably strengthen the economy and create

Box 6

Fragile states

Fragile states are those in which various structural deficits come together. These include the inability or unwillingness of the state to enforce its monopoly on the use of force and to provide for the needs of the population. These aspects are mutually dependent and usually go hand in hand with disregard for human rights, corruption, poverty and inequality. If the state is unwilling or unable to resolve societal conflicts institutionally, and these conflicts become acute due to state fragility, there is a risk that they will be resolved violently.

The fragility indices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Fund for Peace assess these and other indicators. Yemen, Somalia and South Sudan top the global negative ranking. Extremely fragile states have high scores on indicators such as “societal division”, “influence of external actors”, “refugees and internally displaced persons,” and “demographic pressure.” Syria, Haiti, Iraq, Chad and DR Congo, as well as Afghanistan, also fall into this category.¹¹¹

According to the OECD, nearly a quarter of the world’s population and more than three quarters of the world’s extremely poor were living in fragile countries or areas in 2020. The Covid-19 pandemic is further exacerbating the situation for these people (→ **Spotlight – Covid-19**).¹¹²

jobs. Poor governance thus not only undermines the population’s trust in the state and its institutions. It also reduces the chances of sustainable socioeconomic development – and exacerbates the lack of economic prospects, especially among young people (→ **Chap 2.3**).¹¹³ Developments in Venezuela are a current example of how mismanagement and loss of legitimacy by a government lead people to seek refuge abroad (→ **Box 7**).

2.3 Lack of economic and social prospects

Whether people see a future for themselves and their families in their home country depends to a large extent on economic prosperity and the possibility of securing or improving their own livelihoods. Considerable differences in prosperity play a significant role in global migration. These differences are found both between regions within a country and among neighbouring countries, but above all between industrialised and less developed countries. One indicator of the economic gap between rich and poor is the per capita gross domestic product (GDP): On average, it is around twelve times higher in the EU than in sub-Saharan Africa and about seven times higher than the average in South Asia.¹¹⁴

The extent of inequality between countries is also illustrated by the Human Development Index (HDI), which is used annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to assess the development status of countries on a scale from zero to a maximum of one. In addition to average life expectancy, the average duration of education and standard of living are included in the index. In 2019, the countries in sub-Saharan Africa achieved, on average, an HDI score of 0.55, Afghanistan 0.51 and Yemen 0.47. By comparison: Germany came close to the highest score at 0.95.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ Christensen C., Ojomo, E. and Dillon, K. (2019) Das Wohlstandsparadox: Warum klassische Entwicklungshilfe scheitert und wie innovative Ideen Hoffnung geben, p. 221; AfDB and GFI (2013) Illicit Financial Flows and the Problem of Net Resource Transfers from Africa 1980–2009; UN ECA (2015) Illicit Financial Flow: Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa; Countess, I. (2019) Illicit Financial Flows Thwart Human Rights and Development in Africa; Bafana, B. (2017) Can Africa Slay Its Financial Hydra?

¹¹¹ Cf. The Fund for Peace Fragile States Index indicators: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/data/>; The Fund for Peace Fragile States Index data: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/>; in contrast, the OECD (2020a) States of Fragility report measures five dimensions of fragility: Economy, ecology, politics, security and society.

¹¹² OECD (2020a), p. 17.

¹¹³ Rosenthal, J. (2020) Autobahn und Feldweg. Die widersprüchliche Entwicklung afrikanischer Volkswirtschaften, p. 85; see Mo Ibrahim Foundation: Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG): <https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag>.

¹¹⁴ See World Bank: GDP per Capita: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD>

¹¹⁵ UNDP (2020) Human Development Report 2020: The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene, p. 244.

Box 7

The development in Venezuela

The situation in Venezuela has been deteriorating steadily for years. Poor governance, clientelism and corruption have led to 76 percent of Venezuelans in this resource-rich country living below the poverty line.¹¹⁶ There is neither a functioning social protection system nor basic health care. Even basic food commodities are scarce. In 2011, Venezuela had a gross domestic product of 353 billion U.S. dollars; in 2020, the figure was only about 49 billion.¹¹⁷

Many people have left the country due to the desolate economic situation or the political repression of the Venezuelan regime. More than five million people have fled to neighbouring countries since 2017, many of whom do not possess a legal residence status there. Never before have neighbouring countries around the world taken in so many refugees in such a short time – the Venezuelan refugee crisis is second only to the Syrian one in the world.¹¹⁸

Nearly two million Venezuelans have found protection in Colombia alone.¹¹⁹ Chile, Ecuador and Peru have also taken in large numbers of people and are faced with the task of providing for them, integrating them and offering them a perspective, knowing that the exodus from Venezuela will continue.¹²⁰ Some of the people are seeking refuge in Europe, which is why the number of asylum applications in Spain has recently increased significantly (→ Chap 1.3, Fig. 2 and 4).

Fig. 6: Emigration from Venezuela since 2015



Source: Data from IOM (2020a); Figure derived from KAF: <https://www.kas.de/de/armut-und-flucht>¹²¹

¹¹⁶ IMC (2020) Venezuela Complex Emergency Situation Report #12, September 24, 2020.

¹¹⁷ See IMF (2020) World Economic Outlook: A Long and Difficult Ascent; International Monetary Fund: GDP, current prices: <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEO/WORLD/CHN/VEN>; see also Venezuela: Gross domestic product (GDP) in current prices from 1984 to 2022: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/370937/gross-domestic-product-gdp-in-venezuela/>.

¹¹⁸ See UNO: Emergency aid for refugees from Venezuela: <https://www.uno-fluechtlingshilfe.de/hilfe-weltweit/venezuela/>; UNO: Number of refugees: <https://www.uno-fluechtlingshilfe.de/informieren/fluechtlingszahlen/>; UNHCR: Venezuela situation: <https://www.unhcr.org/venezuela-emergency.html>. People from Venezuela are recorded separately by UNHCR, not as refugees with UNHCR status (→ Chapter 1.3).

¹¹⁹ See UNO: Kolumbien: Gewaltsame Konflikte bedrohen die Bevölkerung: <https://www.uno-fluechtlingshilfe.de/hilfe-weltweit/kolumbien/>.

¹²⁰ See Monteiro da Costa, M. and Silveira Correa, M. (2020) Coronavirus and Securitization of Migration in South America: The Venezuelan Journey.

¹²¹ IOM (2020a) Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Situation: IOM Regional Response Overview (July–September 2020); the figures differ slightly from those of the UNHCR (cf. Fig. 2).

Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, it was clear that important development goals would be difficult to achieve in many countries because of increasing violent conflicts, geopolitical tensions, growing disparities, rising public debt and intensifying trade disputes.¹²² However, it is often not the poorest who set out in the hope of a better future. For this, certain prerequisites must be fulfilled: Access to information about migration routes and potential destination countries, contacts and networks, and sufficient financial resources. Many scientific studies indicate that migration can increase in poorer countries when development progress is made and income opportunities and educational levels improve. After a certain income threshold the willingness to migrate decreases again due to improved prospects in the home country. However, there is an intensive academic discourse in recent literature on the validity of this relationship, which is referred to as the “migration hump”.¹²³

Macroeconomic conditions

In the discussion about the economic drivers of irregular migration and displacement, two interrelated problems play an important role at the macroeconomic level: First, the dependence of many developing countries on commodity exports, with low added value and a lack of economic diversification and second, the impact of international trade relations. Both may slow down development and ultimately convey a lack of economic prospects.

Many developing and emerging countries have considerable wealth in mineral resources and other raw materials, which are essential for the production in industrial nations. Nevertheless, countries with rich deposits of these raw materials often show lower economic growth and higher income inequality than countries without

these resources.¹²⁴ The revenues that can be generated from the sale of metals, minerals, and also timber and agricultural goods can fuel negative developments and conflicts.¹²⁵ The blessing of raw materials can become a curse when

- › authoritarian regimes, supported by various interest groups from within and outside the country, control access to resources
- › only a few individuals, groups or foreign corporations benefit from the revenues
- › profits are used to equip security forces or militias to secure access to resources, rather than to develop infrastructure, schools or the social system
- › mining is accompanied by land grabbing and the destruction of natural livelihoods

Poor governance, corruption and conflicts over the distribution of these resources may then lead to a catastrophic dynamic that is difficult to break and can lead to violent conflicts. A comparison of developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Botswana shows that there are other ways to deal with these problems (→ **Box 8**).¹²⁶

The focus on raw material exports causes many developing countries to be heavily dependent on international raw material prices, which are often highly volatile. The lower economic activity associated with the Covid-19 pandemic, for example, led to a temporary slump in oil prices.¹²⁷ The dependence on raw material exports is also reflected in the structure of international trade flows.

In the global trade Africa in particular, but also large parts of Latin America, play only a marginal role for the EU, while for many African countries, especially the North African countries the EU is an important trading partner.¹²⁸ However, it is mainly raw materials and

¹²² The OECD report (2020a) shows that non-fragile states were well on track for 13 of the 17 goals before the Covid-19 pandemic. However, for fragile states, this was true for only four of the 17 goals.

¹²³ See for example, Angenendt, S., Martin-Shields, C. and Schraven, B. (2017) More Development – More Migration? The “Migration Hump” and Its Significance for Development Policy Co-operation with Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 4; Berthiaume, N., Leefmans, N., Oomes, N. et al. (2021) A Reappraisal of the Migration-Development Nexus: Testing the Robustness of the Migration Transition Hypothesis; Kuhnt, S. (2019), p. 10 f.; Natale, F., Migali, S. and Münz, R. (2018) Many More to Come? Migration From and Within Africa; Schneiderhannes, C. (2020) Migration and Development: Revisiting the Migration Hump.

¹²⁴ Sachs, J. and Warner, A. (2001) Natural Resources and Economic Development. The Curse of Natural Resources.

¹²⁵ Mabanza, B. (2018) Strategien imperialer Rohstoffsicherung in der EU-Politik.

¹²⁶ Bannon, I. and Collier, P. (2003) Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions.

¹²⁷ Commodity Markets Outlook (2020) A Shock Like No Other: The Impact of Covid-19 on Commodity Markets.

¹²⁸ WTO (2020) World Trade Statistical Review 2020, p. 14.

Box 8

What an abundance of natural resources can do – a tale of two African countries

Botswana, located in southern Africa, is rich in diamonds. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), in the heart of the continent, holds almost all raw materials of value on its territory, including the mineral coltan, which is needed for the manufacture of smartphones.

Botswana has developed steadily since its independence in 1966 and reached an HDI value of 0.73 in 2019. It realized an above-average economic growth resulting in a sharp drop in poverty. By contrast, the DR Congo scored only 0.48 on the HDI scale of zero to one.¹²⁹ The country is politically unstable and among the poorest in the world. It lacks roads and other basic infrastructure. Violent conflicts have been flaring up repeatedly in some regions for years, mostly over control of valuable raw materials or land. Frequent shootings, kidnappings, rapes and mutilations have forced hundreds of thousands to leave their villages over the past three decades.¹³⁰

A comparative study has analysed the reasons for the different development in the two countries. Botswana has a stable government oriented toward democratic values. It invests a large part of its revenues from the sale of gemstones in infrastructure, education and health. The comparatively homogeneous structure of its small population and low-conflict neighbourhood have supported this positive development.

In contrast, the desolate economic and social situation in the DR Congo can be traced back to conflicts about the allocation of its resources, the geographic proximity to conflict states and poor governance. Little has changed in terms of the latter since the Belgian colonial era: Even then, the local population was left with little or nothing of the wealth unearthed.¹³¹ After all, foreign influences on post-colonial developments are more pronounced in Congo than in Botswana because of its greater geopolitical importance. This factor is also noticeable in the management of natural resources.¹³²

unprocessed agricultural goods that are traded from the south to the north, while in the opposite direction mainly processed products are traded.

The reasons for these differences in trade structure are manifold. On the part of the EU, developing countries are granted tariff reductions on certain industrial products or processed agricultural products. For almost

20 years, the poorest and least developed countries, according to the classification of the United Nations, have enjoyed completely free access to the European market for almost all products except arms.¹³³ However, these benefits are partially offset by trade barriers. For example, exports to the EU must comply with labour and environmental standards as well as quality requirements for agricultural products. And the so-called preferential rules of origin prevent, for example, milk chocolate made in Africa using African cocoa, from being exported duty-free to the EU if it contains ingredients of a different origin, such as sugar from Brazil or milk powder from New Zealand.¹³⁴

¹²⁹ UNDP (2020).

¹³⁰ UNHCR (2018) DR Congo: Steigende Gewalt zwingt tausende Menschen zur Flucht; Ansong, N. (2020) Democratic Republic of the Congo. Federal Agency for Civic Education.

¹³¹ Schärer, K. (2016) Ressourcenreichtum als Fluch oder Segen. Umgang mit Rohstoffen und Folgen des Ressourcenreichtums in Botswana und Kongo.

¹³² Braeckman, C. (2008) Der Katanga-Boom. Kupfer und Kobalt locken Investoren in den Süden des Kongo; Jüssen, L. (2007) Kriegsökonomie in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo, p. 68–72, p. 88–94; Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (1998) Objekt der Begehrlichkeiten – Die Krise an den großen Seen, p. 34–36; Strizek, H. (2001) Externe Faktoren der zentralafrikanischen Staatskrise; Le Monde diplomatique (Publ.) (2009) Atlas der Globalisierung: Sehen und verstehen, was die Welt bewegt, p. 152; Bosse, M. (2020) Afrique. Minerais de sang et néocolonialisme en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC): Le conflit au Kivu, zone grise en proie à de cruciales rivalités géoéconomiques.

¹³³ Cf. Generalised System of Preferences and Special Arrangement for Least Developed Countries at BMWi: Generalised System of Preferences (GSP): <https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Aussenwirtschaft/zollabwicklung-allgemeines-zollpraferenzsystem-aps.html>

¹³⁴ Mari, F. (2018) Keine EU-Zölle für Afrikas Exporte: ein Schwindel?; Rudloff, B. and Schmiege, E. (2018) Afrikanische Entwicklung: Die EU-Handelspolitik wird es nicht richten können.

For a variety of reasons, many developing countries, are not able to market and process exportable raw materials locally to a sufficient extent. There is often a lack of suitable framework conditions such as investment security, training of skilled workers, reliable energy supply, and access to transport routes and technologies. As a result, the opportunity to create value and profits, to create jobs and to diversify the economy in the home country remain unused. In addition, corruption, legal uncertainty and poor governance are frequently cited as causes of low foreign direct investment in these countries.¹³⁵

Finally, African governments in particular have not yet succeeded in eliminating the deficits and restrictions in intraregional trade, which could open up markets and development prospects for them. Intra-African trade accounts for only 16 percent of the total African trade volume.¹³⁶ Again, reasons are manifold: political motives, weak transport infrastructures and the lack of diversification of the economy – which is not least a legacy of the colonial era and premature or poorly balanced market openings in the course of structural adjustment programmes.¹³⁷ A patchwork of trade rules and tariffs with trading partners such as the EU may further contribute to weak development prospects. To better exploit the intra-African potential, the African Union (AU) is striving for an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).¹³⁸ All AU member states except Eritrea have signed the respective trade agreement. The internal market of 1.3 billion people was officially launched on 1 January 2021, but has not yet been practically implemented as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. In Addition, some agreements are still negotiated, such as in the area of services.¹³⁹ For the AfCFTA-initiative to become a success, the aforementioned structural internal and external problems need to be addressed. Furthermore, non-African actors, such

as the EU, should support or at least not hinder the development of the AfCFTA.¹⁴⁰

Lack of employment opportunities – especially for young people

In the countries of origin of irregular migrants, youth unemployment is often above average.¹⁴¹ The strong population growth in many countries of the Global South (→ **Chap 2.4**) is leading to an enormous increase in the supply of labour. For example, up to 20 million young people enter Africa's labour markets every year.¹⁴² Local economic growth and the associated demand for labour are not sufficient to employ them. Moreover, many African economies are predominantly characterised by agriculture and the extraction of raw materials. By comparison, Asian developing and emerging economies are more industrialised and diversified.

Even if they are well-educated, jobseekers are usually left to work in the informal sector, i.e. in the low-paid service sector and in agriculture, without social protection in the event of illness or loss of employment, often under precarious working conditions and without employee rights. Women tend to be found more frequently in precarious informal employment than men.¹⁴³ The informal sector further includes many self-employed persons or microentrepreneurs.¹⁴⁴ In many cases, they trade on the street, work as unregistered taxi drivers or casual workers. Such informal jobs are particularly affected by the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁵ BDI (2014) BDI-Strategie Subsahara-Afrika: Chancenkontinent Afrika.

¹³⁶ Corden, W. M. and Neary, J. P. (1982) Booming Sector and De-Industrialisation in a Small Open Economy; Rudloff, B. and Schmiege, E. (2018); see also Trade Structure by Partner (intraregional trade): <https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/MerchandiseTrade/ByPartner.html>.

¹³⁷ Cf. WTO (2017) Africa and Development.

¹³⁸ See African Union – Goals & Priority Areas of Agenda 2063: <https://au.int/agenda2063/goals>.

¹³⁹ See African Union: African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): <https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/afcfta>; Schmiege, E. (2020) Die Afrikanische Freihandelszone: Perspektiven für Afrika und die europäische Politik.

¹⁴⁰ Mathe, T. (2020) African Free Trade Is Vital for Growth; Bowmans, (2020) The African Continental Free Trade Area: Development Accelerator or More of the Same?; World Bank (2020a) The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Angenendt, S. and Popp, S. (2012) Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in nordafrikanischen Ländern. Trends, Ursachen und Möglichkeiten für entwicklungspolitischen Handelns.

¹⁴² Abdychev, A., Alonso, C., Alper, E. et al. (2018) The Future of Work in Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 21; BMZ (2017a) Mehr Jobs und Einkommen in den ländlichen Räumen Afrikas; Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2019) Africa's Youth: Jobs or Migration, p. 32; IMF (2015) Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa: Navigating Headwinds, p. 25 f.

¹⁴³ ILO (2018) Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture, p. 20 f.

¹⁴⁴ ILO (2018).

¹⁴⁵ Schwettmann, J. (2020) Covid-19 and the informal economy. Impact and Response Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

One obstacle to the employment of young people in many places is the poor quality of professional training. Even though many young jobseekers have formal qualifications, their actual skills are often insufficient to meet the needs of companies. The main reason for this is a lack of practical relevance of professional training, in particular for technical occupations. Among other reasons, this is due to poorly endowed training centres and the fact that the needs of the private sector are not sufficiently taken into account in the respective curricula. In addition, even primary and secondary schools impart insufficient basic technical and scientific knowledge. Furthermore, young people prefer a university degree to vocational training.¹⁴⁶ This is even more true for the qualifications of young women, who are encouraged to pursue technical and mechanical training far less frequently than in Germany.

Unemployment and low and uncertain income opportunities provide a breeding ground for social unrest. If many young people have no long-term prospects of regular work and income, this can lead to domestic tensions, political radicalisation and violent conflicts. This was evident, for example, during the Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East. Persistently high youth unemployment can act as a trigger for migration, as demonstrated by the example of Pakistan (→ **Box 9**).¹⁴⁷

Weak rural development and food insecurity

More than half of the world's population lives in cities. In the least developed countries, however, the rural population still forms the majority. In 2019, 59 percent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa lived in rural areas, and 66 percent in South Asia.¹⁴⁸ For a large part of the rural population in these regions, agriculture, livestock farming, forestry and fishing form

¹⁴⁶ See for example, Angenendt, S. and Popp, S. (2012); Morsy, H. and Mukasa, A. N. (2019) Youth Jobs, Skill and Educational Mismatches in Africa, p. 43; AfDB (2020) African Economic Outlook 2020. Developing Africa's Workforce for the Future.

¹⁴⁷ Dibeh, G., Fakhri, A. and Marrouch, W. (2019) Labor Market and Institutional Drivers of Youth Irregular Migration in the Middle East and North Africa Region; Angenendt, S. and Popp, S. (2012); Angenendt, S. and Popp, S. (2015) Junge Menschen ohne Perspektive: Arbeitslosigkeit und Migrationsdruck in Nordafrika.

¹⁴⁸ World Bank: Urban Population: All Countries and Economies, Most Recent Value: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?most_recent_value_desc=true.

Box 9

Lack of economic and social prospects in Pakistan

With around 216 million people, Pakistan ranks sixth among the world's most populous countries. The population is further growing at two percent per year.¹⁴⁹ Every year, more than four million additional young people enter a labour market that offers scarce prospects.¹⁵⁰ In 2018, about 31 percent of 15- to 24-year-olds in Pakistan were involved neither in school education, nor in professional training, nor in employment.¹⁵¹ Of those in employment, more than 70 percent are engaged in the informal sector, particularly in agriculture. In rural areas in particular, a high proportion of the working population are considered working poor, i.e. as employees whose income is insufficient to get them above the poverty line.¹⁵² The reasons for this situation are, among others, a low productivity in agriculture, unclear property rights and inefficient business organisation. The lack of labour rights leads, among other things, to exploitative working conditions, including child labour.

Many Pakistanis are therefore forced to leave their country and find employment abroad, to sustain their own and their families' living. Currently, about eleven million people from Pakistan live and work abroad, most of them in the Gulf States and the United Kingdom. This makes them the sixth largest diaspora in the world. Their remittances are essential for the Pakistani economy. Contrary to expectations, remittances increased by one percent to 9.1 percent of the GDP since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and reached 24 billion US dollars in 2020.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ See World Bank: Pakistan: <https://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan?view=chart>; World Bank: Population growth (annual %): <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>.

¹⁵⁰ UNDP (2017) Pakistan National Human Development Report: Unleashing the Potential of a Young Pakistan, p. 80.

¹⁵¹ See ILO: Pakistan: https://www.ilo.org/gateway/faces/home/countryHome?locale=EN&countryCode=PAK&_adf.ctrl-state=pggq3q0y8_4.

¹⁵² ILO (2016) Pakistan Decent Work Country Programme III – (2016–2020), p. 15 f.

¹⁵³ See The World Bank: Migration and Remittances Data: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data>.

the basis of their livelihoods. For example, in the least developed countries, an average of 55 percent of the workforce is employed in the agricultural sector, 52 percent in sub-Saharan Africa and 41 percent in South Asia. By comparison: In EU countries, farmers and their employees account for only four percent of the workforce.¹⁵⁴

Worldwide, 75 percent of the low-income population lives in rural areas. On average, they farm less than two hectares. The harvest is often only sufficient for subsistence or for a low income through sales.¹⁵⁵ Smallholder agriculture is usually not very productive. The reasons for this range from inadequate skills and a lack of access to new and adapted technologies for production and processing, to a lack of financing and insurance options.¹⁵⁶ Investments are often hindered by unclear and uncertain property rights and by land and water grabbing. In some places, large areas of land are sold to mostly foreign investors, who use them for industrial cultivation of export products, often resulting in the displacement of the local rural population.¹⁵⁷

In addition, international trade and financial market developments are having an increasing impact on local food prices – and thus also on the sales and income opportunities of smallholder farmers.¹⁵⁸ High population growth (→ **Chap 2.4**), environmental damage and increasingly noticeable effects of climate change, such as soil degradation and water scarcity (→ **Chap 2.5**),

as well as regional conflicts over land use, are further complicating the situation of the rural population.¹⁵⁹

Against this background, it is to be expected that the supply of food to the population, which is already not always guaranteed everywhere, will become more difficult in the future and that tensions will increase as a result.¹⁶⁰ Food shortages and the associated price increases can threaten the existence of poor social classes, lead to discontentment among the population, and even to governments being overthrown.¹⁶¹ The associated, often violent conflicts foster displacement.

Many rural dwellers are literally looking for new paths to improve their situation. Their adaptation strategies include seasonal, circular, and international migration, but often first of all migration to the cities. However, labour markets in urban agglomerations are already strained and unable to absorb the growing influx from the countryside. This can trigger additional international migration.

Concentrated poverty and lack of prospects in poor urban districts

The proportion of the world's population living in cities is steadily increasing. For 2030, the United Nations predicts an increase from around 56 percent today to 60 percent, and to 68 percent by 2050. The absolute number of people living in urban agglomerations worldwide is thus expected to rise from 4.2 billion (2018) to 6.9 billion (2050) in just three decades.¹⁶²

Urban agglomerations are growing primarily in the Global South. In Latin America, the current share of the urban population is already over 80 percent. In South Asia and Africa, it will exceed 50 percent by 2030.¹⁶³ Urbanisation is particularly rapid in these regions – which is also reflected in the rapid growth of the urban

¹⁵⁴ World Bank: Employment in Agriculture: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS>.

¹⁵⁵ FAO (2018) Transforming Food and Agriculture to Achieve the SDGs. 20 Interconnected Actions to Guide Decision-Makers, p. 3. The data on the share of smallholder farms in sub-Saharan Africa is an estimate. FAO (2019a) Main Results and Metadata by Country (2006–2015): World Programme for the Census of Agriculture 2010; AGRA (2017) Africa Agriculture Status Report: The Business of Smallholder Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa. The reports estimate 51 million small farms, of which 80 percent (41 million) are under two hectares in size. In most countries, the total number of small farms is increasing, see HLPE (2013) Investing in Smallholder Agriculture for Food Security; HLPE (2019) Agroecological and Other Innovative Approaches for Sustainable Agriculture and Food Systems that Enhance Food Security and Nutrition.

¹⁵⁶ Sütterlin, S., Reinig, A. and Klingholz, R. (2018) Nahrung, Jobs und Nachhaltigkeit. Was Afrikas Landwirtschaft leisten muss.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Daniel, S. and Mitta, A. (2009) The Great Land Grab: Rush for World's Farmland Threatens Food Security for the Poor; FAO (2019b) FAO Framework on Rural Extreme Poverty. Towards Reaching Target 1.1 of the Sustainable Development Goals; Heinrich Böll Foundation, Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland et al. (2017) Agrifood Atlas. Facts and figures about the corporations that control what we eat, p. 11.

¹⁵⁸ Braun, J. von (2015) Welternährung und Nachhaltigkeit. Herausforderungen und Strategien für das 21. Jahrhundert, p. 47–51.

¹⁵⁹ FAO (2016) Migration, Agriculture and Rural Development. Addressing the Root Causes of Migration and Harnessing Its Potential for Development, p. 8; Klingholz, R., Sütterlin, S., Kaps, A. et al. (2020a) Africa Leapfrogging. Sustainable Innovation in Health, Education and Agriculture.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. FAO (2019b); AGRA (2017), p. 9.

¹⁶¹ Johnstone, S. and Mazo, J. (2011) Global Warming and the Arab Spring; Angenendt, S. and Rudloff, B. (2011) Mehr als sieben magere Jahre? Nahrungsmittelkrisen und Hungerunruhen als neues politisches Risiko.

¹⁶² Ritchie, H. and Roser, M. (2018) Urbanization.

¹⁶³ UN DESA (2019a) World Urbanisation Prospects 2018; BMZ: Hintergrund: Das Zeitalter der Städte: <https://www.bmz.de/de/entwicklungspolitik/stadtentwicklung/hintergrund-18138>.

population in fragile states. Forecasts suggest that the average urban population in fragile states will grow from 43 percent at present to 48 percent by 2030, and even to 59 percent by 2050.¹⁶⁴ The urbanisation trend is not only reflected in the growth of large cities. In Africa in particular, medium-sized and small urban settlements are expected to experience high growth rates in the near future, due to both high birth rates and influxes from rural areas.¹⁶⁵

Urbanisation opens up opportunities, but also poses risks. Development deficits are concentrated in poor urban districts, compelling people into (further) displacement or into irregular migration. These deficits include cramped and poor housing conditions, violent crime, few professional and economic opportunities, high food insecurity and a lack of infrastructure. Rapid and unregulated urbanisation leads to extremely precarious living conditions, from which the urban poor try to escape, for example by migrating abroad.¹⁶⁶

2.4 Demographic pressure

The absolute number of international migrants has risen in recent decades in line with global population growth.¹⁶⁷ However, it is premature to assume that high population growth necessarily means more migration (for example, towards Europe). The relationship between demographic development and migration is much more complex, not least because of the many interactions with other factors influencing migration behaviour. In most cases, the demographic development has only an indirect impact on decisions to migrate – for example, because the growth of a population increases competition for water, land, food, jobs or access to health and education facilities. Demography is thus a subliminal, structural driver of migration that can never be considered independently of other factors that influence people's living conditions.¹⁶⁸

The highest population growth rates are currently being experienced by less developed countries. For example, the population figures of Afghanistan and Pakistan are expected to increase by a factor of about 1.5 by 2050. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the DR Congo and Tanzania, are likely to see their populations double by the middle of the century (→ Fig. 7).¹⁶⁹ The supply situation in these countries is already inadequate for many people. High population growth, coupled with the increasing effects of climate change (→ Chap 2.5), will further increase the pressure on natural resources and existing basic infrastructure in the future, unless national governments are able to take appropriate countermeasures.¹⁷⁰

In order to reduce the supply pressure and improve people's living conditions, the fertility rates in the countries concerned must fall. In the long term, this can only be achieved by expanding the health sector, by an efficient education sector and by better income opportunities. Women in particular must be able to experience greater participation in all aspects of social life. Experience shows that fertility rates fall in countries where women have equal rights and where they can decide for themselves how many children to have thanks to the availability of modern contraceptives.¹⁷¹ To date, hundreds of millions of women in developing countries have no access to modern methods of contraception.¹⁷² This is true even for the 200 million women who, according to studies, would like to prevent pregnancy. In addition, many governments lack the will to address demographic issues and family planning programmes.¹⁷³

However, if people's living conditions and income opportunities improve as a result of development progress, this can initially tend to promote migration, from rural to urban areas or even internationally (→ Chap. 2.3). If socioeconomic progress also causes fertility rates to fall, this will also bring about a change in the age structure of a society. As a result of the declining number of children, the focus of the population shifts to the

¹⁶⁴ OECD (2020a), p. 17.

¹⁶⁵ UN DESA (2019a); OECD, Sahel and West Africa Club (2020) Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics 2020.

¹⁶⁶ OECD (2020a), p. 34.

¹⁶⁷ IOM (2019b), p. 21 f.

¹⁶⁸ Castles, S., de Haas, H. and Miller, M. (2014) The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World.

¹⁶⁹ UN DESA (2019b) World Population Prospects 2019.


¹⁷⁰ Aresin, J., Carrasco Heiermann, A., Kaps, A. et al. (2019) Europa als Ziel? Die Zukunft der globalen Migration.

¹⁷¹ Kaps, A., Schewe, A. and Klingholz, R. (2019) Afrikas demografische Vorreiter. Wie sinkende Kinderzahlen Entwicklung beschleunigen.

¹⁷² Starrs, A., Ezeh, A., Barker, G. et al. (2018) Accelerate Progress—Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights for All.

¹⁷³ See for example, Kaps, A., Schewe, A. and Klingholz, R. (2019).

Fig. 7: Estimated worldwide population growth, in per cent, 2020 to 2050



	Population 2020 in million	Population 2050 in million	Population gains in million	Net migration rate* per 1,000 inhabitants 2015–2020
India	1,380	1,639	259	-0.4
Nigeria	206	401	195	-0.3
Pakistan	221	338	117	-1.1
DR Congo	89	194	105	0.3
Ethiopia	115	205	90	0.3
Tanzania	60	129	69	-0.7
Egypt	102	160	58	-0.4
Indonesia	273	331	58	-0.4

Source: UN DESA (2019b)

*The net migration rate describes the difference between and immigrants and emigrants within a period. The value is negative if more people emigrate than immigrate.

cohorts of young working age, i.e. the age at which the willingness to migrate is generally at its highest.¹⁷⁴

This age structure – a large number of working-age population with few children and older people to care for – is referred to as the “demographic bonus.” It offers the chance of a socioeconomic development boost, such as that experienced by Asian tiger economies, which have reaped the “demographic dividend.”¹⁷⁵ However, an important prerequisite for this is that the young working population is as well educated as possible and that sufficient jobs are available. The latter in particular poses considerable challenges for many countries. In the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, for example, the number of jobs rose only half as fast as the number of people in the labour force between 2011 and 2016.¹⁷⁶

Failure to get young people into employment, in particular, who have invested in their future with an education, can lead to discontentment. Instead of providing an economic advantage, the surplus of young working-age people then poses a threat to the political stability of a country (→ [Chap 2.3](#)).¹⁷⁷ Migration can be an important outlet in such a situation, as the emigration of many Europeans to North America in the 19th century shows.¹⁷⁸ However, if migration opportunities are limited, this can increase dissatisfaction and also the risk of unrest, conflicts and associated displacement.¹⁷⁹

It can be assumed that countries tend to become net migration countries, at least in the middle phase of their demographic development, when the proportion of young adults in the total population is high, i.e.,

more people emigrate than immigrate.¹⁸⁰ In contrast, when the population begins to age or even shrink due to persistently low numbers of children, the need for immigrants usually increases – as is also the case in Germany.¹⁸¹

2.5 Environmental degradation and climate change

Environmental degradation and climate change increasingly play an important role in international migration patterns. Like demographic pressures, they are mostly indirect and are not considered the primary cause of displacement and irregular migration. Long-term impacts of global warming and environmental degradation on the ground – for example, desertification – contribute to human displacement by expediting food insecurity and hunger, resource conflicts, and violence. Extreme weather events such as destructive storms and rising sea-levels can also directly trigger displacement. Data on the extent to which people leave their home countries due to environmental degradation, natural disasters and climate change is sparse. By contrast, there is a comparatively good amount of data available for natural disasters.¹⁸²

The industrialised nations are largely responsible for the profound change in the global climate, and increasingly the emerging economies as well. They continue to emit significantly more CO₂ per capita than developing countries. The latter contribute only a relatively small part of the emissions, mainly by clearing or burning forests.¹⁸³ Yet it is they who are particularly hard hit by the negative effects of global warming. In fragile states of the Mediterranean and the Sahel region, South Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific, impacts of climate change and environmental degradation combine to form complex constellations with local social and

¹⁷⁴ Hugo, G. (2011) Future Demographic Change and Its Interactions With Migration and Climate Change, S. 21 f.

¹⁷⁵ Canning, D., Sangeeta, R. and Yazbeck, A. (Publ.) (2015) Africa’s Demographic Transition. Dividend or Disaster?, p. 23 et seq.

¹⁷⁶ In sub-Saharan Africa alone, it would require the creation of around 20 million jobs annually. See Purfield, C., Finger, H., Ongley, K. et al. (2018) Opportunity for All: Promoting Growth and Inclusiveness in the Middle East and North Africa; Abdychew, A., Alonso, C., Alper, E. et al. (2018), p. 21.

¹⁷⁷ Urdal, H. (2004) The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950–2000; Müller, R., Sievert, S. and Klingholz, R. (2016) Crisis region Mena. Wie demografische Veränderungen die Entwicklung im Nahen Osten und Nordafrika beeinflussen und was das für Europa bedeutet; KOFF (2019) “Youth Bulge” or the question of whether young people jeopardise peace.

¹⁷⁸ Uebele, M. and Geis, W. (2016) Deutsche Einwanderung in den USA im 19. Jahrhundert.

¹⁷⁹ Urdal, H. (2004).

¹⁸⁰ Hugo, G. (2011), p. 21 f.

¹⁸¹ Slupina, M., Dähler, S., Reibstein, L. et al. (2019) Die demografische Lage der Nation. Wie zukunftsfähig Deutschlands Regionen sind.

¹⁸² An overview with sources can be found in Ionescu, D., Mokhnacheva, D. and Gemeine, F. (2017) The Atlas of Environmental Migration; see also Hoffmann, R., Dimitrova, A., Muttarak, A. et al. (2020) A Meta-Analysis of Country-Level Studies on Environmental Change and Migration; Schefran, J. (2017) Der Nexus aus Migration, Klimawandel und Konflikten.

¹⁸³ Scinexx (2007) Klimawandel: Entscheidende Rolle der Entwaldung bestätigt – Rodungen erzeugen rund 20 Prozent der menschlichen CO₂-Emissionen.

political conflicts, geopolitical tensions, and negative consequences of globalisation.¹⁸⁴

Two key aspects illustrate how environmental factors and climate change contribute to displacement: extreme natural events and resource degradation.

Natural disasters and extreme weather events

It is estimated that there were 5.1 million internally displaced persons worldwide at the end of 2019 due to earthquakes, hurricanes or floods, most of them in countries where people's livelihoods are already threatened by other factors.¹⁸⁵ Some have left their country of origin. Some of these events are influenced by climate change, which has caused extreme weather events to increase in frequency and severity in the recent past.¹⁸⁶ These events are particularly devastating when they occur in an environment already previously damaged by overexploitation, erosion, deforestation, or slash-and-burn agriculture.

Extreme heat waves and storms that bring heavy rain, flooding and landslides, causing immediate destruction and loss of life, predominantly affect poorer and very poor countries, sometimes periodically. Many of these are located in the tropics and subtropics, where cyclones tend to be more severe.¹⁸⁷ Of the ten countries worldwide that were most affected by acute extreme weather events between 2000 and 2019 in terms of damage caused and number of deaths, seven fell into the low-income developing country category: Myanmar, Haiti, the Philippines, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Pakistan and

Nepal.¹⁸⁸ Recent countries to suffer from such events include Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, India and Honduras (→ **Box 10**).¹⁸⁹

Fragile states, which often cannot even guarantee core state functions (→ **Box 6**), are hardly in a position to take precautions to protect the population and cope with the effects of such events.¹⁹⁰ If critical infrastructures, health and education facilities are damaged or destroyed, if the supply of water, food, energy is jeopardised and there is no speedy improvement in sight, this can lead to conflicts over scarce resources, intensify existing conflicts and trigger migration.¹⁹¹

Threats to vital natural resources

Global warming not only brings increased acute disasters, but also gradual changes that can threaten the food security and livelihoods of many people in the medium and long term and lead to resource conflicts. Rising sea levels pose the threat of flooding in settlements and on agricultural land, especially on small, flat islands, in river deltas and coastal areas. Scarcity of rainfall, prolonged and long-lasting periods of drought lower groundwater levels, increase erosion and degradation of even fertile soils and lead to harvest losses.¹⁹² Migration or temporary migration can then be a sensible adaptation strategy for the affected people.

In many places, these effects are exacerbated by environmental damage caused by overexploitation of ecosystems and unsustainable farming methods. In the tropics in particular, forests are being destroyed at

¹⁸⁴ Positive effects of globalisation should also be considered: This has contributed to a significant reduction in poverty. See, for example, Huwart, J. and Verdier, L. (2014) *Economic Globalisation: Origins and consequences*, especially Chapter 7: What is the impact of globalisation on the environment?

¹⁸⁵ IDMC (2020a), p. 2, p. 12. In 2019 alone, 24.9 million people were displaced at least temporarily from their original place of residence due to natural events.

¹⁸⁶ See BMU (2012) *Kernaussagen des IPCC Sonderberichtes: IPCC (2012) Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation*.

¹⁸⁷ Kossin, J. P., Knapp, K. R., Olander, T. L. et al. (2020) *Global Increase in Major Tropical Cyclone Exceedance Probability Over the Past Four Decades*; Dunne, D. (2020) *Major Tropical Cyclones Have Become '15% More Likely' Over Past 40 Years*.

¹⁸⁸ Eckstein, D., Künzel, V. and Schäfer, L. (2021) *Global Climate Risk Index 2021: Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events? Weather-Related Loss Events in 2019 and 2000–2019*, p. 13; see also: World Bank: *List of Economies*: <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>.

¹⁸⁹ For 2019 see Eckstein, D., Künzel, V. and Schäfer, L. (2021), p. 8 et seq.; for 2020 and 2021 see also: *The Guardian: Extreme Weather*: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/extreme-weather?page=2>.

¹⁹⁰ WBGU (2008) *Welt im Wandel: Sicherheitsrisiko Klimawandel*.

¹⁹¹ Scheffran, J. (2020) *Climate Extremes and Conflict Dynamics*; Scheffran, J. (2016) *Klimawandel als Risikoverstärker in komplexen Systemen*; Bethke, F., Birching, S., Christian, B. et al. (2020) *Peace and Development 2020: An Analysis of Recent Experiences and Findings*.

¹⁹² Among the first reports describing the consequences of climate change are IPCC (1990/1992) *Climate Change: The IPCC 1990 and 1992 Assessments*; European Commission (2008) *Climate Change and International Security*; WBGU (2008).

Box 10

Poor countries suffer particularly from climate change – for example, Mozambique

Mozambique is regularly hit by extreme weather events. Droughts and hurricanes are particularly hard on the coastal state in southern Africa. In 2019, Mozambique was hit by two catastrophic cyclones: In March, Cyclone Idai destroyed large parts of the port city of Beira, the economic hub of central Mozambique with 500,000 inhabitants. In the surrounding rural regions, Idai destroyed entire villages and crops. 478,000 people were displaced, especially from poor neighbourhoods in the cities and from villages. A month later, another cyclone, Kenneth, hit the country, this time in the north, where 45,000 people had to leave their homes. Supplies to the people here were hampered by a conflict with Islamist militias.¹⁹³

This was the first time since weather records began that two hurricanes hit the country in one season.¹⁹⁴ They destroyed ecosystems and infrastructure worth approximately three billion U.S. dollars.¹⁹⁵ As a result, 1.85 million people were dependent on humanitarian aid.¹⁹⁶ The poor were particularly affected. Their already precarious supply was additionally and in the medium term endangered by the disasters. At the end of 2019, there were still 93,500 people in temporary emergency shelters.

Permanent solutions require long-term investments from the Mozambican government and the international community. Mozambique is one of the world's least developed countries and has an HDI score of 0.46, with nearly half of the population living below the poverty line.¹⁹⁷ Mozambique contributes little to global climate change. Emissions of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide amount to 0.29 tonnes per capita.¹⁹⁸ Germany emits around nine tonnes of CO₂ per inhabitant per year.¹⁹⁹ At the turn of the year 2020/2021, central Mozambique was again hit by two hurricanes. Once again, many houses were destroyed and more than 30,000 people in Beira and the vicinity had to be provided with emergency shelter.²⁰⁰

an alarming rate. Indigenous and local communities manage and conserve about half of the tropical forest landscapes. Studies show that deforestation rates in forests managed by indigenous peoples and communities are two to three times lower than in other forests.²⁰¹

Deforestation threatens fertile soils with erosion and disrupts local and regional water cycles. This leads to water scarcity. Significant damage is also caused by unsustainable technological developments, the exploitation of rainforests or wetlands, and the extraction of raw materials. At the same time, population and economic growth are increasing pressure on ecosystems and natural resources that provide livelihoods and incomes for many people. These are primarily water, land, farmlands, forests, livestock, wildlife and fish stocks.²⁰²

Water scarcity is increasingly becoming a problem for food security. Worldwide, 2.1 billion people have no access to clean and consistently available water – with consequences for their health and their development opportunities. In sub-Saharan Africa, only 24 percent of the population has safe drinking water.²⁰³ Nearly half

¹⁹³ Information is taken from the Mozambique country case study in IDMC (2020a), p. 25 f., unless otherwise indicated.

¹⁹⁴ UNDP (2020), p. 52.

¹⁹⁵ GFDRR (2019) Mozambique Cyclone Idai: Post Disaster Needs Assessment.

¹⁹⁶ UNDP (2019a) Human Development Report 2019: Beyond Income, Beyond Averages, Beyond Today: Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century, p. 52.

¹⁹⁷ UNDP (2020), p. 243, Table A7.1 (data from 2019); Republic of Mozambique (2020) Report. Voluntary National Review of Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development.

¹⁹⁸ See World Development Indicators Database: Country Report: Mozambique: https://databank.worldbank.org/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=MOZ; World Bank: Mozambique: <https://data.worldbank.org/country/MZ>.

¹⁹⁹ See World Bank: Germany: <https://data.worldbank.org/country/DE>.

²⁰⁰ IOM (2021) Mozambique Cyclone Eloise Response Plan.

²⁰¹ Baragwanath, K. and Bayi, E. (2020) Collective Property Rights Reduce Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon; Walker, W., Gorelik, S., Baccini, A. et al. (2020) The Role of Forest Conversion, Degradation, and Disturbance in the Carbon Dynamics of Amazon Indigenous Territories and Protected Areas.

²⁰² UNEP (2019) Global Environment Outlook GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People.

²⁰³ UNESCO and UN Water (2019) Leaving No One Behind: The United Nations World Water Development Report 2019, p. 18 et seq.

of the world's agricultural land (44 percent) is located in arid zones and accounts for 60 percent of global food production.²⁰⁴ Climate change is shifting climate zones, temperatures, rainfall and precipitation patterns. Artificial irrigation in already very hot and dry regions will thus become more difficult. According to comprehensive simulation studies, so-called water stress is likely to increase over the next 30 years, especially in Africa.²⁰⁵

Environmental damage and dwindling resources, along with unequal resource distribution and marginalisation, can cause social and political upheavals and pose a risk of conflict.²⁰⁶ For example, water scarcity has the potential to spark conflicts between population groups – for example, farmers and pastoralists in the Sahel region – and between countries. An example of this is the tension between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt over the use of Nile water and the filling of the reservoir of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in Ethiopia.²⁰⁷ In turn, in resource scarcity-related emergencies and conflicts people can be forced to migrate to other environmentally, socioeconomically, and politically fragile regions, where they exacerbate or trigger environmental and supply problems. In Syria, a devastating drought between 2006 and 2010, combined with deregulation and liberalisation of agricultural policies, uprooted many people in rural areas of north-eastern Syria and drove them to the cities. This has contributed to discontentment with the government. However, the extent of the impact of climate change on civil war and displacement in Syria is disputed.²⁰⁸

The example of Sudan illustrates the complex manner in which the causes of migration and displacement are intertwined. As in other countries of the Sahel region, climate change, population growth, overexploitation and local environmental damage have led to prolonged

droughts and desertification in Sudan. As a result, nomadic pastoralists are increasingly forced to move their herds further and further into areas where they can still find something to feed on. There, they come into conflict with sedentary arable farmers over the increasingly scarce fertile land. In the Darfur region of Sudan, such land-use conflicts have intensified since the mid-1980s and, in connection with the exclusion of broad social groups, have led to violent conflicts since 2003.²⁰⁹

2.6 Smuggling networks

The following section does not analyse the causes of displacement and irregular migration, but rather a factor that influences the choice of route and the intended destination: Smuggling networks determine the paths along which displacement and irregular migration take place and can also be a contributing factor in the decision to embark on the journey.

The higher the barriers to legal migration and the easier and cheaper it appears to be to be transported irregularly from one country to another, the more likely it is that people will make use of the services of smugglers.²¹⁰ As with all illegal activities, it is difficult to estimate the scope of human trafficking. The United Nations estimates that traffickers provided transportation for about 2.5 million people worldwide in 2016, about 375,000 of whom crossed the Mediterranean to Europe. In the process, they earned between five and 5.7 billion US dollars, of which 320 million to 550 million US dollars were for smuggling people to Europe.²¹¹

The services offered by smugglers range from one-off support services before or during the journey, such as obtaining forged documents or information on the nature and scope of existing border controls, to comprehensive planning and execution of the journey, i.e. logistics, means of transportation, accommodation, food and crossing of one or more international borders.

²⁰⁴ Cherlet, M., Hutchinson, C., Reynolds, J. et al. (Publ.) (2018) World Atlas of Desertification: Rethinking Land Degradation and Sustainable Land Management p. 34 et seq.

²⁰⁵ Schlosser, C., Strzepek, K., Gao, X. et al. (2014) The Future of Global Water Stress: An Integrated Assessment; Oxfam Deutschland (2016) Wasserkrisen durch Klimawandel. Wie der Klimawandel weltweit die Versorgung mit Wasser gefährdet; also UNESCO and UN-Water (2019).

²⁰⁶ Molo, B. (2015) Ressourcenkonflikte.

²⁰⁷ Lossow, T., Miehe, L. and Roll, S. (2020) Nile conflict: Compensation Rather Than Mediation; How Europeans Can Lead an Alternative Way Forward; Deutschlandfunk Nova (2020) Äthiopiens Staudamm sorgt für Streit mit Nachbarländern.

²⁰⁸ Kelley, C. P., Mohtadi, S., Cane, M. A. et al. (2015) Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Recent Syrian Drought; Selby, J., Dahi, O., Fröhlich, C. et al. (2017) Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War Revisited.

²⁰⁹ Öhm, M. (2018) Sudan – Darfur.

²¹⁰ Gottesdiener, L. and Kinoshian, S. (2020) Migrant smugglers see boost from U.S. pandemic border policy; Roberts, B., Hanson, G., Cornwell, D. et al. (2010) An Analysis of Migrant Smuggling Costs Along the Southwest Border.

²¹¹ UNODC (2018) Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants, p. 5, 22.

Box 11

Places and routes of irregular migration to Europe

Irregular migrants and refugees reach Europe by sea along three main routes: The western route leads from Morocco, and increasingly also from Algeria or via the Canary Islands to Spain. The central route begins in Libya or Tunisia and has Italy or Malta as its destination. The eastern route goes from Turkey to Greece. The main route changes depending on the general conditions.


Geographically favourably located cities with important infrastructure such as hotels, restaurants, train stations or airports serve as transit stations. In the case of the central route, these include Tripoli in Libya, Gao in northeastern Mali and Agadez in central Niger, both located on the edge of the Sahara (→ Fig. 8).

However, migratory routes to Europe often do not follow a straight line, and are frequently interrupted. They can take months or years. It is not uncommon for smuggled persons to be forced to make stopovers because they cannot finance the next leg of their trip and therefore have to work and/or wait for a money transfer from their relatives.

An infrastructure for irregular migration has developed around these routes and the hubs on the way to Europe. One example of this is Agadez in Niger. Transporting people from the desert city to Libya was a legal business for a long time. Members of nomadic ethnic groups accompanied the journey north through the desert. It was only in 2015 that a controversial law made this business illegal – and robbed not only the smugglers of their (previously legal) livelihood, but also the residents of Agadez, who had earned an income by accommodating and providing for the migrants.

The law was an attempt by the Nigerien government to satisfy the EU's desire to curb irregular migration, in return for which the country benefited greatly from European funding for development and security projects. As a result, the smuggling along the previous route declined. But because local guides know their way around the desert and this region is difficult to control, they switched to other paths and border crossings.²¹²

Fig. 8: Transit stations in North and West Africa for smugglings to Europe on the central Mediterranean route



Source: UNODC (2018), P. 83

The spectrum of providers of such services is broad. It ranges from individuals who, for example, know a region well and act as guides for short but particularly dangerous routes, to complex structures of organised crime. High-ranking members of smuggling organisations usually merely coordinate the specific smuggling activities of other members or outsource them to other

criminal organisations. Smugglers who recruit people willing to migrate often have the same ethnic, linguistic or geographic background as their clients. Such connections help to gain trust.²¹³

In this context, smugglers and smuggled persons often have an ambivalent relationship. On the one hand,

²¹² Tubiana, J., Warin, C. and Saeneen, G. (2018) Multilateral Damage. The Impact of EU Migration Policies on Central Saharan Routes.

²¹³ Cf. UNODC (2018), p. 5, p. 7, p. 27.

smugglers are often respected members of society in the countries of origin because they satisfy an often urgent demand. Word of mouth, in person or via social media, is one of the most important sources of new recruitments. It is not uncommon for smugglers themselves to offer their services on social media, where satisfied “customers” can rate them positively after the transaction is complete. Moreover, smugglers are not considered criminals everywhere, since in some cases, their activities have only been criminalised by changes in the law (→ **Box 11**).

On the other hand, many smugglers are exploiters. They risk life and limb of the people who place themselves in their hands. It is not uncommon for them to abuse their trust, kidnap and sell them, or release them only after their families have paid a ransom.²¹⁴ Some human trafficking networks lure women and minors from underdeveloped regions to other countries in order to force them into prostitution, illegal labour, begging or criminal activities. While smuggling takes place with the consent of those willing to migrate and violates the laws of the state whose border is illegally crossed, human trafficking is a crime against the trafficked persons themselves and is punishable under the Palermo Protocol. (→ **Chap 1.2**). Smuggling and human trafficking are therefore fundamentally different crimes, but in practice cannot always be clearly separated.

One example of the combination of smuggling and trafficking is the network of so-called Nigerian “madams”, who recruit girls and young women for the purpose of prostitution in their country of origin and smuggle them to Europe. Some of the girls and young women know what kind of work awaits them in Europe, but accept this in the hope of better living conditions. They find out about the actual working conditions and the nature of their employment only after their arrival.²¹⁵

The fight against smugglers is difficult. Investments in measures to combat smuggling and strengthen border protection are politically controversial and often have only a limited effect. First, smugglers often quickly

adapt their strategies and business models to changing conditions or take advantage of existing regulations. One example is Mali. Since Malian citizens do not require a visa for Algeria, smugglers in Mali offer migrants from other sub-Saharan African countries in genuine or forged Malian “rental passports” that they return to accomplices after entering the country so that they can be rented out to others.²¹⁶ Another example is the smuggling corridor between the Central American countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador and the United States: The strengthening of border protection in recent years has led to smugglers offering three attempts to illegally cross the borders of Mexico and the United States for a fixed price, so that migrants can set out again at no extra cost if they fail.²¹⁷

Second, even technically sophisticated, expensive border protection measures are often of limited effectiveness if smugglers can use bribes to get border guards to look the other way at the crucial moment. The smugglers pass on the extra cost to their customers.

Third, increased border protection may reduce irregular migration in the short term, but in the medium and long term it is more likely to re-route it, causing people to use more dangerous paths. In addition, more border controls may lead people who would otherwise have organised their own transport to use smuggling services in the first place. Border protection support can thus unintentionally act as a “stimulus programme” for smugglers.²¹⁸

²¹⁴ Gilardi, J. (2020) *Ally or Exploiter? The Smuggler-Migrant Relationship Is a Complex One*.

²¹⁵ BAMF (2020) Country report 27 – Nigeria.

²¹⁶ UNODC (2018), p. 87.

²¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*; Rietig, V. and Bilfinger, C. (2017) *Walls against Migration? About Perceived Truth in the U.S. Migration Debate and the Effectiveness of Border Protection Measures*.

²¹⁸ UNODC (2018); Rietig, V. and Bilfinger, C. (2017).

Spotlight: Social networks and media

Social networks can provide a vital boost for people to leave their home country, whether legally or irregularly. Family members, friends and other compatriots or acquaintances who have already settled in another country offer people who are willing to emigrate a destination. Nowadays, contacts can share their experiences in an inexpensive and quick manner via social media and apps, offer helpful guidance, and give quick advice on the go via cell phone. They are often the first point of contact upon arrival in the destination country and can assist in finding housing or employment.²¹⁹

However, there is a risk of inflated expectations being stoked via social networks, for example, when people present themselves as rich or successful on social media even though their actual legal or financial situation is precarious. If outdated or incorrect information is passed on via these networks, for example, about the costs of travel or the conditions in transit and host countries, this can encourage irregular migration. These challenges were present even before social media existed, but the constant presence of concrete, possibly embellished images is likely to exacerbate this phenomenon.

Existing networks can also serve as cultural and linguistic mediators for migrants in the host country, while simultaneously helping to sustain economic or social bridges to the original homeland. These can also facilitate return migration. Finally, remittances or investments can contribute significantly to the development of their countries of origin (→ **Box 23 and Chap 3.2.5**).

²¹⁹ Chatelard, G. (2005) Iraqi Asylum Migrants in Jordan: Conditions, Religious Networks and the Smuggling Process; Moret, J., Baglioni, S. and Efiionayi-Mäder, D. (2006) The Path of Somali Refugees into Exile: A Comparative Analysis of Secondary Movements and Policy Response; Bauer, Th. K., Epstein, G. and Gang, I. N. (2009) Measuring Ethnic Linkages among Migrants, S. 56-69; Preiß, C. (2020) Bleiben oder Weiterziehen: Entscheidungskriterien für Geflüchtete in Erst-Aufnahmeländern, p. 13; Global Migration Data Portal (2020) Members of diasporas.

2.7 Lack of protection, integration and reintegration systems

People who flee or migrate hope for safety or better living conditions for themselves and their families. If they do not find the appropriate conditions or the necessary protection in the region or country where they first arrive, many migrate further. Others return to their home countries voluntarily or forcibly, but leave again if they are not safe there or do not see any prospects. The following section examines the causes of onward migration from first arrival or transit countries and of renewed emigration after a return.

Problems of protection systems in host countries

Depending on the reasons the people arriving assert for leaving the home country and the country they arrive in, they are entitled to different national and international protection systems (→ **Chap 1.2**). Within the framework of its international obligations, each country is largely free to determine how it organises protection and what assistance is available to new arrivals. In Germany, beneficiaries of protection – i.e. persons entitled to asylum under Art. 16a of the Basic Law, refugees as per § 3 of the Asylum Law, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection as per § 4 of the Asylum Law or those entitled to stay on the basis of a ban on deportation as per § 60 Sec. 5, 7 of the Residence Law – are granted a residence permit that allows access to housing, health and educational facilities, work and participation in everyday life.²²⁰

In many host countries – especially in countries neighbouring those where violence or natural disasters have displaced people – UNHCR registers arrivals and sometimes places them in refugee camps, where they are provided with the basic necessities of life. But refugees often live outside camps in cities or towns.²²¹ There, it can be more difficult to find support and protection, in part because it is harder for UNHCR and other organisations to reach them. Xenophobia and discrimination

²²⁰ UNHCR (2021a) Rechte nach der Anerkennung.

²²¹ Erdoğan, M. (2019) Syrian Refugees in Turkey; see also Avenarius, T. (2021) Zwei Millionen Menschen ohne legalen Status. According to the article, only 60,000 of the Syrian refugees live in camps.

are aggravating factors in these situations, and the more precarious the economic situation in host communities, the more likely they are to occur.

As different as the protection systems of countries are, the difficulties in establishing and expanding protection systems are similar. Current examples include Turkey, Lebanon, and Mexico, which have had to deal with a high influx of protection seekers in recent years. Although these host countries have taken important steps to offer people a secure status and livelihood, the protection systems are often insufficient in terms of offering long-term prospects. This increases the likelihood of onward migration. The scope of this is wide (→ **Boxes 12 and 13**).

Lack of protection, precarious living conditions and poor prospects in countries of first reception often leave people with few options. Only a few people are able to escape this situation, by leaving the country for example on humanitarian visas or through organised resettlement to third countries that are willing to accept them. For years, the political will to take in people through organised resettlement has been declining in many countries. The U.S., long a global leader in this area, had all but withdrawn from it during the Trump presidency. The new U.S. President Biden has put the issue of resettlement high on the political agenda again.²²² In Europe, there are still comparatively few resettlement places. Germany, for example, set the number in the year 2020 at 5,500 places. This is more than a few years ago, but moderate overall and in need of significant expansion.²²³ Legal pathways to labour migration are also scarce. In particular, people with low or non-formal qualifications have few opportunities to migrate legally. It is therefore not surprising that many people resort to irregular ways.

Lack of reintegration opportunities in countries of origin

The less support people experience in their country of origin after a voluntary or forced return, the more likely they are to migrate again (**Concepts → Box 14**).

In principle, both voluntary and involuntary returnees strive for everything they had previously lacked in their home country, such as secure access to basic services like water, food, housing, medical care and education. Depending on age, gender, education level and skills, as well as the circumstances of departure, returnees may need additional support. The situation of people who return involuntarily is often worse than before migration. They have often sold their possessions and gone into debt to pay for travel or smuggling.

They also struggle with the stigma of being a failure or a traitor, making it even more difficult for them to find work.²²⁴

Short-term return assistance is often organised by IOM and funded by various EU member states and other countries. Globally, IOM assisted the voluntary return of a total of about 65,000 people on behalf of various countries in 2019 – more than twice as many as in 2011.²²⁵ However, such and long-term reintegration assistance reaches only a small proportion of returnees, while the need for it is growing worldwide.

²²² Rietig, V. and Eckner, C. (2021) US-Migrationspolitik unter Joe Biden: Was Deutschland erwarten kann und tun sollte.

²²³ DGAP (2020) Neustart für das transatlantische Verhältnis: US-Wahl 2020, p. 14; BMI (2020) Humanitäre Aufnahmeprogramme; SVR (2019) Legal migration for work and training. Mobility options to Europe for those not in need of protection, p. 82 f.

²²⁴ Koser, K. and Kuschminder, K. (2015) Comparative Research on the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration of Migrants.

²²⁵ IOM (2019c) Return and Reintegration. Key Highlights, p. 2; IOM: Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration: <https://www.iom.int/assisted-voluntary-return-and-reintegration>.

Box 12

Development of protection in the host country Turkey

Turkey has advanced the development of its protection systems in recent years with the help of the EU. In 2020, there were approximately four million refugees living in the country on the Bosphorus: about 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees, 356,000 non-Syrian asylum seekers, including many from Afghanistan, and an unknown number of irregular migrants of other nationalities.²²⁶ An estimated 500,000 Syrian refugees live in Istanbul alone.

In 2013, Turkey passed a new asylum law.²²⁷ This was the first time a Turkish asylum authority was established and four categories of protection were introduced.²²⁸ Because Turkey is not a signatory to the 1967 Geneva Refugee Convention (GRC) Protocol, it is not obligated to grant refugee status to non-Europeans. Specifically for registered Syrian refugees, a complementary protection status was introduced in 2014 to protect them from repatriation to Syria and to grant them access to the Turkish labour market, health care, and education system.²²⁹ However, only 27,390 Syrians actually received work permits between 2016 and 2018, even though, according to one study, nearly 39 percent of Syrians who were able to work were working in 2019.²³⁰ The number of Syrian students in Turkish schools was nearly 660,000 in 2020.²³¹

Turkey does not grant comparable protection to people from other countries.²³² Their situation therefore remains difficult despite the new law. How many of them have received protection from Turkey's new asylum authority so far is not public. In 2018, the asylum authority made fewer than 3,000 decisions in the entire year. Those waiting for an asylum decision are allowed to stay in the country, but support is scarce.

The extent to which Turkey's protection systems are actually sufficient is disputed. Turkey does a lot for refugees from Syria and has taken in many more refugees than EU countries, relative to its population; at five percent, the proportion of refugees in the population is about three times that of Germany.²³³ The influx of such a large number of people has a massive impact on all aspects of daily life, from the labour market, schools and health care to social cohesion. Since 2016, the EU has supported the care of refugees in Turkey through financial payments amounting to six billion euros under the EU-Turkey Declaration. As a result, 1.8 million Syrians in Turkey receive monthly social assistance, the largest project of its kind ever funded by the EU in a third country.²³⁴

Critics, meanwhile, point to numerous reports documenting that the country does not comply with the GRC, violations of the ban on *refoulement* are commonplace, and there are forced returns to Syria. The fact that the supply situation and opportunities for participation are limited, especially for non-Syrians in Turkey, also tarnishes the image of Turkey as a provider of protection and has resulted in the country remaining only a transit station for some people.²³⁵

²²⁶ Estimates put the figure at two million people without legal status. Cf. Avenarius, T. (2021).

²²⁷ UNHCR Press Briefing, UNHCR welcomes Turkey's new law on asylum, 12th April 2013; see also: European Commission, Report on progress by Turkey in fulfilling the requirements of its visa liberalisation roadmap, Brussels, 20th October 2014, p. 16 on the new law.

²²⁸ The four categories are: 1) "Refugee status" for recognised European refugees (under the GRC); 2) "Conditional refugee status" for recognised non-European refugees; 3) "Subsidiary protection status" for European and non-European nationals who cannot return to their home country because of armed conflict or threat of death penalty or torture and fear inhuman or degrading treatment; 4) "Temporary protection" in a situation of mass influx.

²²⁹ See UNHCR: Temporary protection in Turkey: <https://help.unhcr.org/turkey/information-for-syrians/temporary-protection-in-turkey/>.

²³⁰ Regarding work permits: CHP, "Ensar ve muhacir soylemi Suriyeli siginmaciya derman olmuyor", March 2019. On the situation of Syrians in 2019: Aysegul Kayaoglu, "Labor market activities of Syrian refugees in Turkey", February 2019.

²³¹ Turkish Government and UNICEF (2019) Educational Statistics for Children under Temporary Protection in Turkey: Statistical Report.

²³² Kush, O. (2019) How Displaced Syrians Navigate Their Status in Turkey; Karasapan, O. (2019) Turkey's Syrian Refugees—the Welcome Fades.

²³³ See Christophersen, E. (2020) These 10 countries receive the most refugees: Global displacement.

²³⁴ https://ec.europa.eu/echo/essn_en.

²³⁵ Human Rights Watch (2019) Turkey: Syrians Being Deported to Danger: Authorities Use Violence, Threats, Detention to Coerce Returns; Amnesty International (2019) Turkey: Sent to a War Zone: Turkey's Illegal Deportations of Syrian Refugees; Kiniklioğlu, S. (2020) Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Changing Attitudes and Fortunes; Operation Data Portal: Mediterranean Situation: Greece: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179>.

Box 13

Broad spectrum of different protection systems

Lebanon is currently home to around 1.5 million people from Syria. In terms of population, no country in the world hosts more refugees than Lebanon: Their proportion is around a quarter. Yet Lebanon itself suffers from political crises and economic weakness, which have been exacerbated since the August 2020 port explosion and by the Covid-19 pandemic. Many Lebanese have limited access to basic services such as water and electricity. Refugees live in precarious conditions, with more than half in extreme poverty.²³⁶ The country does not officially recognise UNHCR-registered refugees as such. Few of the Syrians have legal residency status; access to the labour market and schooling are restricted; and the Lebanese government is increasingly pushing for their return to Syria. The rapid deterioration of the living conditions and supply situation also for the Lebanese population due to the multiple crisis increasingly leads to social tensions and attacks on refugees. In spite of the inadequate protection and living conditions in Lebanon, there is hardly any secondary migration toward Europe due to the geographic location.²³⁷

Morocco has been trying to establish protection systems for several years. The country adopted a National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum in 2014. However, as in other countries (for example, Tunisia and Ghana), implementation is progressing rather slowly. An important step toward protection has been two regularisation campaigns that have given legal residence status to about 40,000 sub-Saharan African migrants in recent years.²³⁸ Nevertheless, many irregular migrants in Morocco continue to live without prospects for legal residence status or social participation, which may encourage secondary migration to Europe.

In **Mexico**, generous protection systems exist on paper. However, due to a lack of financial resources and/or political will, these are not effectively implemented. Mexico offers various types of legal protection to migrants from Central America, including so-called humanitarian visas and the right to apply for asylum. However, COMAR, the agency responsible for processing asylum applications, is hopelessly underfunded. During the lengthy examination process, applicants are sometimes held in detention centres infiltrated by criminal gangs. On the whole, only a few enjoy actual protection.²³⁹ For this reason, and due to widespread family contacts in the United States, many continue to migrate north.

Colombia provides a positive example: The country has taken in almost two million people from neighbouring Venezuela (→ **Box 7**). In addition, around 500,000 Colombians who fled the civil war in Colombia to Venezuela have returned to their home country. Colombia must provide for up to eight million internally displaced persons in addition to Venezuelan refugees.²⁴⁰ Half of the Venezuelans in the country do not have regular residency status. However, on February 8, 2021, Colombian President Iván Duque made a surprise announcement that Colombia would grant them formal protection status over the next ten years. When this temporary protected status takes effect, it will allow people to access basic services such as the health care system. The protective status will also apply to those who newly enter the country in the next two years.²⁴¹

²³⁶ Rietig, V. (2019b) Realität gegen Rhetorik: Warum mehr Syrer in ihr Heimatland zurückkehren und was das für Deutschland bedeutet – und was nicht.

²³⁷ Rietig, V. (2019b); Human Rights Watch (2018) Lebanon, Events of 2018.

²³⁸ Schuettler, K. (2017) A Second Regularization Campaign For Irregular Immigrants in Morocco: When Emigration Countries Become Immigration Countries.

²³⁹ SEGOB and NIM (w. y.): Derechos humanos de las personas migrantes que transitan por México; Dominguez-Villegas, R. (2019) Protection and Reintegration: Mexico Reforms Migration Agenda in an Increasingly Complex Era.

²⁴⁰ See Rolón Salazar, M. (2020) “Hay más víctimas de desplazamiento forzado en Colombia que número de habitantes en Costa Rica”; UNO: Kolumbien: Gewaltsame Konflikte bedrohen die Bevölkerung: <https://www.uno-fluechtlingshilfe.de/hilfe-weltweit/kolumbien/>; IDMC (2020a), p. 60, estimates 5.6 million people, cf. Chap. 1.3.

²⁴¹ UNHCR and IOM (2021) UNHCR and IOM Welcome Colombia’s Decision to Regularize Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants; Hernandez, C. (2021) Colombia Is Pioneering a New Model for Integrating Migrants and Refugees. Will It Work?

Box 14

Return and Reintegration – Explanation of Terms

Return is the generic term for the process of departure of a migrant to his or her home country or to a country traversed on the way to Germany. Return can be voluntary (i.e. without government coercion) or involuntary (with government coercion), with or without financial support, organised independently or by government agencies.

Voluntary return is the process when migrants leave Germany without government coercion. The term is controversial, as the actual voluntariness is not always the case. For example, persons who are obliged to leave the country and who have received a notice to do so only have the choice of leaving within a certain period of time and with funding, if necessary, or being deported. Some actors therefore prefer to refer to it as “assisted return.”²⁴²

Reintegration is the process of reintegrating a person into his or her country of origin, which can include legal, political, social, economic, cultural, religious, and linguistic aspects. There is no single definition of “reintegration” or “sustainable return”. The terms are closely linked and are sometimes even equated in the specialised literature.²⁴³

Even successful reintegration, however, does not necessarily mean that returnees will remain in their country in the long term. A pertinent survey demonstrated that even well reintegrated returnees often expressed the intention to migrate again – the vast majority, however, by legal means, such as through a work or student visa. At the same time, there were also returnees whose reintegration was difficult or unsuccessful, but who nevertheless did not intend to migrate again.²⁴⁴

²⁴² Rietig, V. and Günnewig, M. (2020a) Deutsche Rückkehrpolitik und Abschiebungen. Zehn Wege aus der Dauerkrise; Lack of voluntariness may give rise to legal responsibility of the state returning the person under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); see ECtHR, No. 25244/18, Judgment of 14 November 2019 – N.A. v. Finland, Sec. 59 f. The deliberate creation of distress and generation of hopelessness can also give rise to significant legal doubts about voluntariness; UN Human Rights Council (2018) Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Sec. 19 et seq.

²⁴³ IOM (2019a) Reintegration.

²⁴⁴ Koser, K. and Kuschminder, K. (2015).

2.8 Outlook: What do we know about future developments?

If we want to reduce the causes of displacement and irregular migration, we need information about where and why people leave their home countries and seek better living conditions elsewhere. For political decisions, knowledge about the expected or possible future displacement and migration patterns is extremely important. In recent years, therefore, calls for forecasts have grown louder.²⁴⁵ However understandable the desire for evidence and planning fundamentals may be, it is difficult to satisfy in the case of migration and, in particular, displacement. Migration research is largely unanimous about one thing: Precise, long-term and, above all, small-scale predictions of where, when and how many people will decide to leave and where they will go to are virtually impossible with existing empirical methods and statistical models.

There are several reasons for this, including

- › **the multitude of determinants:** The factors described in this chapter that influence migration decisions are difficult to capture in their entirety in statistical models
- › **the numerous and difficult-to-measure interdependencies:** The preceding analysis has made it clear that the individual drivers often mutually influence each other, which further complicates the design of realistic models. In addition, there is the complexity of individual decisions. People assess potential displacement and migration situations differently. Without micro-sociological and micro-economic insights and corresponding models, it is difficult to predict whether or not people will decide to leave in the face of violence, hardship and lack of future opportunities
- › **the inadequacy of migration data:** There have been numerous efforts in recent times to improve the data situation. This is an explicit goal of the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees. The German government has been supporting such efforts for several years, for example through the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Devel-

²⁴⁵ Bijak, J. and Czaika, M. (2020) How Can Europe Better Prepare for Future Migration Movements? Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Displacements.

opment (KNOMAD)²⁴⁶ by the World Bank or by funding the *Global Migration Data Analysis Centre* (GMDAC)²⁴⁷ operated by IOM in Berlin.

Nevertheless, the available data on displacement and migration is often still insufficient to provide a complete picture. There is often a lack of sufficiently detailed information, especially disaggregated data by gender, age and education. In addition, the quality of the data is often insufficient or the different sources are not comparable due to differing collection methods. This contributes to the fact that even the data on migration within the EU is fragmented²⁴⁸

Many governmental, academic and non-academic research institutions are now working on migration forecasting models. However, all previous approaches have methodological shortcomings and limited validity.²⁴⁹

This has been demonstrated, for example, by attempts to quantify the migration potential between Eastern and Western Europe in the run-up to the EU's eastward expansion.²⁵⁰ The discussion about the extent of future migration from Africa to Europe also shows the wide range of possible predictions – depending on which assumptions are made in each case.²⁵¹ Moreover, new developments can influence displacement and migration in previously unimagined ways, as is currently being demonstrated by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Different approaches to forecasting

Forecasts aim to produce the most precise statements possible about displacement and migration in the near future. Scenarios, on the other hand, provide plausible descriptions of possible development paths from which insights into future migration can be gained. Both approaches differ in terms of their objectives,

methods and expected results: Forecasts are mostly used for operational purposes, whereas scenarios are used for strategy development. The former often use quantitative methods and aim at concrete figures, while the latter use qualitative methods to better understand the forces that drive or hinder migration and migration decisions (→ **Box 15**).²⁵²

Increasing digitisation is strengthening hopes that mass data and their analysis by artificial intelligence (AI) can improve the predictive capacity of displacement and migration, for example by using high-resolution satellite imagery, georeferenced data, cell phone data, or data from social media (→ also **Spotlight – Digital Technologies**). In this way, International and European organisations as well as individual governments are trying to combine new and traditional data sources and to thus improve migration forecasting, for example by combining asylum statistics and migration data with survey data, conflict indicators, and environmental data such as rainfall patterns or droughts. The European Commission is proposing a Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint as one element of the EU's September 2020 Pact on Migration and Asylum to enable an expeditious, efficient, and coordinated EU response to a migration crisis through improved early warning.²⁵³

The described limitations in predicting migration are particularly relevant for the work of the Commission on the Root Causes of Displacement. We, too, cannot offer any concrete assessments of future displacement and migration. Nevertheless, with due caution, we can outline some general and regional development trends on the basis of the causes described in this chapter.

Selected regional migration trends

The drivers of displacement and migration outlined in this chapter play different roles depending on the country and global region. As a result, the potential for future migration to Europe varies from region to

²⁴⁶ See KNOMAD: <https://www.knomad.org/>.

²⁴⁷ See Global Migration Data Analysis Centre: <https://gmdac.iom.int/>.

²⁴⁸ GMDAC (2016) Migration Forecasting. Beyond the Limits of Uncertainty.

²⁴⁹ IOM (2019a) Reintegration.


²⁵⁰ For an overview of the range of forecasts of potential migration made in the run-up to the EU's eastward expansion, see i.a. Faßmann, H. and Münz, R. (2003) Auswirkungen der EU-Erweiterung auf die Ost-West-Wanderung.

²⁵¹ SVR (2020) A Joint Endeavour: Shaping Migration from Africa to Europe: Annual Report 2020.

²⁵² An example of a current migration scenario: Angenendt, S., Koch, A. and Müller, M. (2020) Foresight: Global Competition for Health Care Workers from Africa.

²⁵³ European Commission (2020b): Commission recommendation of 23rd September 2020 on an EU mechanism for Preparedness and Management of Crises related to Migration (Migration Preparedness and Crises Blueprint).

Fig. 9: Overview of world regions



Source: Berlin Institute for Population and Development (2019)²⁵⁴

region. In the following, the Commission outlines some key development trends for selected regions of the world (→ Fig. 9) that could influence future displacement and migration patterns.

Middle East and North Africa

The countries of the Middle East and North Africa, which are located in the immediate vicinity of Europe and are also known by the acronym MENA (Middle

East-North Africa), form the most important region of origin of displacement and irregular migration to Europe. This is particularly true of Syria and Iraq.

It can be assumed that this will continue to be the case in the future. The Middle East is considered the most conflict-prone region in the world.²⁵⁵ According to estimates by the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), this part of the MENA region is likely to

²⁵⁴ Aresin, J., Carrasco Heiermann, A., Kaps, A. et al. (2019), p. 28.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

Box 15

How forecasts and scenarios come about and how to deal with them

For both forecasting methods, the question of which displacement and migration factors interact in which way is a central problem. Here, considering correlations can help, i.e. of statistical relationships between different factors. However, correlations do not allow statements about causality: Even if, for example, there is a high positive correlation between bilateral trade and migration between two countries, it cannot be concluded that increased bilateral trade is causally responsible for higher migration flows. Also, the primary goal of forecasts or scenarios is not to identify causal relationships. Rather, the aim is to use statistical methods to describe past migration as well as possible on the basis of data on possible influencing factors, in order to be able to predict future developments to the best possible extent on the basis of these findings.

Accordingly, forecasts aim to make precise predictions based on past developments; they provide policymakers with the information they need to make and communicate political decisions. They answer the question: What will happen in the future if the central influencing factors do not change fundamentally? Scenarios, on the other hand, can make policymakers aware of various future developments if central factors change fundamentally in the future, i.e. if the future differs from the past. Consequently, forecasts have the disadvantage that they are based on assumptions about structural and temporal continuity, rely on sufficiently precise and reliable data, and can create a deceptive impression of accuracy. From a statistical point of view, the inaccuracy of a forecast can at least be limited by means of so-called forecast intervals, but experience has shown that these are largely ignored in the political and public discourse. Scenarios, on the other hand, are often difficult to communicate due to the numerous assumptions involved and may be influenced by the basic attitudes of the authors.

Regardless of whether forecasts, scenarios or a mixture of both approaches are used to estimate migration potentials: They can all only contribute to a limited extent to reducing the inherent uncertainties that a look into the future entails. Those using statistical models or future scenarios for their own decision-making must therefore always be aware of the limitations of the various methods and the limits of their predictions or future scenarios. Likewise, users should always familiarise themselves with the underlying data and assumptions and be aware of the limitations they entail. Policymakers should be upfront about the methodological limitations of models and scenarios and the limited informative value of their results.

remain fragile over the next ten to 20 years. In North African countries, particularly in Libya, the increasing commixture of smuggling, organised crime, and ethnicised conflict may cause increased displacement in the future.²⁵⁶

Most MENA countries suffer not only from ongoing conflicts and a tense political situation in many places, but also from a difficult economic situation. Particularly for the growing number of young people of working age – i.e. the age group with the highest probability to migrate (→ Chap 2.4) – lack jobs and prospects.²⁵⁷ Ten years after the Arab Spring, the frustration of the young population at the lack of future prospects is continuing and is fuelling the desire to migrate.²⁵⁸ Although a large

proportion of displacement and labour migration is taking place in the region itself, both the security and wealth gaps between Europe and the MENA countries make an increase in future migration toward Europe likely.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan African countries will experience the highest population growths worldwide in the coming decades (→ Fig. 7). According to estimates by the United Nations, the population in sub-Saharan Africa is likely to almost double from around 1.1 billion today to 2.1 billion by 2050.²⁵⁹ This will further increase the pressure on natural resources such as land and water, but also on basic infrastructure. Distributional conflicts will become more likely – and in an already less developed and fragile region. According to Fund for Peace anal-

²⁵⁶ Rudolf, M., Schetter, C. and Schmitz-Pranghe, C. (2020) Beobachtbare Trends aus der Fluchtforschung.

²⁵⁷ Aresin, J., Carrasco Heiermann, A., Kaps, A. et al. (2019).

²⁵⁸ Chulov, M. (2020) 10 Years on, the Arab Spring's Explosive Rage and Dashed Dreams; Köhler, G. (2021) Ten Years After the Arab Spring: How Stable is Morocco Really?

²⁵⁹ See UN World Population Prospects 2019: <https://population.un.org/wpp/>.

ysis, the region hosts 21 of the 30 countries with the highest risk of conflict in the world.²⁶⁰

The effects of climate change are also likely to contribute to destabilisation in the future. The more frequent occurrence of extreme heat events, increasing drought, and changes in rainfall patterns are likely to exacerbate food insecurity in the future and threaten the livelihoods of millions of smallholder farmers (→ **Chap 2.5**). Many people will be forced to move, which will further accelerate urbanisation in many sub-Saharan African countries to begin with (→ **Chap 2.3**).²⁶¹

All these factors are likely to contribute to the fact that many people, especially the growing number of those of working age, do not see any future prospects in their home country. The majority of displacement and migration will continue to be concentrated in the region itself. However, the potential for migration to North Africa and on to Europe could increase in the future.²⁶²

Latin America

For migrants from Latin American countries, Europe plays only a secondary role as a destination region. In addition to countries in the region itself, the USA is the most important destination. However, the number of asylum applications in the EU from people from Venezuela and Colombia has recently increased significantly. Between 2018 and 2019 alone, the number of initial applications doubled and tripled respectively, with 90 percent of applications being made in Spain.²⁶³

From a demographic perspective, migration pressure in the region is likely to decrease in the coming decades, as the population is growing only slightly and is increasingly aging. The proportion of young working-age people who are more likely to migrate will decline in the coming decades.²⁶⁴ At the same time, crises

and conflicts such as those in Venezuela and the violent crime in numerous other countries in the region are causing many people to leave their home countries. Displacement triggered by organised crime is likely to increase in the future.²⁶⁵

The precarious economic situation in many countries in the region, which has worsened as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, can also encourage migration. The comparatively well-educated young population in particular lacks jobs and income opportunities.²⁶⁶ In addition, climate change is likely to have a negative impact on agricultural productivity and tourism in the future.

In the Latin American countries, migration potential can thus be expected to remain at least constant in the future, if not to increase. However, it is likely that North America will remain the primary destination for migration. The recent shift in U.S. migration policy by U.S. President Biden could also contribute to a decline again in the increased number of asylum applications from Latin American countries in the EU.

Post-Soviet region

In the region of the former Soviet Union, migration takes place primarily for gainful employment between the now independent states and Russia. Besides the common language, this can be attributed to a good migration infrastructure and established networks. This is unlikely to change significantly in the future. With the increasing aging and, in some cases, population decline in many post-Soviet societies, the (demographic) migration potential is decreasing.

Only if the economic and political situation in the region deteriorates (further) could the EU – and especially Germany with its relatively large diaspora from post-Soviet states – become more important as a migration destination. This is especially true for states such as Ukraine, Georgia or the Republic of Moldova, which are politically more oriented toward the EU than toward Russia.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁰ Messner, J., Haken, N., Taft, P. et al. (2019) Fragile States Index: Annual Report 2019.

²⁶¹ Serdeczny, O., Adams, S., Baarsch, F. et al. (2017) Climate change impacts in Sub-Saharan Africa: from physical changes to their social repercussions.

²⁶² Aresin, J., Carrasco Heiermann, A., Kaps, A. et al. (2019).

²⁶³ See Eurostat: Statistics on asylum: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics/de; EASO (2020) EASO report on Venezuela to assist EU asylum officials with dramatic increase in applications: Support is our mission. 3 September 2020: European Asylum Support Office: <https://easo.europa.eu/news-events/easo-report-venezuela-assist-eu-asylum-officials-dramatic-increase-applications>.

²⁶⁴ Aresin, J., Carrasco Heiermann, A., Kaps, A. et al. (2019), p. 82 f.

²⁶⁵ Rudolf, M., Schetter, C. and Schmitz-Pranghe, C. (2020), p. 5.

²⁶⁶ https://www.ilo.org/caribbean/newsroom/WCMS_715152/lang--en/index.htm

²⁶⁷ Cf. *ibid.*

The resurgence of violent conflicts, for example in Ukraine or most recently in Nagorno-Karabakh, could contribute to the short-term hikes in displacement to Europe in the future. This also applies to Belarus if the political conflict there continues or even intensifies.

Asia

According to surveys, people in Asian countries wish to migrate relatively rarely in global comparison.²⁶⁸ In East and Southeast Asia, socioeconomic progress in recent decades has created new prospects in almost all states. From those countries that lack income opportunities and future prospects, such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, people predominantly migrate to more developed states within the region. As the prosperity, security and demographic gap between East and Southeast Asian countries is likely to persist, migration is expected to remain predominantly within the region itself. This also applies to displacement, which is likely to increase, mainly due to the effects of climate change in the region.

By contrast, the migration potential is significantly higher in countries in South Asia, where the population continues to grow steadily and where not enough jobs have been created despite high economic growth in recent decades. In addition, the region is one of the world's most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. This threatens the livelihoods of millions of people living as subsistence farmers in the region. At the same time, violent conflicts and the associated destruction of infrastructure are likely to continue to encourage or force migration in the future. This is particularly true of civil-war-stricken Afghanistan, the second most important country of origin for asylum seekers in Germany.²⁶⁹ Overall, however, it can be assumed that displacement and migration in South Asia will be concentrated primarily in the region itself and that only a small proportion will reach Europe.

²⁶⁸ Esipova, N., Pugliese, A. and Ray, J. (2018) More Than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate If They Could.

²⁶⁹ Aresin, J., Carrasco Heiermann, A., Kaps, A. et al. (2019).

Spotlight: The effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on displacement and irregular migration

Currently, there is an intense discussion in research and policy circles about the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on future migration movements. It is still unclear to which extent the pandemic will change the drivers of displacement and irregular migration. Some expect more short-term, localised, and substantive impacts. Others fear fundamental and long-term impacts on displacement and irregular migration.

Measures to combat the pandemic, such as lockdowns and international border closures, have caused national economic activity to collapse in many countries, reduced international trade, labour migration and tourism, and caused commodity prices to plummet and foreign investment to decline. The consequences of this pandemic economic crisis are a rise in poverty and unemployment, increasing national household debt and a worsening lack of economic prospects. According to current World Bank estimates, between 143 and 163 million people worldwide are additionally expected to fall into extreme poverty (incomes below 1.90 US dollars per day) by the end of 2021 as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic.²⁷⁰

The pandemic could aggravate existing underlying crises, intensifying into a "poly-pandemic" that "undermines development progress, exacerbates state fragility, and further erodes international cooperation," according to a report on the Munich Security Conference. "Failure to contain Covid-19 and its numerous consequent pandemics – including those of hunger, inequality, and authoritarianism – is likely to massively increase the suffering of already vulnerable countries and populations."²⁷¹ Such a combined effect of fundamental crises could lead to even more people in the affected countries and regions leaving their home countries than before.

Some of the more short to medium term consequences of the pandemic are being felt above all by people who were pursuing specific migration plans or who had already set out: Last year, governments massively restricted intra-

²⁷⁰ Lakner, C., Yonzan, N., Mahler, D. et al. (2021) Updated Estimates of the Impact of Covid-19 on Global Poverty: Looking Back at 2020 and the Outlook for 2021.

²⁷¹ Eisentraut, S., Miede, L., Hartmann, L. et al. (2020) Poly-pandemic: Special Edition of the Munich Security Report on Development, Fragility, and Conflict in the Era of Covid-19, Munich: Munich Security Conference (MSC), November 2020, p. 9.

and interstate mobility worldwide in order to contain the spread of the virus.²⁷² Increased border controls, temporary border closures and the temporary suspension of humanitarian admission programmes have been reflected in a significant decrease in cross-border migration and in falling numbers of asylum applications. A considerable decline in regular labour migration has been observed as well. The recruitment of workers in the context of the pandemic has become more complicated, for example due to additional obligations to provide information about the travel route, medical evidence and extended health checks.

Refugees and migrants are particularly affected by limitations on their mobility, as they often have limited rights, are more frequently precariously employed as compared to natives, and are the first to lose their jobs in crisis situations. This has macroeconomic significance. For example, the World Bank estimates that global remittances from migrants will decrease by 14 percent in 2021 compared to 2019.²⁷³ By the end of 2021, cash flows could decrease so much that 33 million additional people could be at risk of hunger in the 88 countries served by the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) alone.²⁷⁴

Overall, based on current knowledge, it can be assumed that the Covid-19 pandemic will influence global change in the coming years in at least four ways:²⁷⁵

1. Due to the recession, global demand for migrant workers is likely to stagnate or even decline for the time being. At the same time, the demand will persist in some countries that are particularly dependent, such as the Gulf states. Demand for labour will also remain high in some key sectors, such as nursing, and competition for such skilled workers will continue. The pandemic has highlighted the need for low-skilled migrant labour in some industrialised countries, such as seasonal agricultural workers. Europe is already dependent on immigration and will be even more so in the future.

2. The number of refugees and displaced persons will continue to rise. According to the World Bank, the number of people living in extreme poverty will increase

significantly.²⁷⁶ Fragile states will be particularly affected by this. The global poverty rate is expected to rise for the first time in 30 years, which is most likely to be associated with further distribution struggles and migration movements. For many who leave their home countries in search of better economic prospects, internal migration is the next obvious option. In the absence of legal immigration channels and against the backdrop of tighter border controls, the number of internal migrants is likely to continue to rise. The same applies to people fleeing violent conflicts: Because the potential for conflict is growing in particularly fragile states, internal displacement will also increase.

3. If legal migration routes to the EU remain limited in the context of pandemic containment, irregular migration will continue to increase. In many countries of origin, the poor economic situation will persuade people to migrate. At the same time, in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, countries around the world can be expected to expand their tools for controlling international mobility, such as biometric travel documents, networked data banks, and other techniques for monitoring means of communication and border regions. Faced with tight controls, those affected will use riskier routes and take greater risks. Accordingly, demand for the services of professional people smugglers will increase.

4. There will be a north-south disparity in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic. For example, it is feared that vaccine access for low-income countries will be severely delayed, slowing economic recovery.²⁷⁷ The extent of the disparity will depend on the actions of rich countries. The development will strongly influence internal and international displacement and migration patterns. Refugees and migrants have been particularly affected by the pandemic. International organisations such as IOM and UNHCR have therefore already urged governments to include these people in their vaccination programmes.

Covid-19 reinforces significant structural drivers of displacement and irregular migration, increasing the need to implement the recommendations proposed in the following chapter.

²⁷² See IOM Mobility Impacts Covid-19: <https://migration.iom.int>; IOM (2020b) IOM Covid-19 Impact On Key Locations Of Internal Mobility Weekly Analysis 24 June 2020.

²⁷³ KNOMAD (2020) Phase II: Covid-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens.

²⁷⁴ IOM and WFP (2020) Populations at Risk: Implications of Covid-19 for Hunger, Migration and Displacement; Lakner, C., Yonzan, N., Mahler, D. et al. (2021).

²⁷⁵ Angenendt, S., Biehler, N., Bossong, R. et al. (2020) Die Auswirkungen der Covid-19-Pandemie auf das internationale Wanderungsgeschehen.

²⁷⁶ World Bank (2020b) Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2020: Reversals of Fortune; Lakner, C., Yonzan, N., Mahler, D. et al. (2021).

²⁷⁷ For example, The Economist (2021) Africa's Recovery From Covid-19 Will Be Slow. A Second Wave Could Play Havoc With Commerce, Public Finances And Schools.

Recommendations for action

3



In this chapter, the Commission proposes measures in five fields of action: They focus on reducing the causes of displacement and irregular migration in people’s home countries (Chap. 3.1 to 3.3), on improving the situation of refugees and internally displaced persons in order to reduce the pressure for onward migration (Chap. 3.4), and present options, how displacement and migration can be shaped to be humane and coherent

(Chap. 3.5). A spotlight illuminates the contribution of digital technologies. The chapter concludes with cross-sectoral recommendations for sufficient, multi-year, flexible and targeted funding for measures to reduce the root causes of displacement and irregular migration.

Fig. 10: Content from Chapter 3





3.1 Preventing crises and resolving conflicts

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- 1 Combine the analysis capabilities and review the effects.** The German government should pool and expand German and European analyses of the risk of conflict, expand early warning capabilities for mid-term and long-term risks and have the effectiveness of conflict handling strategies independently reviewed regularly. → 3.1.1
- 2 Develop, implement, and communicate the interministerial country and regional strategies more consistently.** In order to enhance the strategic processes of all ministries, the German government should set up a “Council for Peace, Security and Development” that ensures a comprehensive approach and involves systematically independent institutions as well as civil society for exploring and identifying possible options for action. → 3.1.1
- 3 Enhance the German and European peace research and use the findings in implementation.** The German government should especially enhance the work of the “German Foundation for Peace Research” (DSF) and expand with by a focus on European policies. → 3.1.1
- 4 Enhance capacities for mediation and humanitarian diplomacy, strengthen Germany’s role as bridge builder and mediator.** The German government should continue to refine its profile in mediation activities and continue to expand the integrated approach of the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) by expanding the pool of experts and its working for mediation. → 3.1.2
- 5 Review arms exports.** The German government should align its authorisation regimen for arms exports to third countries with the existing arms export guidelines, so that German arms deliveries do not fuel interstate conflicts further. → 3.1.2
- 6 Align security cooperation initiatives to the *do-no-harm* principle.** The German government should align its cooperation with security actors of third countries to the UN Resolution 2553 *Security Sector Governance and Reform* and thus improve its interministerial actions with a view to conflict sensitivity. → 3.1.2
- 7 Increase the number of women as actors in crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peace building.** The German government should continue to consistently promote the implementation of UN Resolution 1325 and its follow-up resolutions and thus promote the equal inclusion of women along the conflict cycle. → 3.1.2

Violent conflicts are a central cause of displacement (→ **Chap 2.1**). In order to reduce root causes of displacement and create opportunities for refugees to return after conflicts have ended, Germany, in cooperation with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), must seize every opportunity to limit and resolve violent conflicts, or better yet, to prevent them in the first place. With the policy guidelines “Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace” adopted in 2017, the German government set the framework for its political commitment in the area of crisis prevention, conflict management and peace promotion, and formulated goals, the implementation of which it is monitoring on the basis of 50 voluntary commitments.²⁷⁸ Nevertheless, the central task remains to formulate and implement clear and coherent strategies for individual conflicts. The Commission is aware that the options for conflict resolution are limited and very difficult due to the increasing complexity of the conflicts and the large number of actors involved. Syria and Afghanistan, the two countries from which most refugees in Germany originate, are examples of this.

From the viewpoint of the Commission, crisis prevention and conflict resolution require efforts by the German government and its partners in two core areas:

1. Strengthening political strategic capability, developing and implementing interministerial strategies and promoting them multilaterally
2. Strengthening Germany’s role in the implementation of civilian approaches to crisis prevention and conflict resolution

²⁷⁸ Federal Government (2017) Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace. The guidelines are supplemented by the interministerial strategies to support “*Transitional Justice*,” “Supporting the Security Sector Reform (SSR),” and to promote rule of law; see Federal Government (2019a) Interministerial Strategy to Support “*Transitional Justice*” in the Context of Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management, and Peacebuilding; Federal Government (2019b) Security Sector Reform; Federal Government (2019c) Interministerial Strategy for promoting the rule of law in the Context of Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management, and Peacebuilding.

3.1.1 Developing, implementing and multilaterally driving forward interministerial strategies

Institutions are strategic if they define concrete goals for action and the necessary steps to implement these goals, provide the tools and financial resources needed to implement the measures, and then regularly review their impact and modify them if necessary.²⁷⁹ Strategic capability is important to reduce the root causes of displacement, so that Germany, taking into account the prospects and capacities of the partner countries, can select the appropriate civil instruments and measures for conflict prevention and regulation, as well as, if necessary, military means to contain them, and synchronises them in cooperation with all ministries concerned. All measures must be conflict-sensitive in the sense of the *do-no-harm* principle²⁸⁰ so that they do not unintentionally exacerbate conflicts.²⁸¹ At the same time, strategic capability is essential so that Germany can contribute not just financial and human resources within the EU and in international and regional organisations (UN, NATO, OSCE), multilateral coalitions, and in bilateral work with partner countries, but can also actively help in their conceptualisation and provide long-term impetus for multilateralism and conflict prevention.

Germany is ready to assume more responsibility internationally. The German government has repeatedly and consistently acknowledged this at the latest since 2014.²⁸² In recent years, the German government has invested a great deal in order to be able to plan and act in a more strategic and coordinated manner. For example, after 2015, the Federal Foreign Office (FFO) established the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Assistance, Crisis Prevention Stabilisation and

²⁷⁹ Jansen, D. (1997) Das Problem der Akteursqualität korporativer Akteure; Siegel, J. (2019) Strategiefähigkeit (in) der Ministerialverwaltung – aus der Sicht des Public Management.

²⁸⁰ ICRC: Do no harm graphic: <https://bit.ly/3rjJ60G>.

²⁸¹ Federal Government (2017), p. 56; see also the German government’s implementation strategy for the Security Sector Reform, see Federal Government (2019b).

²⁸² Since 2014 at the latest, the Federal President and the German government have repeatedly and consistently reiterated that Germany is ready to take on more responsibility. See, inter alia: Der Bundespräsident (2014) Eröffnung der 50. Munich Security Conference: Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt: Anmerkungen zu Verantwortung, Normen und Bündnissen; Ischinger, W. and Messner, D. (2017) Deutschlands neue Verantwortung: die Zukunft der deutschen und europäischen Außen-, Entwicklungs- und Sicherheitspolitik.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction.²⁸³ In the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), a new Directorate for Displacement and Migration, Crisis Prevention and Management was set up in 2016. The increased awareness of responsibility is reflected not least in Germany's growing financial support for new instruments²⁸⁴, initiatives and multilateral organisations that focus specifically on crisis contexts and the concerns of refugees, internally displaced persons and migrants. Germany is thus an international pioneer in responding quickly and substantially to the increased need for support in the face of growing crises.²⁸⁵ The central aim is to link the instruments of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP nexus).²⁸⁶

In order to better coordinate the use of funds between the ministries and to strategically strengthen networked action, the FFO and BMZ have developed the concept of "Joint Analysis and Coordinated Planning" (GAAP). They now apply this concept to 16 countries and the African Union (AU Commission). In addition, the 2019 Operations Manual for the Interministerial Approach to Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts and

Building Peace aims to promote coherent action among ministries engaged in fragile contexts.²⁸⁷

With the Crisis Prevention guidelines from 2017, beyond the improvement of the institutional conditions, the conceptual framework for strategies, which are expected to erode the base of conflicts and thus also reduce the root causes of displacement, was laid. The German government has become increasingly involved in the analysis and development of strategies in a number of international conflicts. For example, Germany plays a leading role in the international response to the Ukraine conflict²⁸⁸ and has co-chaired the Stabilisation Working Group of the Global Coalition against Daesh (→ **Box 16**).²⁸⁹ At the Berlin Conference on Libya, working groups and structures were created to resolve the conflict in order to support the UN-led peace process.²⁹⁰

Furthermore, the German government has invested significantly in data collection, analysis and early warning systems to better anticipate conflicts and outbreaks of violence. In the process, digital technologies and machine learning methods are increasingly being used for the early detection of security risks.²⁹¹ Existing databases of international organisations can also be used with IT support to improve the forecasting of migration movements (→ **Chap 2.8**). An interministerial

²⁸³ FFO (2015) Review 2014 – Außenpolitik weiter denken: „Krise, Ordnung, Europa“, p. 44; see also FFO (2021c) Directorate-General for Humanitarian Assistance, Crisis Prevention Stabilisation and Post-Conflict Reconstruction.

²⁸⁴ Supplementing the BMZ's capacity-building transition assistance, new instruments were created to build prospects specifically for refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities locally ("Special Initiative on Displacement/Partnership for Prospects Middle East" – see: BMZ: Reducing root causes of displacement – Stabilising host regions – Supporting refugees: https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/Sonderinitiative-Fluchtursachen-bekaempfen-Fluechtlinge-reintegrieren/deutsche_politik/index.jsp), supporting voluntary return ("Perspektive Heimat" (Perspective Heimat) programme – see: BMZ [2019] Perspektive Heimat – Ein Programm für Bleibeperspektiven, Rückkehr und Reintegration) as well as to enable legal and development-friendly migration ("Migration for Development" programme – see: GIZ: "Migration for Development" [PME] programme: <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/62318.html>).

²⁸⁵ With the "Special Initiative on Displacement," the BMZ created an instrument with a high degree of flexibility and responsiveness in 2014; other programmes have been converted into multi-year programmes, for example in connection with the Syria crisis (→ **Chap. 3.4 und 3.6**). For an international comparison, see Gagnon, J. and Rodrigues, M. (2020) Towards More Sustainable Solutions to Forced Displacement: What Measures Are Donor Countries Applying to Forced Displacement in Developing Countries?

²⁸⁶ For a general definition of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, see Centre For Humanitarian Action: <https://kurzelinks.de/n74j>; Hövels, S. (2020) Triple Nexus to Go: Humanitarian Topics Explained; Weishaupt, S. (2020) The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: Towards Differentiated Configurations.

²⁸⁷ Federal Government (2019d) Operations Manual: Interministerial Approach to Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts and Building Peace. Regular coordination takes place at all levels, from the state secretary level to the working level, for instance, the interministerial Working Group for Early Crisis Detection, the coordinating group on "Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management, Peacebuilding," or the interministerial Africa Committee.

²⁸⁸ Menzer, J. (2020) Der Russland-Ukraine-Konflikt zwischen Trumps Amerika und Putins Russland, p. 19 et seq.

²⁸⁹ FFO (2021b) Continuing the fight against IS with determination.

²⁹⁰ FFO (2021a) Forging ahead - one year after the Berlin Libya Conference.

²⁹¹ These include, for example, the EU's *Global Conflict Risk Index* (GCRI) or the pilot project "Metis" of the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) and the University of the Federal Armed Forces Munich. In 2020, the FFO launched the PREVIEW system, which also uses machine learning methods to collect publicly available data on the political, economic and social situation in specific countries in order to identify crises and conflicts at an early stage. A functionally similar digital assistance system, "Early Crisis Detection – IT Support" (IT-U KFE), is also currently being implemented in the BMVg for improved prediction of crisis potentials in military contexts, see BMVg (2020) Bundesministerium der Verteidigung startet „Kompetenzzentrum Krisenfrüherkennung“; see also the other programme descriptions: Halkia, S., Ferri, S., Papazoglou, M. et al. (2019) Dynamic Global Conflict Risk Index; BMVg (2017) Pilot project Metis launched; FFO (2020a) Krisenfrüherkennung, Konfliktanalyse und Strategische Vorausschau.

Box 16

Coherent ministerial involvement of the German government in Iraq

The German government's civilian and military involvement in Iraq in the fight against the Islamic State (IS) terrorist organisation demonstrates important approaches to coherent strategic ministerial planning and action. Since March 2015, Germany, together with the United States and the United Arab Emirates, has chaired the Stabilisation Working Group, which is responsible for restoring basic services and reconstruction in the liberated areas as part of the Global Coalition Against Daesh. In addition, Germany, along with the Iraqi government, co-chairs the *Stabilisation Task Force*, which helps coordinate international stabilisation efforts and civilian support for the country, which has been wracked by war, terror, and government failure. Germany thus exerts considerable influence on the strategic direction of the international community's involvement in the further development of Iraq and beyond.

Furthermore, the German government has also made different contributions of its own during the various phases of conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction: As part of the Global Coalition Against Daesh, the *Bundeswehr* (Federal Armed Forces) has participated in the fight against IS since December 2015 by providing reconnaissance, aerial refuelling and personnel, as well as training and equipment assistance to Iraqi armed and security forces, thereby helping the coalition liberate areas that IS had taken under its control. Other contributions include humanitarian assistance, stabilisation measures, strengthening resilience, and reconstruction assistance in areas liberated from IS, as well as measures to promote peace, coming to terms with human rights violations, sustainable economic development and employment support, and good governance.²⁹² This interministerial involvement will continue and is making an important contribution to the stabilisation, reconstruction, and development of Iraq. Through infrastructure measures and the creation of local economic prospects, it is contributing to the gradual return of internally displaced persons in particular and is limiting further displacement from Iraq.

structure has been created within the German government for this purpose (→ also **Spotlight – Digital technologies**).²⁹³

Despite these investments and conceptual developments, the German government has been repeatedly accused of lacking consistent strategic capability in view of a large number of current and impending crises and conflicts.²⁹⁴ The criticism is justified insofar as the findings from the data and reports are often underutilised and are insufficiently translated into political action. In both Berlin and Brussels, early crisis

detection has only been inadequately linked to political decision-making processes so far. In addition, the German government invested in the capacities needed to develop strategies only at a later stage and rather hesitantly until now. In many places, there is a lack of personnel who could support the German contribution to promising strategic approaches beyond the sometimes considerable financial contributions. For example, the German government was relatively quick to support the French Sahel strategy by deploying the *Bundeswehr*. However, the French approach has been controversial. Germany has made efforts to expand its political and strategic input on the Sahel. For a long time, it has not been able to act as a strategic discussion partner and promote a coordinated use of diplomatic, development-policy and security-policy measures.

While the comprehensive concept of security gives policymakers a holistic understanding of security in which civilian crisis prevention is crucial, the public debate is often still dominated by a division between military and civilian. The German government could facilitate a well-founded public discussion about the various options for action by articulating more clearly

²⁹² FFO (2020b) Iraq: Beziehungen zu Deutschland; German Federal Parliament (2018) Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Lage in Irak und zum deutschen Irak-Engagement p. 3 et seq.; GIZ: Iraq; GIZ local staff: <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/52758.html>; UNOCHA (2020) Do No Harm Guidance Note for Defining Humanitarian Engagement When Serious Humanitarian and Protection Concerns Are Present.

²⁹³ In 2015, for example, the German government invited IOM to set up its Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) in Berlin. The facility collects and analyses data on migration and displacement, makes it available to policymakers and researchers, and processes it for the public, see: IOM's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre: <https://gmdac.iom.int/>.

²⁹⁴ Cf. Techau, J. (2018) Strategic Competence and Weltschmerz: German Foreign Policy until 2030 – Germany and the World 2030; Brockmeier, S. and Rotmann, P. (2019) Krieg vor der Haustür: Die Gewalt in Europas Nachbarschaft und was wir dagegen tun können.

which instruments are basically possible and according to which criteria it evaluates and ultimately selects them. Particularly with regard to military cooperation, difficult political and strategic balancing issues always arise. In August 2014, for example, the German government decided to supply military equipment to Iraqi security forces in the Kurdistan-Iraq region in the context of the armed conflict with the Islamic State (IS/Daesh) terrorist organisation in Iraq, even though this involved supplying weapons to a war zone. The aim was to support the Peshmerga in their fight against IS and consequently prevent the most serious human rights violations.²⁹⁵

What should we do?

1) Combine analysis capabilities and review the effects.²⁹⁶ The German government should work to align and better consolidate the German, European and international data bases and analytical capacities more comprehensively and support the expansion of the Berlin-based *Global Migration Data Analysis Centre* (GMDAC) in analysing data on displacement and migration.²⁹⁷ Conflict risk analyses and early warning systems should focus more than before on medium and long-term conflict and consequently on displacement risks so that prevention strategies can be developed in good time and with as much foresight as possible. Human rights violations and escalating conflicts should be systematically evaluated in order to develop strategies to enable conflict resolution in as nonviolent a manner as possible.

In order to increase the long-term strategic capability, its effectiveness in implementation should be independently monitored.

2) Develop, implement, and communicate the interministerial country and regional strategies more consistently. Beyond the GAAP concept, the German government should create a reliable institutional framework by consistently implementing the processes listed in the Operations Manual.

²⁹⁵ German government (2014) Support for the Kurds in Iraq: ISIS terror.

²⁹⁶ Abstention by Dr. Steffen Angenendt (member of GMDAC's Scientific Advisory Board since 2016).

²⁹⁷ See IOM's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre: <https://gmdac.iom.int/>.

To this end, the Commission recommends expanding the mandate, composition and working methods of the Federal Security Council or creating an additional body. The objective should be a "Council for Peace, Security and Development" in which the ministries of foreign affairs, interior, defence, justice, economic cooperation and development, economics and energy are represented as well as the ministries of food and agriculture and for the environment. The coordinating group on "Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Building Peace" is to prepare the meetings of the Council. The Council should

- › systematically evaluate interministerial early warning indicators, in particular on medium and long-term conflict and displacement risks, and on this basis set clear goals for German foreign, security and development policy;
- › analyse the use of instruments of individual ministries, the EU, multilateral institutions and partners to achieve jointly defined goals;
- › ensure a coordinated approach between humanitarian aid, development cooperation and peace-building (HDP nexus) and ensure that the measures developed do not contradict each other (for example, in possibly conflicting areas such as economy and environmental protection) but complement and reinforce each other;
- › systematically involve independent institutions and civil society in the analysis of information and the working out options for action.²⁹⁸

The public should be informed in a transparent manner about all deliberations and decisions of the Council that are not subject to diplomatic or military confidentiality. On this basis, the German government can also represent the chosen strategy and its implementation in the EU and internationally better.

3) Enhance the German and European peace research and use the findings for better implementation.²⁹⁹ In order to improve the knowledge bases in dealing with

²⁹⁸ Consultation with external experts by the Council should become a central element for the development of strategies that represent various scientific disciplines (such as regional expertise, terrorism research, trauma therapy) and civil society expertise. The German government should also make greater use of the analyses and practical experience of the Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention and Peace Building.

²⁹⁹ Abstention of Commission member Prof. Dr. Heike Krieger (member of the Board of Trustees of the German Foundation for Peace Research and former Chair of the Scientific Advisory Board since 2020).

fragile contexts, violent conflicts, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, peace and conflict research should be systematically promoted at national and European level. At the national level, the German government should provide long-term financial security for the work of the German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF), which was established in 2000 as a federal foundation. In order for the DSF to be able to fulfil its mission of promoting research in the long term, the foundation capital must be increased substantially, as called for by the German Science Council in an evaluation of the peace and conflict research in 2019. With additional funding, the DSF could provide targeted support for research and knowledge transfer on crisis and violence prevention at the European level.

Furthermore, the German government should advocate that the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation be supplemented with a focus on “peace and conflict research” and that the OSCE’s early warning and analysis capacities be sustainably supported with EU funds.

3.1.2 Strengthening Germany’s role in the implementation of civil approaches to crisis prevention and conflict regulation

With regard to crisis prevention, the German government’s 2017 guidelines and interministerial strategies clearly state that civilian approaches and means have priority wherever possible in an overall political strategy. The guidelines also emphasise the important contribution of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of weapons to sustainable and stable peace orders.³⁰⁰ The first priority is to address the causes of conflict in concrete terms, to promote peace by strengthening social cohesion and to mediate in cases of disputes. However, this also includes pushing for respect for human rights and principles of the rule of law and taking action against impunity for crimes under international law, especially genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Art. 5 Sec. 1 of the ICC Statute), which are among the central causes of displacement. In view of the political fragmentation

of the UN Security Council, which has made decisive action impossible, for example, in the case of the Syrian regime using chemical weapons, Germany’s consistent efforts to punish crimes under international law within the framework of international criminal jurisdiction³⁰¹ and to further advance efforts to reform the UN Security Council are all the more important.³⁰²

Since the end of the 1990s, Germany has created a number of institutions, formats and funding instruments to support crisis prevention and civil conflict resolution in cooperation with civil society actors.³⁰³ An important first building block for the development of an infrastructure for civil conflict resolution in the German government was the interministerial committee consisting of representatives of all ministries involved. This committee developed the 2004 Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding³⁰⁴ and was responsible for its implementation. In 2018, the Advisory Council on Civilian Crisis Prevention and Peacebuilding was established, which comprises experts from various civil society organisations and academic institutions and advises the federal ministries.³⁰⁵

Germany enjoys acceptance as a bridge builder and mediator at the international level and should continue to strategically expand this profile. With the 2017 Guidelines on Conflict Prevention, the German government has formed the right conceptual strategic

³⁰⁰ The primacy of the political and the precedence of prevention apply in these guidelines. The use of military force is the last resort; civilian measures are to be given priority wherever possible.

³⁰¹ In addition to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, crimes under international law can be tried worldwide in accordance with the principle of international law. On this basis, the first trial of perpetrators of the Assad regime is taking place in Germany at the Higher Regional Court of Koblenz, see Higher Regional Court of Koblenz (2021) Urteil gegen einen mutmaßlichen Mitarbeiter des syrischen Geheimdienstes wegen Beihilfe zu einem Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit.

³⁰² FFO (2020c) Reform of the United Nations Security Council.

³⁰³ In 2002, the Berlin Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) was established, amongst others, to train and delegates personnel for international peace missions. Since 2001, the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (ifa) has hosted the “zivik” funding programme, which supports non-governmental organisations around the world in preventing or resolving conflicts. In 1999, various German development and aid organisations joined forces with the BMZ to launch the Civil Peace Service (ZFD), which qualifies specialists in peaceful conflict management and delegates them on missions abroad. The German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF), founded in 2000, promotes scientific research on the prevention of violence. The Working Group on Peace and Development (FriEnt) promotes the exchange between state institutions and church aid organisations, civil society networks and political foundations.

³⁰⁴ The 2004 Action Plan was replaced in 2017 by the Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace, see Federal Government (2017), p. 14.

³⁰⁵ FFO (2021e) Neuer Beirat: Frische Expertise für die Friedensarbeit der Bundesregierung.

framework. It should pursue the implementation of the ambitious goals with even greater commitment.³⁰⁶

What should we do?

1) Enhance capacities for mediation and humanitarian diplomacy, strengthen Germany's role as bridge builder and mediator. Mediation refers to the intervention in conflict resolution initiated voluntarily by a third party in negotiation and dialogue processes that is accepted by all sides. Mediation is used in the prevention, in the accompaniment of ceasefire negotiations or in the implementation of agreements, and often supports subsequent political reform processes. In the past, the German government has played a central role in EU mediation activities in the Eastern neighbourhood and in measures taken by the OSCE. It should make greater use of these capabilities also in the Southern neighbourhood policy and provide even greater support for the EU's potential in this area. Cooperation with regional organisations³⁰⁷ should be expanded and greater use made of their diplomatic potential.

In order to further develop its capacities in the area of mediation, the German government should, firstly, further strengthen the integrated approach of the Berlin Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) by expanding the pool of experts and making use of it. Second, it should intensify its cooperation with NGOs that have mediation expertise and exchange experiences even more systematically.

Another focus should be on promoting "insider mediators": These are local people in crisis-prone regions who are competent in engaging in dialogue with the various interest groups and mediating between conflict parties. In this way, local competencies and resources can be strengthened at the same time. In all mediation processes, the equal participation of women should be

ensured wherever possible in order to give women's interests and needs a voice.³⁰⁸

In addition, the German government should focus on reinforcing civil society peace actors such as human rights defenders in crisis and post-conflict regions. Since they are often under pressure and work under difficult conditions, the support concepts for these actors should be more closely adapted to local needs and contexts.

Furthermore, Germany should provide greater support for humanitarian diplomacy efforts in order to create or maintain access for actors of humanitarian aid and development cooperation in the event of a crisis, to ensure basic care and support for the civil society, and thus to prevent displacement. In most conflict areas, humanitarian organisations work out joint positions and strategies under the leadership of the respective UN Humanitarian Coordinator or in the coordination mechanisms of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.³⁰⁹ Germany should provide greater political support for the work of the humanitarian coordinators by espousing all conflict parties for negotiations and deliveries of aid and supporting the mandates of the humanitarian organisations together with other donor countries. In this context, it is important to develop transformative development and peace approaches for long-term solutions from the outset, even in acute crises.

2) Review arms exports. Between 2018 and 2020, 48 percent of export licences for German arms exports went to countries outside the EU and NATO, primarily to states in the Middle East and North Africa. The five authoritarian Arab states of Egypt, Algeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates alone accounted for more than half of these export licences, at 4.7 billion euros.³¹⁰ This export policy is questionable not only against the background of the poor human rights record in these countries. German arms deliveries

³⁰⁶ The implementation of the 50 voluntary commitments from the guidelines was reviewed in 2020 and the status presented in an implementation report on 31 March 2021. The report on the implementation of the guidelines highlights, as a key mission for the next four years, further efforts for effective integrated planning and coordination to continuously expand and improve interministerial cooperation for early crisis detection, for prevention, as well as for effective crisis management. FFO (2021d) Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace: Report on the Implementation of the Federal Government Guidelines.

³⁰⁷ For example, with the African Union (AU) and regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

³⁰⁸ Cf. Federal Government (2017).

³⁰⁹ UNOCHA (2017) Humanitarian Coordination Leadership.

³¹⁰ Hüllinghorst, Y. and Roll, S. (2020); BMWi (2019a) Report by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on Its Policy on Exports of Conventional Military Equipment in 2018; BMWi (2020) Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Jahre 2019; Deutscher Bundestag (2020) Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 14. Dezember 2020 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung.

could contribute to further escalating the numerous interstate conflicts in the region.

The German government should therefore review its licensing practice for third countries. The existing arms export guidelines, in which tensions and the threat of “armed conflicts” are explicitly named as exclusion criteria for arms exports, provide pointers for a reorientation.³¹¹ The fact that, despite the announced restrictive practice, war weapons continue to be exported to crisis regions shows that the 2008 EU Common Position on Arms Exports, which formulated strict criteria to prevent the transfer of munition to war zones, need to be urgently implemented by all EU member states.³¹² The German government should set a good example and introduce an arms export control law in Germany that requires companies to provide proof of diligence.

3) Align security cooperation initiatives to the *do-no-harm* principle. In the case of cooperation initiatives aimed at training and equipping security apparatuses in third countries, in which Germany participates in a bilateral and multilateral framework, it must be ensured that the partners respect human rights and that the security apparatuses are subject to civilian control and democratic supervision.³¹³

In this regard, the German government should align its actions with the UN Resolution 2553 on *Security Sector Governance and Reform* (SSG/R), which was adopted by the UN Security Council in December 2020.³¹⁴ This resolution states that security sector reforms in the context of peace agreements and peace operations can have a peacebuilding effect under certain conditions.

³¹¹ “The delivery of war weapons and other armaments related to war weapons is not authorised to countries, – that are involved in armed conflicts or where there is a threat of such a conflict, – where there is a threat of an outbreak of armed conflicts or where existing tensions and conflicts would be triggered, perpetuated, or exacerbated by the export.” See BMWi (2014) Politische Grundsätze der Bundesregierung für den Export von Kriegswaffen und sonstigen Rüstungsgütern, p. 7.

³¹² Council of the European Union (2008) Council common position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment; bpb and BICC (2011) Gemeinsamer Standpunkt der Europäischen Union (EU) für Rüstungsexporte.

³¹³ The 2019 interministerial strategy “Supporting the Security Sector Reform (SSR)” also provides that: “The federal government contributes to strengthening democratic oversight, good governance, as well as civilian control in security sector institutions in partner countries.” See Federal Government (2019b), p. 24.

³¹⁴ UN (2020b) Security Council Updates Reform Text to Address Gaps in Post-Conflict States, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2553.

At the same time, however, it states that one-dimensional measures towards the capacity-building of the police and armed forces fall short and that cooperation in the security sector must be integrated into comprehensive national reform processes. Success in the area of security sector reform thus depends on the extent to which governance, i.e. the structure, management and control of the police and armed forces, is guaranteed. By helping to implement this resolution, the German government can improve interministerial action with a view to conflict sensitivity.


4) Increase the number of women as actors in crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peace building. With UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and its follow-up resolutions, the international community has committed itself not only to protecting women’s rights, but also to involving women on an equal footing in peace negotiations, conflict resolution and reconstruction. According to scientific studies, conflicts that threatened to turn into armed conflicts were defused more sustainably when women were involved at as many levels as possible.³¹⁵ In post-conflict countries and in countries undergoing transformation processes, the reconstruction period is important for preparing the groundwork for women to break out of established gender structures as agents of change and take on supporting and leadership roles in politics, the economy and society. The goal of the German government should therefore be to advocate for more gender equality along the lines of the German government’s National Action Plan for the Implementation of Resolution 1325, if possible at all working levels in the conflict cycle.³¹⁶ As one of the world’s most important donor countries, Germany should not only support local efforts by women, but also provide impetus itself.³¹⁷

³¹⁵ UN Women (2015) Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, p. 54 f.; Dixon, S., Paffenholz, T., Ross, N. et al. (2016) Making Women Count – Not Just Counting Women: Assessing Women’s Inclusion and Influence on Peace Negotiations, p. 22.

³¹⁶ Violence prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace promotion, see UN (1992) An Agenda for Peace.

³¹⁷ An example of this is the Global Action Network on Forced Displacement – Women as Agents of Change launched in October 2020. See Women’s Peace & Humanitarian Fund: Global: New Network Accelerates Action for Women in Forced Displacement: <https://wphfund.org/2021/01/27/global-new-network-launch-accelerates-action-for-women-in-forced-displacement/>.

3.2 Securing livelihoods and creating new opportunities for development



RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- 1 **Consistently promote and demand good governance** – even in fragile states and countries with authoritarian regimes. Good governance is a basic prerequisite for people to find basic provision and development prospects in their home countries. Therefore, the German government should select appropriate and coherent instruments and partners on a country-specific basis. It should further support actors from the civil society and strengthen the collaboration with regional organisations such as the African Union. → 3.2.1
- 2 **Support the state and local administrations in ensuring basic public services for all.** Apart from controlling the rural exodus, the German government should also strengthen urban development and strategically support the improvement of living conditions especially in the poor urban districts. This also enlarges the opportunities for internally displaced persons and refugees, who mainly seek protection in the cities. → 3.2.1
- 3 **Ensure education and health care.** The holistic strengthening of the education and health care systems in poor and fragile countries should be in the focus of development policy. Good primary and secondary education form the basis of individual and social development and should therefore be encouraged unabatedly. Barriers for women and girls to obtain education must be dismantled and the digitalisation opportunities should be used. Access to vaccinations and medications is elementary for controlling illnesses and pandemics in a spirit of solidarity. → 3.2.2
- 4 **Establish social protection systems.** Protecting people from health, economic, or weather-related risks and shocks, is an effective means to promote welfare and social participation, reduce poverty and remove uncertainties. Therefore, the German government should drive the development of social protection systems in countries of origin and host countries of the refugees, displaced persons as well as irregular migrants through focussed allocation of financial resources. → 3.2.3
- 5 **Enhance agricultural productivity.** The German government should strongly promote activities to increase agricultural productivity and ecological restructuring, to ensure sufficient food and to maintain the development and attractiveness of the agricultural sector for employment. This includes the protection of land rights and the promotion of innovations and local supply chains. → 3.2.4
- 6 **Intensify vocational training.** The focus should be placed on a practice-based orientation of the vocational training. Activities in this area should be realised in cooperation with German and European companies and – where applicable – with the training partnerships described in Chapter 3.5. → 3.2.5
- 7 **Improve the climate for investments.** In its development policy measures aimed at the economy, the German government should concentrate on strengthening those institutions, which can improve the conditions for entrepreneurship and investments. Activities in this area should particularly consider the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises and the digitalisation of administrative processes. → 3.2.5
- 8 **Develop the international trade policy further.** To achieve this, Germany and the EU should consistently support regional free trade agreements (especially AfCFTA) and simplify the so-called rules of origin for all finished and semi-finished products exported into the EU from developing countries for the benefit of their local producers and apply the rules of origin more generously than before. → 3.2.5

Conflicts are a central cause of displacement. The triggers for the conflicts, in turn, are often rooted in or exacerbated by poverty and hunger, lack of economic prospects, political repression or scarce resources. These structural drivers can in turn be reasons for displacement and, above all, irregular migration. Either way: secure livelihoods and development prospects are important prerequisites for people to be able to stay in their home countries. Precarious living conditions are often the reason why entire families migrate or at least send one family member to find better income opportunities elsewhere and provide for their relatives. Food insecurity and hunger lead to distribution conflicts. A lack of education worsens opportunities in the labour market and for political participation. Poverty and low prospects of earning their own income increase the likelihood that young people in particular will emigrate and take illegal routes to do so – or seek a future in criminal or extremist groups (→ [Chap 2.3](#)).

It is the responsibility of the state to create favourable conditions for individual and societal development (→ [Chap 2.2](#)). The following recommendations show how the German government can support the current and potential countries of origin of refugees and irregular migrants in creating or expanding these conditions. In order to meet people's basic needs and open up prospects for their development and remaining in their home countries, the Commission believes that efforts are needed in the following core areas:

1. Strengthening state institutions for basic service provision and development prospects
2. Striving for education and health for all
3. Establishing social protection systems
4. Enhancing agricultural productivity
5. Promoting sustainable economic development in the industrial and service sectors

Measures in these areas must be financially as well as environmentally and socially sustainable to ensure that improvements are lasting. They should also increase resilience, i.e. give the population a foothold in times of crisis, such as natural disasters or pandemics, and thus help prevent forced migration.

The following measures address the structural causes of displacement and irregular migration and therefore have a medium to long-term impact. They require a lot of patience and the broadest possible alliance within the

EU and with other international actors. The framework is provided by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Even if the improvement of livelihoods and development prospects in poor regions of the world is a core task of the BMZ, it is a cross-ministerial task to which instruments from various policy areas must contribute.

It is not only in their home countries that people's living conditions need to be improved. Those who have already been forced to leave their home countries also need basic services. This is particularly important in situations of prolonged displacement and applies both to refugees and displaced persons who find shelter in camps, as well as to those who live in other types of accommodation. This has a significant influence on their decision to remain in the host region or country and not to leave again in search of prospects in a third country (→ [Chap. 3.4](#)).

3.2.1 Strengthening state institutions for basic service provision and development prospects

Where governments and state institutions assume responsibility for protecting the population of their country, making it possible to meet their basic needs and creating suitable conditions for personal fulfilment and societal development, the causes of displacement and involuntary migration are significantly reduced. However, the will and ability of governments to meet this demand varies considerably. The number of fragile countries and regions in which people are denied not just protection but also their social, cultural and economic human rights is increasing.³¹⁸ But even in some countries with a good economic starting position or a formally stable system of government, an adequate standard of living is not assured for large sections of the population. Even young democracies such as Tunisia, which are on the way to making their governments and administrative structures more efficient, are frequently not in a position to meet the population's expectations of a significant improvement in their living conditions in the short and medium term.³¹⁹

³¹⁸ OECD (2020a), p. 17.

³¹⁹ Dix, H. (2020) Tunesien im Arabischen Frühling. Zwischenruf zehn Jahre nach der Revolution; Meyer, H. (2021) Auf wackeligen Beinen: Zehn Jahre nach der gelungenen Revolution herrschen Klientelismus und Populismus in Tunesien – die Migrationszahlen steigen.

The prerequisites for basic service provision and development prospects are functioning state institutions, transparent and efficient rules and a government that enjoys the trust of the population. That is why the German government promotes good governance. To this end, it relies on political dialogue, development cooperation with reform-minded governments and institutions, and incentives and support in various policy areas to improve the rule of law, fight corruption, promote democracy, reform administrations, levy taxes fairly and transparently, and use them in a development-oriented and efficient manner (good financial governance). Good governance includes giving space to a strong and independent civil society and guaranteeing political and individual human rights, especially freedom of expression and assembly. The German government therefore works intensively with local civil society partners.

Cooperation is particularly difficult with fragile states, where people are most in need of aid, but governments are usually unable or unwilling to guarantee security, education, health care and infrastructure.³²⁰ For this reason, these states are particularly important for reducing the root causes of displacement and irregular migration. In order to at least reduce the causes there, the German government is increasingly working with non-governmental groups and multilateral organisations. Through them, the beneficiaries can be reached without the direct involvement of the government, especially in countries with poor governance. In this way, authoritarian structures are not legitimised or even strengthened. As part of its Action Plan on Human Rights,³²¹ the German government supports projects run by local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), for example, which help to maintain the room for manoeuvre in civil society.³²² In a project financed by the FFO, it also offers protection and support to persecuted

researchers, cultural workers and human rights defenders, either locally or abroad.³²³ Finally, the German government supports international research as well as monitoring and coordination mechanisms on good governance and on the fragility of states in order to improve the data pool and basis for decision-making.³²⁴

What should we do?

1) Consistently promote and demand good governance. The German government should systematically step up its engagement in this area across all ministries. Germany should also work to improve governance in fragile states and countries with authoritarian regimes. To this end, the German government should select appropriate instruments and partners on a country-specific basis. Wherever possible, institutions interested in good governance should be reinforced and improvements and reform goals achieved through concrete incentives. This can also be done in the context of task-oriented cooperation, for example for education and healthcare (→ **Chap. 3.2.2**), enhanced climate protection (→ **Chap. 3.3**), for the improvement of investment conditions (→ **Chap. 3.2.5**) or in the context of migration partnerships (→ **Chap. 3.5.4**).

Particular importance is attached to the fight against corruption, as corruption plays a key role in weakening of trust in state structures. In addition, human rights defenders and other **civil society** actors must be supported. Their rights and freedoms are being restricted worldwide (→ **Chap. 2.2**), and they increasingly need protection as well as support. All programmes of the German government should be examined to determine the extent to which they contribute to establishing and consolidating structures that are geared to the needs and human rights³²⁵ of the population.

Where authoritarian governments show no willingness to implement reforms in favour of good governance,

³²⁰ According to the OECD's (2020a) report on States of Fragility, 35 fragile countries were classified as authoritarian in 2019, 17 as hybrid regimes, and two as incomplete democracies. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) uses the *Democracy Index* by the *Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)* as a source for this.

³²¹ The Action Plan is part of the German government's 14th Human Rights Report. See FFO (2020d) Fourteenth Human Rights Report of the German Government: Reference period: 1 October 2018 until 30 September 2020.

³²² Governance, readiness for reform, and fragility were also used as criteria in the reorientation of cooperation with partner countries worldwide that took place in 2020. Cf. BMZ (2020a) Reformkonzept „BMZ 2030“ Umdenken – Umsteuern, p. 5–7.

³²³ FFO (2020e) Wer Menschenrechte verteidigt, muss geschützt werden; ifa: Elisabeth-Selbert-Initiative: <https://www.ifa.de/en/fundings/elisabeth-selbert-initiative/>.

³²⁴ For example, OECD: About GOVNET: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/accountable-effective-institutions/about-govnet.htm>; and OECD (2020b) The International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF).

³²⁵ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example Art. 25 on living standards. See bpb (2018) 70 Jahre Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte.

the German government should identify shortcomings more than has hitherto been the case and explain and implement consequences in a transparent manner. Conceivable measures include restrictions on the issuance of visas and the blocking of accounts for persons linked to the government. Such measures will not influence the willingness to pursue reform in the short term. However, they make it clear that Germany, the EU and the international community are taking a stand. If sustained with perseverance, they can lead to improvements.³²⁶

Nevertheless, political dialogue should also be maintained with authoritarian governments. Development measures should benefit the population exclusively and directly. Although humanitarian aid interventions must follow the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, the actors must work to ensure that humanitarian aid does not serve to support a regime. Conflicting goals in cooperation with authoritarian states should be assessed on an interministerial basis for each individual country and should lead to a coherent strategy.

Just as important as bilateral relations with a country is **cooperation with regional organisations** committed to goals or standards of good governance. The German government should further develop these. For example, the member states of the African Union (AU) have committed themselves to respect for human rights, democracy, gender equality and the rule of law in their Agenda 2063, as have the member states of subregional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Southern African Development Community (SADC).³²⁷ They should be supported in achieving the goals and standards agreed upon by their members.

³²⁶ On the difficulties of dealing with authoritarian regimes in the context of displacement and migration, see for example Koch, A., Weber, A. and Werenfels, I. (2018) *Profiteers of Migration? Authoritarian States in Africa and European Migration Management*.

³²⁷ African Union Commission (2015) *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want*. Here, in 2015, African states committed themselves to, among other things, respect for human rights, democracy, gender equality, and the rule of law. For an overview of SADC's protocols, vision, and mission, see SADC: SADC Protocol: <https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sa-protocols/>; for ECOWAS's Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, see OHCHR (2001) *Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (A/SP1/12/01)*; Asserate, A. W. (2016) *Die neue Völkerwanderung: Wer Europa bewahren will, muss Afrika retten*, p. 193.

Multilateral forums could be used more intensively to achieve progress in terms of commonly defined goals. In addition to overarching goals such as the SDGs of the UN Agenda 2030 or international conventions, agreements whose compliance brings concrete benefits for countries are particularly suitable. For example, the *Financial Action Task Force* (FATF) sets and reviews international standards to prevent money laundering, financing of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The FATF also calls on non-members where it finds shortcomings to control illicit monetary flows and, through the public listing of uncooperative states, has an important lever to ensure compliance with the standards.³²⁸

In all of this, coherent action by the various actors of the German government and the EU is necessary. The sanctions regimes against human rights violations adopted by EU foreign ministers at the end of 2020 are a good example of this.³²⁹

2) Support the state and local administrations in ensuring basic services for all. Where governments strive to ensure basic services for their populations, political participation and legal security, the German government should support these efforts as best it can across all ministries. After all, these are core prerequisites for sustainably reducing the causes of displacement and irregular migration.

In many places, there is already a lack of access to clean water, sanitary facilities and provisions for the disposal of wastewater (SDG 6). However, there are also considerable gaps in the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in the areas of food security (SDG 2), health care (SDG 3) and state institutions in the education and energy sectors (SDGs 4 and 7). The German government should therefore work to ensure that states assume their own responsibility for the provision of basic services to the population by generating and

³²⁸ The FATF was established in 1989 and is affiliated to the OECD. Over 200 countries have now committed to comply with the standards, see FATF: *Who We Are*: <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/whoweare/>. On 1 July 2020, Germany assumed the chairmanship of the FATF and aims to make progress in combating illicit arms trafficking and smuggling, among other issues. See BMF (2020) *Deutschland übernimmt für zwei Jahre FATF-Präsidentschaft*.

³²⁹ European Union (2020) *Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses*.

Box 17

Lagos – a megacity as a link between rural exodus and international migration

The Nigerian coastal city of Lagos is growing faster than any other city in the world. While the population of Nigeria has risen from 45 million in 1960 to 209 million today, an almost fivefold increase, the population of the Lagos metropolitan region has skyrocketed from 762,000 to about 14 million in the same period.³³⁰ It is therefore now about 18 times larger. One reason for the rapid growth is immigration from rural regions of Nigeria. The government has failed to modernise agriculture in these regions and to implement its plans to establish industry in rural areas, despite temporarily high revenues from oil production.³³¹

Lagos is a prime example of the economic power and allure of large cities: A quarter to a third of Nigeria's gross domestic product (GDP) is generated here. Banks, technology companies and the film industry are booming, and start-ups find investors relatively easily. Nevertheless, the supply of jobs lags far behind the growing number of job seekers, especially young job seekers. The predominantly youthful influxes from the countryside end up primarily in the poor neighbourhoods of Lagos, where the majority of the population is younger than 30 anyway. Dramatic contrasts between the glittering city centre, wealthy neighbourhoods and sprawling slums characterise the image of the megacity.³³²

Lagos is picking up some of the migration dynamics in Nigeria. At the same time, poor living conditions are pushing people into migrate (onward) to Europe and to the United States. The developed economies raise the expectation that life there offers better opportunities for work and participation.³³³ On this basis, immigrants from the densely populated and predominantly Christian south of Nigeria decide to migrate primarily to Europe, while those from the north who profess Islam are more likely to be drawn to the Gulf states in search of work.³³⁴

making available adequate resources through the strengthening of their tax systems and by building the necessary institutional capacities. This also includes transparency and public participation mechanisms for monitoring these basic obligations.

In addition to national institutions, the **decentralised administrative structures** in regions and municipalities are particularly important, because their efficiency has a direct impact on people's prospects of staying. The German government should do more to promote effective and transparent administrative action at sub-national levels, including with the EU and development banks, so that administrations can respond appropriately to the specific needs of the population and improve access to basic services. First, they should be supported establishing sound planning fundamentals for the provision of basic services (needs assessment, mapping, and more). Second, participation mechanisms for the population need to be established or, where they exist, strengthened. Women and youth in particular must be involved. Third, municipal and self-managed operator models should be promoted to ensure access to clean water, transport, housing and energy. Fourth, decentralised authorities should be supported in taking advantage of the opportunities offered by digitisation for transparent, citizen-oriented

³³⁰ See World Migration Review: Nigeria population 2020: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/nigeria-population> (Status as of: 22.12.2020); World Migration Review: Lagos population 2020: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/lagos-population> (Status as of: 22.12.2020).

³³¹ Idrissa, A. (2019) Dialog im Widerstreit: Folgewirkungen der EU-Migrationspolitik auf die westafrikanische Integration, dargestellt anhand der Fallbeispiele Nigeria, Mali und Niger.

³³² Toesland, F. (2019) Afrika: Enormes Wachstum von Megacities: In 80 Jahren werden die drei größten Städte der Welt auf dem Kontinent liegen; Smith, S. (2019) Nigeria: Rette sich, wer kann; Cool Geography (2015) UIC – Lagos Urban Planning: An Example of How Urban Planning Is Improving the Quality of Life for the Urban Poor, Makoko Slum Redevelopment; Amakihe, E. (2017) Forced Eviction and Demolition of Slum: A Case Study of the Makoko Slum in Lagos, Nigeria.

³³³ Idrissa, A. (2019).

³³⁴ Ayeni, A. (2017) Increasing Population, Urbanisation and Climatic Factors in Lagos State, Nigeria: The Nexus and Implications on Water Demand and Supply.

and cost-efficient administrative and participation procedures (e-governance) (→ **Spotlight – Digital technologies**).³³⁵ In all these areas, decentralised administrations must be integrated into the transformation processes of higher-level authorities.

The German government should take greater account of the special **needs of cities**. Traditionally, German development policy has focused on securing livelihoods in rural regions. This is because a large proportion of poor and extremely poor people continue to live there.³³⁶ Rural development should therefore remain a core concern of German development cooperation in the future.³³⁷ German development cooperation, on the other hand, does not yet do sufficient justice to increasing urbanisation. Cities are becoming increasingly important in reducing the root causes of (onward) displacement and irregular migration, as they are a starting point for irregular migration and a place of refuge for internally displaced persons and refugees. For example, the Nigerian megacity of Lagos serves as a migration hub (→ **Box 17**).

Migration from rural to urban areas will continue and presents opportunities. In principle, it is easier to provide basic government services in cities than in sparsely populated areas. In addition, cities act as drivers of productivity and innovation, as they generate new business models, participation processes or development proposals.³³⁸ However, people who move from poor rural areas to cities in the hope of better living conditions often do not find reliable income opportunities there. They primarily find accommodation in poor urban neighbourhoods (→ **Chap. 2.3**). Currently, about a quarter of all city dwellers worldwide, almost 900 million people, live in such slums, with another 180,000 added every day through births and immigration.³³⁹ The increase in the urban population is often

accompanied by the densification and deterioration of housing and the lack of access to water and food as well as poor sanitation. Internally displaced persons or refugees from neighbouring states also often settle there. According to current estimates, 80 percent of internally displaced persons and 60 percent of refugees worldwide live in cities.³⁴⁰

Enough reasons why the German government should provide stronger and more strategic support for improving living conditions in cities, especially in poor neighbourhoods. Fast-growing small and medium-sized cities should also be taken into consideration.

With a view to displacement and irregular migration, the German government should therefore expand its urban development activities. In doing so, it should focus particularly on cities where poor living conditions are pushing people into displacement or migration, or may do so in the future. Especially in order to improve food security in cities, the German government should become more involved in the Food and Agriculture Organisation's (FAO) *City Region Food Systems Programme*³⁴¹ and promote the participation of local civil society. Networking among cities should be promoted to make existing experiences, tools and innovative ideas more accessible.³⁴² For the development of cities and their metropolitan regions, it is essential to align all policy approaches and measures with SDG 11 of Agenda 2030: "Make cities and settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable."

3) Ensure access to water and energy. Clean water is the basis of all care, for the prevention of many diseases, for hygiene in health care, in schools, in public and private facilities (SDG 6 "Clean water and sanitation"). 2.2 billion people worldwide still do not have regular

³³⁵ See current initiatives under development by the EU, such as the Digital for Development (D4D) Hub: <https://d4dlaunch.eu/#about>, and by the German government, see GIZ: eGovernance and ICT Building Blocks: <https://toolkit-digitalisierung.de/make-it-initiative/>.

³³⁶ Müller, J. (2020) *Globaler Hunger als Verletzung der menschlichen Würde*, p. 27.

³³⁷ BMZ (2020a), p. 9 f.

³³⁸ World Bank (2017) *High-Density Cities Hold the Key to Transforming Economic Geography*; Ritchie, H. and Roser, M. (2018); see the graph, based on UN DESA 2014, in: Feltes, T. (2018) *Mastering Africa's Urban Future: Safety and Security in South African Cities*, p. 22.

³³⁹ BMZ: *Hintergrund: Das Zeitalter der Städte*: <https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/stadtentwicklung/hintergrund/index.html>.

³⁴⁰ Park, H. (2016) *The Power of Cities: Cities Are Our Future*.

³⁴¹ FAO (2019c) *The CRFS Approach: City Region Food Systems Programme, Reinforcing Rural-Urban Linkages for Climate Resilient Food Systems*.

³⁴² UN Habitat (2020) *World Cities Report 2020: The Value of Sustainable Urbanization*, p. 296 et seq.; Ndebele-Murisa, M., Mubaya C., Pretorius, L. et al. (2020) *City to City Learning and Knowledge Exchange for Climate Resilience in Southern Africa*; on the initiative of slum dwellers, see for example, Arputham, J. (2016) *Why We Do Slum Profiles*; Beukes, A. (2015) *Making the Invisible Visible – Generating Data on 'Slums' at Local, City and Global Scales*; Mitlin, D. (2016) *Knowledge is power: Community-based data collection helps the residents of informal settlements to fight for their interests*.

access to clean drinking water.³⁴³ Providing this to the population is a government task, but governments in developing countries are not always able to do so. Reasons include local water scarcity and lack of investment in technology and maintenance capacities. With high levels of government debt, rapid progress in building and expanding the necessary infrastructure cannot be achieved by the public sector alone. In addition, there are increasing water shortages as a result of climatic changes in many regions of origin of refugees and irregular migrants. The German government should support partnerships between private companies and public utilities (→ **Box 18**).

Box 18

Locally adapted solutions for water supply using the example of Uganda

Especially in very sparsely populated rural areas, water pipes with household connections are not always realistic. Therefore, it is important to find locally adapted solutions. Wells are available in many places, but they often cannot be used because the hand pumps are defective. The social enterprise *Whave Solutions* in Uganda has found a solution to this problem. It works together with the local authorities and communities to ensure a permanent supply from existing sources for a fee: *Pump attendants* are paid to maintain the pumps and monitor their operation. The remuneration is performance-based: The maximum amount is paid only if the well functions smoothly. Thanks to this incentive system, repairs are completed within one day on average, thus ensuring a reliable drinking water supply. The tariffs are adjusted to the income of the local communities and allow the service to be economically self-sustaining. This creates crisis-proof jobs in rural communities in Uganda. *Whave Solutions* networks actors in the water supply sector to implement uniform regulations that benefit Uganda's rural population.³⁴⁴

A **demand-driven energy supply** is a fundamental prerequisite for economic and social development. Nearly three billion people worldwide do not have access to clean fuels that allow them to cook meals indoors without producing lung-damaging smoke.³⁴⁵ 789 million people worldwide did not have access to a power outlet in 2018. In sub-Saharan Africa, this was true for 548 million, or more than half of all people living there. But in India, too, 64 million inhabitants remained without electricity.³⁴⁶ Without electricity, however, no light burns to study, no refrigerator keeps food or medicines fresh, no cell phone can be charged, and no Internet works to access information. Where there is no modern energy supply, no machines can run to produce consumer goods or medicines. It is a fundamental prerequisite for investors who want to establish small businesses or large industrial enterprises and create employment opportunities.

All programmes and organisations that support poor countries in achieving the sustainable development goal of access to “affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all” (SDG 7) also improve people's prospects of staying in the country. Since the countries of origin of refugees and irregular migrants in particular usually have an enormous pent-up demand, and on the other hand, there must be no increase in energy consumption at the expense of the global climate, the focus should be on decentralised, sustainable energy systems from renewable sources (→ **Chap. 3.3**).

3.2.2 Striving for education and health for all

Good prospects for living and staying include educational opportunities and general health care – both in cities and in rural regions. It is true that poor health infrastructure or a lack of schools does not immediately force people to leave their place of residence. But if these basic services are generally lacking or impaired by violent conflicts, the desire for a functioning health system and for better educational opportunities can reinforce the decision to leave or at least influence the

³⁴³ UNESCO (2020) The UN world water development report 2020: Water and climate change. Executive summary.

³⁴⁴ See Whave Solutions: www.whave.org; TeamUp Uganda: www.teamupug.org.

³⁴⁵ UN (2020c) Sustainable Development Goals: Report (2020), p. 38.

³⁴⁶ IEA, IRENA, UNSD et al. (2020) Tracking SDG 7: The Energy Progress Report; or as an interactive visualisation (also country-specific), see IEA, IRENA, UNSD et al.: Results Worldwide: <https://trackingsdg7.esmap.org>.

direction of migration.³⁴⁷ Surveys of African migrants who reached Europe by irregular means show, for example, that inadequate access to essential basic services influenced the decision to migrate.³⁴⁸ Education and health are also prerequisites for the success of other measures to reduce displacement and irregular migration. Investing in health and education systems is therefore a crucial factor in offering people prospects in their home countries.

What should we do?

1) Make good education accessible to all. It is of fundamental importance to provide solid primary and secondary education. Because education is the key to good development opportunities for every individual and entire nations. It encourages people's social and political participation, it is a prerequisite for better employment opportunities and income, and can thus reduce poverty. Education helps to prevent conflicts and promote democratisation.³⁴⁹ It can protect people against misinformation and manipulation, it helps to better assess risks, and it strengthens the resilience and adaptability of societies in the face of climate change. In addition, the education of girls has demonstrably contributed to lower fertility rates and consequently to a slowdown in population growth in the medium to long term – which, among other things, reduces the pressure on people's livelihoods (→ **Chap. 2.4**).

There is no way around this goal – even if education can drive migration in an uncertain environment in the first place. After all, those who are educated or at least able to read and write are more likely to obtain the necessary information, contacts and funds to accomplish migration.³⁵⁰

Many countries in the Global South, especially fragile states, are far from achieving the Sustainable Development Goal of “inclusive, equitable and quality educa-

tion [...] for all” (SDG 4), and some have even regressed recently. Girls are particularly affected. Due to pandemic-driven school closures, children and adolescents have not only missed months of classes. For many of them – especially girls – this increases the risk that they will not return to school and will drop out of the education system permanently. At the same time, cuts in the education budget are likely to lead to a massive further deterioration in access to education in many countries.³⁵¹

It is therefore urgently necessary to once again give high priority to primary and secondary education in the context of Corona development programmes as well as in regular development cooperation. The decision in the course of the BMZ 2030 reform strategy to promote basic education in the future only in the context of multilateral approaches should do justice to this prioritisation and not lead to a reduction – even in financial terms – in Germany's commitment in this key area.

The Commission considers the following approaches to be particularly important:

- › **Focussing on investment in education systems with partner governments as an investment in a better future for all.** This includes promoting country-specific public investment in education through multilateral organisations such as the *Global Partnership for Education* (GPE) and the *Education Cannot Wait* (ECW) fund, as well as through political dialogue with partner countries. Moreover, even after the BMZ 2030 reform, bilateral opportunities to promote primary and secondary education should be used: as part of sectoral programmes in which education is an important component – for example, programmes to promote democracy or food security, – and in fragile or crisis contexts.
- › **Clearly identify and dismantle barriers to access to education.** It is particularly important to increase support for girls' access to education. This means identifying and openly addressing with partners the reasons that prevent girls from attending school or

³⁴⁷ Czaika, M. and Reinprecht, C. (2020) Drivers of Migration: A Synthesis of Knowledge. International Migration Institute Working Paper; Hear, N. van, Bakewell, O. and Long, K. (2012) Drivers of Migration. Migrating Out of Poverty Consortium.

³⁴⁸ UNDP (2019b) Scaling Fences: Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe.

³⁴⁹ Klingholz, R. and Kaps, A. (2017) Eine verlorene Generation vermeiden. Was Bildung in Krisensituationen leisten kann.

³⁵⁰ Aresin, J., Carrasco Heiermann, A., Kaps, A. et al. (2019).

³⁵¹ OECD (2020a), p. 21, summarises the results of various studies on this subject. See also: UNESCO, UNICEF and World Bank (2020) What Have We Learned? Overview of Findings From a Survey of Ministries of Education on National Responses to Covid-19.

continuing their education and professional training: Work in the household, lack of security, religious or cultural traditions such as child marriages, lack of comprehensive sexuality education, early pregnancies, and lack of access to menstrual hygiene.

- › **Improve quality in the education sector.** Above all, this requires greater support for teacher training and consistent evaluation of learning progress. For example, the Kenyan government's *Tusome* Programme³⁵² can serve as a model; research, exchange of experience, and practical support would be useful for its implementation in other countries.³⁵³
- › **Strengthen education systems as a whole.** To this end, the lower parts of the education pyramid must be promoted more noticeably, i.e. pre-primary, primary, and secondary education, including vocational training.
- › **Exploit the opportunities presented by digitisation.** To this end, digital opportunities must be taken into account from the outset in educational measures and systematically exploited. Supporting the use of new learning tools and technologies can also mean providing additional access to education or improving the qualifications of teachers themselves.³⁵⁴ Access to the Internet and electricity is indispensable. One example is Uruguay, which has been using video lessons and animated textbooks for years. For this purpose, the state gives every child a tablet computer and provides free Internet access even in rural regions. The small South American country was thus well prepared when the Covid-19 pandemic restricted school operations.³⁵⁵

2) Guarantee universal healthcare. With the SDG 3 – “a healthy life for all at all ages” – all UN member states have committed themselves to catering for the health and well-being of their populations. Germany has already stepped up its commitment to global health in recent years. In addition, as part of the Covid-19 pandemic, the German government has provided additional funding to multilateral partners such as the

World Health Organisation (WHO), the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). Germany is one of the largest donors to the *Access to Covid-19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-A)* platform, which was initiated in the G20 context and launched by WHO in April 2020. ACT-A aims to ensure development, production, and equitable access for all to Covid-19 vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics, and to advance the strengthening of the healthcare system as a cross-cutting issue.³⁵⁶

COVAX, ACT-A's vaccine pillar, has been supplying vaccines to more than 50 countries worldwide since the end of February 2021, particularly to Africa. COVAX plans to vaccinate at least 20 percent of the population across the world by the end of 2021. Rapid access to vaccines for poor countries is critical to ensuring that people are able to get back to work and children back to school again. It prevents the global wealth gap from widening further depending on access to vaccines. Sharing vaccines would help end the pandemic more quickly around the world. For this reason alone, wealthy countries must ensure that the COVAX vaccine initiative under ACT-A is adequately funded and that sufficient vaccines are produced worldwide at affordable prices. The Commission therefore welcomes the fact that the German government has already made more than two billion euros available for ACT-A, especially for COVAX. It should also call on other countries to provide further funding and to dispense vaccines, especially for the vaccination of health workers and vulnerable groups, as recommended by WHO. Vaccines should only be donated through COVAX to ensure fair distribution. Refugees, displaced persons, irregular migrants and stateless persons must also be included in vaccination programmes. For this, cooperation with host countries and with ACT-A or the COVAX vaccine pillar is necessary.

Furthermore, the German government should support measures to expand global production capacities for medicines and vaccines and to reduce vaccine prices, such as sharing know-how and manufacturing licences. The measures to contain the Covid-19 pandemic

³⁵² See: Tusome Africa, <https://www.tusomeafrica.org>.

³⁵³ Klingholz, R., Sütterlin, S., Kaps, A. et al. (2020b) Schnell, bezahlbar, nachhaltig. Wie in Afrika große Entwicklungssprünge möglich werden.

³⁵⁴ See a current initiative by the German government: GIZ: Africa Cloud – Eine Initiative für digitales Lernen in Afrika: <https://toolkit-digitalisierung.de/africa-cloud-eine-initiative-fuer-digitales-lernen-in-afrika/>.

³⁵⁵ Abé, N. (2021) Warum Uruguays Schüler so gut durch die Pandemie kommen.

³⁵⁶ See WHO: The Access to Covid-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator: <https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator>; for donors, see WHO: The ACT Accelerator Funding Tracker: <https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/funding-tracker>; Germany has provided 2.2 billion euros so far.

should already extend beyond the current pandemic and support developing countries in particular to prepare for future epidemics better.

Effective pandemic containment also involves strengthening healthcare systems in developing countries. Only functioning healthcare systems are in a position to contain the current pandemic by means of vaccination campaigns and other preventive measures and by providing care for those infected. They maintain standard care and create the conditions for effective management and prevention of future epidemics or pandemics. This leg of the WHO ACT-A initiative has been underfunded so far.

Beyond pandemics, good health care helps to reduce the causes of displacement and irregular migration. This requires, in particular, adequate basic healthcare structures in rural regions, which are often neglected. The German government should therefore work within the framework of German development cooperation, but also in cooperation at the EU and international level, to strengthen extensive basic healthcare systems worldwide and to achieve lasting improvements and solid financing in the health sector. The share of German public funding for development cooperation in the health sector should reach the WHO-recommended target of at least 0.1 percent of gross national income (GNI) in a lasting and reliable manner. To date, Germany has only achieved around 0.04 percent (2018).³⁵⁷

The aim should be to strengthen healthcare systems in less developed countries, especially in fragile contexts. The objective here is to expand access to public, comprehensive, high-quality basic healthcare services located nearby in a non-discriminatory manner so that

their users do not end up in financial distress (universal health coverage) and to ensure the supply of safe, high-quality medicines, vaccines and diagnostics.³⁵⁸ This includes, in particular, promoting the training of local health workers (→ **Box 19**). Where possible, community-based care should be strengthened with the help of digital technologies: After all, cell phone services, smartphone apps or telemedicine enable professional advice, diagnosis and sometimes treatment as well, even over long distances.

Box 19

Aides for improved health in Ethiopia

Ensuring access to good healthcare for people in poor countries requires governments to recognise that economic development and the health of the population are mutually beneficial. Ethiopia, still one of the poorest countries in the world, provides an example of how much can be done with little money.

As part of the *Health Extension Programme* (HEP), the Ethiopian Ministry of Health has set up health stations in each of the approximately 15,000 smallest administrative units since 2003. To ensure that two health workers can be available to help patients in all these facilities, more than 30,000 women from the respective regions have received basic medical training. The focus of their work is to attend to hygiene, prevention and health education, as well as the health of pregnant women, mothers and children.³⁵⁹ Because the health workers come from the region and offer their services locally, people are happy to accept these health services.

The results of the HEP are impressive: Maternal and infant mortality has halved since its introduction, and under-five mortality rates have more than halved. The number of women using modern contraceptive methods had increased sixfold by 2016. The rate of new malaria cases and HIV infections has been reduced. At the same time, the programme creates income opportunities for women with secondary education.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁷ Estimate by Rüppel, T. and Rüppel, J. (2020) Zuschüsse für die öffentliche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Gesundheitsbereich: Aktuelle Ergebnisse der Analyse relevanter Einzelprojekte und Maßnahmen mit Gesundheitsbezug im Zeitraum 2014–2018 sowie darauf aufbauende Rückberechnungen für 2000–2013 und Projektionen für 2019–2021, p. 2. Values for 2019 and 2020 are not yet available. In 2020, there was an estimated increase to 0.07 in the course of containing the Covid-19 pandemic. The 0.1 percent/GNI target was calculated by a WHO commission in 2001 based on funding for the health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). SDG 3, however, is much more comprehensive; even if countries achieved the 0.1 percent target, it would not be possible to finance the implementation of SDG 3 on this basis. Recent calculations indicate a target of 0.15 percent/GNI; Chatham House (2014) Shared Responsibilities for Health. A Coherent Global Framework for Health Financing: Final Report of the Centre on Global Health Security Working Group on Health Financing.

³⁵⁸ Access to Medicine Foundation (2018) Access to Medicine Index 2018.

³⁵⁹ Kaps, A., Reinig, A. und Klingholz, R. (2018) Vom Hungerland zum Hoffnungsträger: Wird Äthiopien zum Vorbild für den afrikanischen Aufschwung?

³⁶⁰ Klingholz, R., Sütterlin, S., Kaps, A. et al. (2020b).

The German government should increasingly work to ensure that primary care – as defined in SDG 3.7 – includes sexual and reproductive healthcare services. This is essential to reduce the risk of maternal mortality from unsafe births and lack of access to skilled abortions, enforcing the right to family planning and eliminating harmful practices of gender-based violence, especially female genital mutilation, as well as early and forced marriage.

3.2.3 Establishing social protection systems

Only 29 percent of the world's population is fully protected against financial hardship caused by illness, accidents, need for care or unemployment. 55 percent have no protection at all.³⁶¹ In the countries where German development cooperation is active, up to 85 percent of the workforce works in the informal sector; state measures for social protection do not reach them.³⁶² In many of the countries of origin of refugees and irregular migrants arriving in Europe today, there are only rudimentary state social protection systems, if at all.³⁶³ Yet the number of people who would need social protection is increasing significantly once again as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. (→ **Spotlight – Covid-19**).

Efficient social protection systems foster resilience, i.e. people's ability to withstand health, economic or weather-related risks and shocks. They promote well-being and societal participation and reduce the risk of slipping into poverty and hardship if, for example, expensive medication or operations become necessary.³⁶⁴ They create prospects for the future and moreover, can also reduce social inequality.

Especially for governments of fragile states, the provision of social protection can be an instrument for reducing the causes of displacement and irregular migration. If these governments are enabled to provide

their populations with basic services, the trust placed in them can increase and, consequently, their legitimacy.

German development cooperation therefore supports the establishment and expansion of efficient social protection systems. To this end, it has at its disposal a wide range of flexible funding instruments that can be used in cooperation with partner countries in a way that can be customised for the country context. These development-oriented resilience programmes already provide the necessary basic social protection in the short and medium term (→ **Box 20**). They successfully provide solutions where social protection systems do not (yet) function or do not reach a sufficient number of people.

In 2012, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) developed the *Social Protection Floors* (SPF) model for the support of social protection systems by the international community. These are packages of measures to be defined nationally in order to ensure that all people have access to basic health care and basic income security throughout the lifespan (→ **Fig. 11**). 185 ILO members, i.e. governments and social partners, have adopted the recommendation on SPFs and the implementation of the corresponding measures.³⁶⁵

Basic social protection is usually provided through non-contributory mechanisms. These can include direct transfer benefits for children, the unemployed, the poor, the elderly, or persons with disabilities, as well as vouchers or discounts for certain population groups, school meals and food assistance, and free access to basic health services and medicines. Finally, in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, an unconditional basic income is under discussion again.³⁶⁶ The next stage is a state social protection system that requires certain groups or the entire population to make payments in order to benefit from pensions, health insurance or payments in case of sickness and loss of earnings. Protection beyond this level must be paid for out of one's own pocket.³⁶⁷

³⁶¹ ILO (2017) World Social Protection Report 2017–19: Universal Social Protection to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals; cf. also World Bank (2018a) The State of Social Safety Nets 2018.

³⁶² BMZ: Social protection topics: <https://health.bmz.de/social-protection/>

³⁶³ World Bank (2018a) describes the state of affairs on social protection systems worldwide.


³⁶⁴ Ibid, Chapter 2.

³⁶⁵ ILO (2012) R202 – Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202).

³⁶⁶ Cf. Molina, G. and Ortiz-Juarez, E. (2020) Temporary Basic Income: Protecting Poor and Vulnerable People in Developing Countries.

³⁶⁷ World Bank (2018a), p. 6.

Fig. 11: **Basis social protection as foundation, to increase resilience**



Source: adapted from ILO (2012)³⁶⁸

What should we do?

The Commission sees social protection systems as an important contribution to reducing the structural causes of irregular migration and displacement.³⁶⁹ It recommends additional investments in the development of systems for basic social protection that are adapted to local conditions in order to improve public services, build resilience and provide safety for many people quickly in the event of a crisis. This is all the more important because it is precisely these investments that have a major impact at relatively low cost. Social protection systems are an efficient instrument that can be adapted, expanded and amplified to meet specific needs.³⁷⁰

In concrete terms, the Commission makes the following recommendations to the German government:

1) Develop a comprehensive strategy to build adaptable social protection systems. The goal of this strategy of the German government must be to contribute to the development and expansion of efficient social protection systems that are financially sustainable, predictable and reliable for all members of society and thus also help to reduce poverty and social inequalities in the long term (SDG 1.3).³⁷¹ Strategic focus for social protection systems should be on poor and vulnerable populations and especially in fragile contexts and crisis situations. In this context, resilience programmes should be linked as closely as possible with the development of adaptive social protection systems.

³⁶⁸ See also GVG (2017) Social Protection as an Alternative to Migration? An Assessment of the Role of Social Protection in Reducing Push Factors for Migration in Different Country Contexts, p. 63.

³⁶⁹ See: Adhikari, S. and Gentilini, U. (2018) Should I Stay or Should I Go? Do Cash Transfers Affect Migration?; GVG (2017).

³⁷⁰ Valverde, F., Pacheco-Jiménez, J., Muzaffar, T. et al. (2019) Measuring Financing Gaps in Social Protection for Achieving SDG Target 1.3. Global Estimates and Strategies for Developing Countries. The team of authors puts the financial requirement for basic social protection (excluding health insurance) in low and middle-income countries at 2.4 percent of GDP (p. v).

³⁷¹ SDG 1.3: Implement social protection systems and measures appropriate to national circumstances for all, including basic protection, and achieve broad coverage of the poor and vulnerable by 2030, see Federal Statistical Office: <http://sdg-indikatoren.de/1/>.

At the international level, the *Building Blocks* approach presented by the World Bank is already a good concept for building efficient and adaptable social protection systems.³⁷² The German government can build on this in its strategy and should work with its international partners to further develop the existing approaches and instruments. For this purpose, strategic country planning processes under the leadership of the partner countries in cooperation with international and bilateral partners should be sought. It is especially important to analyse the needs and the target groups. The adaptability is also measured in terms of whether additional target groups can be accommodated, for example refugees, and whether the systems enable a rapid and adequate response in the event of natural disasters or pandemics. In addition, the German development cooperation can draw on existing experiences with international partners (World Bank, World Food Programme [WFP] and United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF]) (→ **Box 20**).

2) Invest in the development and financing of social protection systems. On the basis of this strategy, the German government should provide much greater support to the partner countries of the German development cooperation in significantly increasing the number of people protected. The main objective must be to establish adaptive protection systems and to achieve the adequately defined *Social Protection Floors*. For the development of social protection systems, the Commission proposes high start-up financing by international donor countries with degressive participation. As local capacities are established, the national tax system strengthened, and pilot models or platforms successfully tested, national governments can increasingly take over social protection. In order to reduce the causes of displacement and irregular migration, the long-term objective would be for the partner countries to provide the funds for the basic social protection of their population from their own budgets. The international community would only fund components that are beyond the responsibility or capacity of the partner country such as additional services for responding to external shocks and expanding to include internally displaced persons or refugees. For example, the additional cash disbursements to households facing the highest social risks in refugee camps and bordering communities have proven to be a necessary and proper

response to the Covid-19 pandemic and its socio-economic impact. They should guide the proposed approach.

In general, the German government should make use of its influence on the EU and the international financial institutions beyond the current level³⁷³ to further promote the development and financing of social protection systems. In a joint and ambitious effort, an additional one billion people can receive a social protection benefit by 2025 and SDG 1.3 can be achieved by 2030.³⁷⁴

3) Provide social protection for refugees. Just like people in poorer countries, refugees who cannot return to their home countries and are at risk of falling into poverty need a social safety net. The German government should support their integration into the social protection systems of the host countries. Although the German government must expect that there will be resistance to such efforts in some host countries, it should nevertheless work towards compliance with the international obligations and the principle of equal treatment enshrined in the Geneva Refugee Convention's (GRC).

3.2.4 Enhancing agricultural productivity

Hunger is one of the greatest obstacles to development. It fosters a lack of prospects and violence, contributing to migration and displacement. According to Welthungerhilfe, 690 million people worldwide did not have enough to eat in 2019 to lead an active and healthy life. That is equal to about nine percent of the world's population. Of these, 272 million are affected by acute food insecurity and more than 30 million people are even at risk of famine. In absolute terms, the majority of the undernourished live in Asia; Africa has the highest percentage of hungry people in the population, and the trend is rising rapidly.³⁷⁵ The situation has worsened as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic and the economic crisis it has triggered.

³⁷³ Germany has committed itself to the field of social protection as part of international networks of relevant actors, for example in the Global Partnership for Universal Social Protection (USP-2030), of which Germany is a member of the steering group. See ILO: USP2030: Universal Social Protection: <https://www.usp2030.org/gimi/USP2030.action>.

³⁷⁴ SDG 1.3 requires access to at least one social protection benefit. The target of one billion additional people by 2025 is based on the ILO data collection on social protection and calculations by the BMZ in partner countries of German development cooperation.

³⁷⁵ WHO (2020) As More Go Hungry and Malnutrition Persists, Achieving Zero Hunger by 2030 in Doubt, UN Report Warns.

³⁷² See Bowen, T., del Ninno, C., Andrews, C. et al. (2020) Adaptive Social Protection: Building Resilience to Shocks, p. 9 et seq.

Box 20

Where German development cooperation supports social protection

In **Cambodia**, the *ID Poor* government programme supported by Germany covers the poorest people in the country. Those identified as poor receive free health care, among other benefits. When the Covid-19 pandemic caused the economy to collapse and income opportunities to dwindle, the database enabled an unconditional cash transfer program for the poor to be launched in a very short time in June 2020. Since the beginning of the pandemic, almost 100,000 additional households, having lost their income, have been enrolled in the programme. Meanwhile, nearly 700,000 households, or more than 2.5 million people, receive monthly support of about 50 US dollars per household.³⁷⁶

The *National Poverty Targeting Programme* is **Lebanon's** first targeted social safety net to support households living in poverty. The programme provides them with a tailored package of health, education, and food services. The *World Food Programme* supports, among other things, the food supply sector – funded by the BMZ – thus enabling 15,000 poor Lebanese households to buy food at 460 partner stores using electronic cards. The Lebanese government has since expanded the system to provide direct support. To this end, WFP provides technical advice and capacity building support to the Lebanese government, including in the areas of target group identification and data management of beneficiaries.³⁷⁷

In the **Sahel region**, German-funded programmes of the World Bank, WFP, and UNICEF are working together with the governments of Mali, Mauritania, and Niger to provide basic social assistance in the short and medium term and simultaneously helping to strengthen national social systems in the medium to long term. The goal is to provide cash transfers and complementary services to 1.75 million people in need. Wherever possible, support is provided through government programmes. Where national capacities are exhausted, the programme directly implements cash transfers based on the national plans. In addition, protective measures against the spread of Covid-19 are being implemented and complementary services are being provided to prevent the nutritional status of the most vulnerable groups – women and children – from deteriorating. In addition, these services are designed to protect children and women from exploitation.³⁷⁸

The causes of hunger and malnutrition are manifold. Poverty, insecure land rights and lack of access to adapted innovations and information mean that agricultural yields remain low. As a result, farmers do not produce enough food for the growing population in their own countries. Many countries in these regions are dependent on food aid and imports. Furthermore, the ongoing climate change and rising violent conflicts are increasingly limiting agricultural production (cf. Chap. 2.3 and 2.5).

At the same time, a growing world population is increasing the pressure on all the world's food systems. Therefore, on the one hand, the production of food in agriculture must be increased and the distribution of food must be restructured; on the other hand, post-harvest losses must be reduced and the throwing away of food must be radically reduced.³⁷⁹

It is therefore right for the German government to continue to focus on promoting food security and rural development in its development cooperation. The BMZ invests around 1.5 billion euros annually, or 20 percent of its budget, in this area. Around one-third of the funding amount is allocated to the special initiative *One WORLD – No Hunger* (SEWOH), which supports, among others, 15 green innovation centres in the agri-

³⁷⁶ See IDPoor: <https://www.idpoor.gov.kh/>.

³⁷⁷ World Bank (2020c) Targeting Poor Households in Lebanon: National Poverty Targeting Programme (NPTP); WFP (2017) Lebanon Country Strategic Plan (2018–2020).

³⁷⁸ WFP (2019) Scaling Up for Resilient Individuals, Communities and Systems in the Sahel; the African Development Bank (AfDB) is also implementing social protection projects in the region, currently mainly for Covid-19, see ADF and AfDB (2020) Covid-19 Support Programme In G5 Sahel Countries – Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger And Chad (PARC COVID-19 – G5 Sahel).

³⁷⁹ Klingholz, R., Sütterlin, S., Kaps, A. et al. (2020b); Welthungerhilfe (2020) Hunger: Verbreitung, Ursachen & Folgen.

cultural and food sector. Other BMZ measures include strategic partnerships with regional organisations to intensify conventional agricultural production,³⁸⁰ the promotion of development-oriented agricultural research, and programmes for securing land rights and soil protection.³⁸¹

The Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) provides funding through the *International Climate Initiative* (ICI) programme for projects in developing and emerging countries, which are designed to help adapt land use to the consequences of climate change.³⁸² The Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL) is implementing programmes in 28 African countries with the overarching goal of implementing the human right to adequate food. The objectives of the programmes is to contribute to location-adapted, sustainable, climate-resilient and economically viable agriculture and forestry.³⁸³ In view of the expected implications of the Covid-19 pandemic, Germany provided an additional 27.3 million euros through the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in December 2020 to providing for the smallholder rural population in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America to stabilise the agricultural production and the markets.³⁸⁴

The Commission welcomes the German government's commitment to rural development and food security, especially under the conditions of climate change. This focus should be continued at a high level, also to improve living conditions in rural areas and to promote education and employment. However, the approaches

of the federal ministries involved should be coordinated more vigorously and more carefully. Only in this way can the transition to sustainable, agroecological, equitable and diverse agricultural and food systems succeed, while at the same time preserving biodiversity and providing an adequate livelihood for a growing world population.³⁸⁵

In particular, programmes that support smallholder households, especially women and young people, should be promoted. This is because women do majority of the hard manual labour, but have little say in the matter. Smallholder farms must – and are willing to – develop and modernise themselves in a self-determined manner in order to achieve food security, sovereignty and income. To do so, they need knowledge of agroecological practices and access to secure land rights, credit, irrigation options, and production-enhancing tools, such as appliances that facilitate the work or high-quality seeds adapted to the respective local conditions that they can grow themselves.

Additionally, small-scale farms need access to information about adapted farming techniques and markets, weather conditions, and ways to hedge against risks such as harvest losses (→ **Box 21**).³⁸⁶

What should we do?

The measures in this area must be aimed at establishing or expanding a productive, ecologically oriented agricultural and food industry that primarily ensures local and regional supplies. In addition to food sovereignty and food security, this also provides the basis for employment in and around agriculture – for example, in the processing of agricultural products, in handicraft, transport and trade, and in the service sector. Increasing agricultural productivity thus helps reduce the root causes of displacement and irregular migration in a number of ways.

³⁸⁰ For example, with the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), which lobbies African governments for structural change, but relies primarily on commercial high-yield seeds, synthetic fertilisers and pesticides. Intended goals of increasing yields have not been achieved. Political and financial support for alternative approaches such as agroecology has fallen short so far. The support of AGRA is controversial against this background. Cf. Wise, T. (2020) *Failing Africa's Farmers: An Impact Assessment of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa*.

³⁸¹ For example, the funding for 15 research centres of the Global Research Partnership for a Food Secure Future (CGIAR), the World Vegetable Center, and the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE). CGIAR: Science for Humanity's Greatest Challenges: <https://www.cgiar.org>.

³⁸² BMU (2020a) *Adapting to the impacts of climate change*.

³⁸³ BMEL (2020) *Ernährung sichern – Wachstum fördern: Das Engagement des BMEL für eine moderne, nachhaltige Land-, Ernährungs- und Forstwirtschaft in Afrika*.

³⁸⁴ IFAD (2020) *Multi-Million Euro Contribution From Germany to IFAD Will Help Avert a Covid-19 Food Crisis*.

³⁸⁵ See World Agriculture Report: <https://www.weltagrabericht.de/>.

³⁸⁶ Also see Laborde, D., Porciello, J. and Smaller, C. (2020) *Ceres2030: Sustainable Solutions to End Hunger Summary Report*.

Box 21

Small-scale agriculture as an opportunity for Yazidis in Iraq

Many Yazidis who fled the Islamic State (IS) in 2014 are now returning to their home region of Sinjar in Iraq and relying on agriculture. This is beneficial since Yazidis – as farmers and nomads – have been practicing farming and cattle-breeding for several generations. If this existing core competency received financial support, it would be an investment in the region's future and it would help mitigate the causes of emigration and displacement.

It's not just for displaced persons to be able to return, but also about rebuilding the region that is in ruins, and creating a perspective for people locally so that they can make a living. The region and climate are suitable for this. Sinjar can flourish by starting over if people receive help in expanding their existing strengths and capacities, not only in the form of agro-ecological advice, for instance, but also through financial support, such as the targeted granting of small loans. The goal must be for people to be able to look after themselves again one day and not remain dependent on donor countries. First, however, mines must be cleared so that the large overgrown field areas can be safely used again.³⁸⁷

Experiences from the following initiatives can benefit if support is provided: Together with Nadia's Initiative, the aid organisation of IS survivor and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Nadia Murad, Dorcas has helped farmers resume agriculture through the installation of water supply systems, knowledge transfer, as well as financial assistance.³⁸⁸ In 2019 and 2020, Welthungerhilfe, together with ACTED, a French organisation in Kani Sarki, near Dohuk organised education and financial assistance for farmers.³⁸⁹

The Commission recommends the following set of measures:

1) Promote sustainable intensification. In order to fight hunger, improve living conditions in rural areas and thus opening up prospects for people to build a viable future in their countries of origin, particular emphasis must be put on sustainable intensification in terms of promotion of a bio-diverse, ecological and resilient agriculture. This means making agriculture more efficient and productive, while encouraging agro-ecological practices adapted to local conditions as much as possible, and also working for greater diversity in the cultivation of crops as well as in the consumption of food. In doing so, the supply of locally adapted quality seed that can be home-grown can make a significant contribution to food security in view of climate change

and dwindling resources. Animal husbandry and farming should be optimised taking into account animal welfare and largely closed nutrient cycles.

In terms of diversified, ecological agriculture, the orientation of the Green Innovation Centres should also be subjected to critical review. Income from forestry or agroforestry can be an important supplement to secure food supplies, stabilise family incomes and reduce the root causes of displacement. In this context, sustainable forest management and participatory forest use should be promoted.

Sustainable intensification in terms of agro-ecological management is a prerequisite for ensuring sufficient and healthy food while making agricultural and forestry production systems more resilient to the impacts of climate change.³⁹⁰ The German government

³⁸⁷ Amnesty International (2018) *Dead Land: Islamic State's Deliberate Destruction of Iraq's Farmland*; UN Habitat (2015) *Emerging Land Tenure Issues Among Displaced Yazidis in Sinjar, Iraq*, p. 22 et seq.

³⁸⁸ See Dorcas for Those in Need: <https://www.dorcas.org/iraq/wash-nadias-initiative-the-pursuit-of-justice/>.

³⁸⁹ See ACTED: https://www.acted.org/en/working-with-the-farmers-of-sinjar/#_ftn1.

³⁹⁰ Sikora, R., Terry, E., Vlek, P. et al. (Publ.) (2020) *Transforming Agriculture in Southern Africa. Constraints, Technologies, Policies and Processes*; IPBES (2019) *Summary for Policymakers of the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services*; FAO (2019b); HLPE (2019).

should therefore do all it can to implement international agreements designed to safeguard the rights of smallholder farmers and the responsible use of land and genetic resources.³⁹¹ Lastly, this also includes legally prohibiting the export of pesticides and insecticides to developing countries, which are not permitted in Germany and the EU.

2) Promote modernisation and innovation. Rural development programmes should expand the access to financial services for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in agriculture. These include measures to mitigate non-payment risks as well as the recognition of guarantees from communities (joint liability group lending). This can be done by expanding insurance systems and guarantee funds.

The successful expansion of organic agriculture is mainly based on the development of small-scale, decentralised irrigation systems that can be managed by smallholder farmers themselves, which should be promoted (→ **Chap. 3.2.1**).

Rural development programmes should take advantage of the potential that lies in the mechanisation of small-scale agriculture: Good tools, small tractors and other equipment tailored to small-scale conditions make working in the agricultural sector more productive and more attractive for young people. Innovative business models which, for example, make it possible to borrow equipment via digital systems instead of having to purchase it, are to be supported.

Having said that, the German development cooperation should learn from successful models or provide direct support to the same. Good examples could be social enterprises like *One Acre Fund* in East Africa or *Babban Gona* in Nigeria, which use economies of scale quite pragmatically: As bulk buyers, they offer communities of smallholder farmers a total package with financing at good conditions, supply of reasonably priced fertilizers and seeds, consultation, storage

facilities and sales of their products at the best possible price – with impressive success.³⁹²

As a general rule, research on agriculture should give greater consideration to the principles of resilience and biodiversity, as well as to previous findings on agroecology and adaptation of agricultural systems to climate change. All approaches and programmes developed in this process should be evaluated as to whether they achieve the desired effect: for example, for preserving soil quality, permanently increasing incomes over a period of time, or reducing the number of days of hunger in a population.³⁹³

3) Help in securing the land rights. The German government should work more clearly to ensure that the developing countries establish fair and secure land ownership and use rights. Especially small-scale farms need clarity in order to be able to plan, invest and manage for the long term. Joint land use rights ensure a basis for subsistence and food security, especially when it comes to marginalised groups, indigenous people, landless people, young people, and women. Creating or restoring clear land rights, for example, via land registers, resolves land-use conflicts, prevents future conflicts and stabilises societies in post-conflict situations.

Regulated land rights and constitutional institutions that guard them, are essential prerequisites for the sustainable economic, ecological and social development of rural areas.

In order to strengthen the equal access to these rights, German development cooperation should make the *Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security* (VGGT)³⁹⁴ and the *Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems* (RAI)³⁹⁵ the basis of its policy.

³⁹¹ These are especially the “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security”, see FAO (2012), the “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas”, see UN (2018): Resolution/Adopted by the Human Rights Council on 28 September 2018; and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture”, see FAO (2009): A Global Treaty for Food Security and Sustainable Agriculture.

³⁹² See One Acre Fund: <https://oneacrefund.org/about-us/>; Babban Gona: <https://babbangona.com>.

³⁹³ In this context, the cooperation with AGRA should also be evaluated and a critical revision must be submitted.

³⁹⁴ FAO (2012).

³⁹⁵ FAO (2014) Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems.

4) Support the establishment of local value-added chains. The further processing of agricultural raw products on site and the production for local markets must be promoted systematically. Added value from further processing creates employment opportunities in the country. The self-organisation of small-scale farms for common storage, production and marketing, for example, within the scope of cooperatives, should be particularly strengthened – technically and financially. Especially small and medium-sized cities in the surroundings should get involved when establishing regional value-added chains.³⁹⁶

3.2.5 Promoting sustainable economic development in the industrial and service sectors

A weak economic development combined with high level of uncertainty and lack of employment opportunities may cause people, in particular young people, to migrate (→ **Chap. 2.3**). The Covid-19 pandemic has further detrimental effects on the economies of developing countries: The costs of health care systems are rising substantially, global supply chains are being significantly disrupted, and the restrictions entailed by the pandemic have led to economic collapses, especially in the informal sector. Hence, it appears to be of utmost importance for developing and emerging economies, to lay the foundations for sustainable and inclusive economic growth and make them less vulnerable to crises.

The measures of the German government in this respect include offers for the improvement of financial literacy, bilateral investment agreements, public investment guarantees and support in the development of financial systems. Additionally, the German government promotes improved social and environmental standards along global supply chains and consultation related to the introduction of environmental taxes. Apart from that, the German government supports international forums for the improvement of the economic situation in developing countries. During its G20 presidency, for example, the German government

initiated the *G20 Compact with Africa (CwA)* to promote private investment on this continent.³⁹⁷

Small projects such as the establishment of a vocational training centre for the textile sector in Ethiopia are also included. As part of the realignment of its work, the BMZ has placed a focus on education and sustainable growth for good jobs.³⁹⁸ In addition to the promotion of vocational training, the focus is on the development of the private sector and financial systems as well as trade and economic infrastructure.³⁹⁹ Furthermore, there are development policy projects by other federal ministries, most of which are implemented in cooperation with the BMZ.⁴⁰⁰ Concerning economic policy, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) coordinates the position of the German government. BMZ and FFO are also active here.

In December 2020, the EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS, previously ACP States), an association of 79 former colonies, were able to close a new partnership agreement. This is supposed to, as soon as it has been ratified, replace the Cotonou Agreement that expired in 2020. The new agreement extends to areas such as sustainable economic development, human rights, as well as peace and security.⁴⁰¹ More stringent obligations to readmit irregular migrants, identified both in the chapters on migration and trafficking in human beings and in an appendix to the agreement, are criticised continuously.⁴⁰²

The German government further supports the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area, AfCFTA, which officially came into force at the beginning of 2021. There is tremendous potential in AfCFTA, as the regional integration of African national economies, and thus intraregional trade, has been very weak so far. If the African Continental Free Trade Area generates stronger economic momentum, it could

³⁹⁷ <https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/compactwithafrica/home.html>.

³⁹⁸ BMZ (2020a), p. 9.

³⁹⁹ *ibid.*

⁴⁰⁰ For example, BMWi (2016) Gemeinsame Initiative von BMZ und BMWi für wirtschaftliches Engagement in und mit Afrika; BMU (2019) New support programme for local small-scale projects in developing countries; BMEL: Forests around the globe: https://www.bmel.de/DE/themen/wald/waelder-weltweit/waelder-weltweit_node.html.

⁴⁰¹ European Commission (2021a) Post-Cotonou: Negotiators reach a political deal on a new EU/Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Partnership Agreement.

⁴⁰² Mari, F. (2020) EU vertieft Spaltung Afrikas.

³⁹⁶ BMWi (2019b) Highlights of economic policies: Monthly Report for December 2019; Tacoli, C., McGranahan, G. and Satterthwaite, D. (2015) Urbanisation, Rural-Urban Migration and Urban Poverty.

Box 22

Dual vocational training in Pakistan

Corruption, inadequate infrastructure and legal uncertainty as well as the unstable political situation in some parts of the country, deemed to be responsible for Pakistan's economy barely growing. The education system also appears to be frail: Despite official compulsory schooling, enrolment rates are only around 95 per cent at the primary level, 86.5 per cent at the secondary level and nine per cent at the tertiary level. These rates are significantly lower for girls in each case.⁴⁰³ A large number of young working people enter the job market every year, which is far from being able to accommodate them – partly because they do not have the necessary qualifications. To escape the threat of unemployment, many young Pakistanis believe that the only alternative is to emigrate. (→ Box 9).

Since 2011, the BMZ, together with the EU and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Islamabad, has been supporting the Pakistani government in a comprehensive reform of its vocational training system.⁴⁰⁴ The project aims to improve the quality and practical relevance of vocational education. The current focus of the programme is to improve the integration of the private sector into the system and implement the planned reforms. The project is being implemented in close cooperation with the German Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GPCCI) and other industrial associations in the economic centre of Karachi. Measures funded through the programme range from the design of adequate curricula for occupational training, the development of new courses of instruction, equipment procurement, and training and development of teaching staff. Between 2017 and 2020, 24,000 young people received training, 42 per cent of whom were women. 418 workshops at 195 public and private training institutes were completed or newly established, and 58 new courses of instruction created. The local economy not only participates by providing practical training modules in companies, but is also represented in the supervisory bodies of vocational training authorities and vocational schools and involved in the coordination of courses of instruction, job counselling and job placement.

help to reduce irregular migration. However, a hindrance for this development could be different bilateral trade agreements with individual African states, that result from the EU's trade policy negotiations that are currently underway with African countries. While these agreements acknowledge the different levels of development of African economies, they may also lead to fragmentation and impede African continental integration (→ Chap. 2.3). In the light of the Covid-19 pandemic, the G20 countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have set up extensive aid and financial programmes to support the economies in developing countries and prevent a possible financial market crisis.⁴⁰⁵ These programmes, however, may not

be sufficient to avoid a significant regression in the economic development of many countries.

What should we do?

Development policy measures to improve the economic situation, with the aim of mitigating economic drivers of irregular migration in the medium to long term, should be geared towards creating decent and economically and ecologically sustainable employment opportunities, diversifying the structure of the economies, strengthening vocational training and improving the overall conditions for international trade, in particular also trade between developing countries.

First institutions, then investments: The Commission recommends the German government to be more courageous in its focus on economic development in the industrial and service sectors. In the mostly unstable countries of origin of irregular migrants, it recommends to initially focus activities towards the cooperation strengthening of institutions in order to ultimately improve the conditions for investments –

⁴⁰³ UNESCO: Pakistan: <http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/pk?theme=education-and-literacy>.

⁴⁰⁴ GIZ: Support for vocational training reform in Pakistan (TVET SSP): <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/74535.html>; GIZ and NAVTTC: Pakistan Technical & Vocational, Education & Training Reform: <https://tvetreform.org.pk/>.

⁴⁰⁵ This is supported, for example, by the BMZ's *Corona emergency program*, which helps stabilise global key sectors in the midst of the crisis. Thus, BMZ has provided the ILO with EUR 14.5 million to reduce risk of infection in the workplace, safeguard jobs and lessen social hardship in seven key textile countries in Africa and Asia. See BMZ (2020b) Deutschland unterstützt zwei Millionen Textilarbeiter in Asien und Afrika.

particularly with regard to small and medium-sized enterprises – and thus create the basis for additional jobs (→ **Chap. 3.2.1**).

The Commission recommends the German government to concentrate on three main topics in sustainable economic development:

1) Intensify vocational training. Young people in emerging economies and developing countries often lack a path to a self-sustaining, formal professional life that does not involve (fee-based) higher education institutions. The existing systems of vocational training are often dysfunctional and unrelated to the job market. A competent vocational training geared to the needs of the job market does more than improving individual income and employment opportunities. The availability of well-trained skilled workers is also one of the key factors for the development of a diversified economy and an important factor for foreign direct investments. It promotes the competitiveness and innovative capacity as well as the resilience of an economy and thus makes an important contribution to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goal “decent work and economic growth”⁴⁰⁶ (SDG 8).

The Commission therefore requests the German government to further expand its initiatives in the area of vocational training and to link them to the training partnerships described in more detail in **Chapter 3.5**. In addition to quality and job market orientation, vocational training should improve the participation of girls and women. Training in areas such as mechanical engineering, equipment and tool production or climate-friendly energy systems should be specifically promoted in order to strengthen the competitiveness and future viability of the local economies and institutions (→ **Chap. 3.3.1**).

The German government should continue to focus on the cooperation with German and European companies and business associations in the area of vocational training. It should especially make use of the extensive experience of the network of German Chambers of Commerce Abroad (→ **Box 22**). They take on extensive tasks, for example, by supporting

training alliances and developing quality-assured curricula for dual training programmes, recruiting companies for these programmes, educating company trainers and organising examinations. They also form an important interface between the companies and the respective government agencies. In addition, the promotion and further development of modular digital vocational training platforms should be pursued, as these enable vocational training curricula to be adapted quickly and effectively to local conditions and needs. The *atingi*⁴⁰⁷ platform launched by the BMZ, for example, could be a first important step in this regard; however, this platform should be scientifically evaluated for its acceptance and effectiveness.

2) Improve the climate for investments. Uncertain property rights, inefficient public institutions, corruption and inadequate financing opportunities, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), are frequently mentioned as reasons for the comparatively low diversification of the economic structure and low investments in many developing countries. If public institutions necessary for entrepreneurial activity are not present, operate inefficiently or do not comply with the necessary standards, there is little promise of success in promoting local and foreign investments. Therefore, the German government’s development policy aimed at the economy should focus on improving the general conditions for investments.

In particular, it appears to be of utmost importance to strengthen the institutions that can create favourable overall conditions for local entrepreneurship. When strengthening institutions and improving overall conditions, it should be ensured that companies are addressed in a targeted manner and that local companies are integrated into international value-added chains.

⁴⁰⁶ See The Sustainable Development Goals: Goal 8: Decent work and economic growth: <https://17ziele.de/ziele/8.html>.


⁴⁰⁷ See GIZ: *atingi*: <https://www.atingi.org/en/data-protection>.

Box 23

The contribution of the diaspora to the economic development of the countries of origin

Refugees as well as migrants often maintain close ties with their countries of origin (→ **Spotlight - Social networks and media**). They support the development in their countries of origin not only by means of return remittance and investments, but also by means of knowledge and technology diffusion and contribute to securing the livelihoods of relatives and friends. Currently, the remittances of the global diaspora are approximately three times the size of the official development assistance of the OECD countries (→ **Fig. 12**).

Fig. 12: Increase in remittances



Source: KNOMAD (2020), p. 8.

Global remittances have greatly increased since the turn of the millennium. In 2019, they peaked with 548 billion US dollars. For 2020 and 2021, the World Bank predicts a decline by almost 15 per cent, i.e., 470 billion US dollars, due to the Covid-19 pandemic. However, starting from a higher absolute level, foreign direct investments are declining more sharply.⁴⁰⁸

Germany supports the diaspora with various projects in order to establish companies in their countries of origin or to implement projects with local partners. In 2019, BMZ cooperated with African diaspora organisations and launched the *WIDU.africa* online platform that connects funders in Europe with start-ups in their countries of origin. Currently, Cameroon, Ghana, Ethiopia, Togo and Kenya are the countries where companies are being set up as part of this project, which creates jobs and prospects of people to build a viable future in their home countries.⁴⁰⁹ This type of projects serve as models and should be expanded.

⁴⁰⁸ KNOMAD (2020), p. 8.

⁴⁰⁹ The *www.widu.africa* online platform enables a complete digitalised development of project proposals. Previously, over 10,900 people registered themselves on the *widu*-platform. In terms of already permitted 1,400 projects, around EUR 2,300,000 of private investments could be mobilised, which corresponds to 4,200 jobs maintained and planned (50 per cent women). With the *Corona Business Grant* over 400 projects in specific sectors could also be supported (health and transport, for instance).

There are a variety of potential connecting factors in this policy area. For example, it might be advisable to support the development or use of land registers which can improve the protection of property rights for individuals and communities. Consulting services can improve the handling of exports in order to reduce trade costs, lower the costs of business start-ups, or speed up approval procedures and make them more transparent. Assistance may further be required to introduce a public procurement system that assigns contracts to local SMEs in a corruption-free, efficient and transparent manner. The increased use of digitalisation in administrative processes should play a significant role in these assistance and consulting services (→ **Spotlight – Digital technologies**).

The German government should further use its long lasting expertise to make financial systems more efficient and to promote adequate financing instruments, especially for SMEs. It should continue to intensify its activities in this area. In doing so, it should put stronger focus on digital investments and credit platforms that can keep administrative costs low for small-scale financial support (→ **Box 23**), and link these measures with complementary advisory services. The latter is particularly important with respect to the introduction and improvement of credit information systems and the introduction of a modern insolvency law, which are essential for effective financial systems. These measure may improve credit supply not only in terms of volume but also in terms of quality.

First institution, then investments – following this principle, the German government should only support initiatives in specific economic sectors or in the establishment of selected industrial clusters if basic institutional prerequisites are existent such as secured property rights or a sufficient transport infrastructure. Once these requirements are met, economic policy support measures should generally not focus on the establishment of specific sectors, but on activities and technologies that can be used independent of a particular sector. This includes, for example, the establishment of the technical and social infrastructure required for such activities, the creation of training opportunities, the reduction of investment risks via guarantees or climate policy measures. The promotion of such activities should be clearly limited in time and linked to whether verifiable success criteria are achieved.

3) Develop the commercial policy further. The Commission supports the objective of the German government in advocating development-friendly trade agreements at the European level. Thus, the 2018 coalition agreement formulated the goal of, “reviewing the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with African states to see if they serve economic and social development”.⁴¹⁰ This process is not yet completed. Furthermore, there have been few comprehensive scientific studies on the effects of the Economic Partnership Agreements.

Concerning Africa, the Commission recommends the German government to take the current disputes between the AU and the EU seriously concerning the trade and investment policies – for example, with regard to the issue of export taxes – and advocates for a reform of these policies. In particular, the German government should focus more on promoting intra-African trade and make every effort to support the expansion of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The German government should also urge Brussels to prioritise the promotion of the African domestic market in the planned EU-Africa Pact and to involve other member states in addition to the EU Commission.

However, the possible reasons as to why the trade relations between the EU and Africa so far have been characterised by an extreme imbalance despite preferential access for poor countries must also be verified: Restrictive rules of origin as well as strict product-standards, especially for agricultural products, impede African exporters (→ **Chap. 2.3**). Since quality standards serve to protect the consumers in Europe, they should not be lowered. Instead, companies in the developing countries should be enabled to meet the requirements and standards. The German government can use its experience from previous as well as ongoing projects and intensify consulting services and training in this area.⁴¹¹

⁴¹⁰ Federal Government (2018) Koalitionsvertrag 2018: Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land, p. 160.

⁴¹¹ Since 2006, for example, the BMEL has been supporting the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) global partnership platform founded by the WTO, the World Bank, the OIE, the WHO and the FAO, which helps developing countries in implementing international standards, guidelines and recommendations. See STDF: <https://www.standardsfacility.org>.

The Commission pleads in favour of simplifying the so-called rules of origin for all finished and semi-finished products exported to the EU for the benefit of African producers and using and applying them more generously. Although this may result in importing final goods with smaller shares of inputs of African origin, it may support the development of a more productive agricultural and food economy in Africa. Rules of origin could be changed for a defined transition period as well as for selected countries and products. Based on scientific monitoring, it could then be evaluated whether these measures are effective in increasing trade, in shifting value-added chains more towards African countries and in improving the diversification of the economic structure in the countries under consideration. Based on the results of such a scientific evaluation, a decision on the continuation or withdrawal of the adjusted rules can be made.

In the sense of a sustainable and integrative economic development in the countries of origin of refugees as well as irregular migrants, the Commission also advocates setting or maintaining international human rights and environmental standards in globalised trade. This includes curbing exploitative child labour and exploitation in the countries of origin from where the goods are imported, as well as illegal deforestation, pesticide use, water and air pollution. The *Supply Chain Act* that the German government launched in spring 2021, may be a first step – if it is properly designed.⁴¹² This Act is intended to oblige German companies to promote respect for social and environmental standards in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in their global supply chains, thereby contributing to fair working conditions and equitable wages.

⁴¹² Federal Government (2021) Supply Chain Act: Greater protection for people and the environment in the global economy.

3.3 Halting climate change and coping with its impacts in a spirit of solidarity



RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- 1 **Take responsibility as major emitters.** Climate change mitigation is an effective approach in order to reduce the root causes of displacement and irregular migration. The EU should raise its target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55 per cent by 2030 compared to 1990 to at least 65 per cent. → 3.3.1
- 2 **Promote climate-neutral development in the Global South and use the synergy effects of renewable energies.** Germany and Europe should support the climate and environment-friendly development and restructuring of the economies in the developing countries even more massively than is already the case. A fixed mechanism should be established to achieve this (climate matching). The focus should be on efforts for a worldwide energy revolution in terms of regenerative energy supply. → 3.3.1
- 3 **Support environment and climate-friendly urban development.** German and European development cooperation should become more actively involved than they have been in the past to shape the urbanisation in developing and emerging countries in the most climate-friendly way possible and to simultaneously encourage economic innovation and sustainable energy supply even for the inhabitants of poor neighbourhoods. Environmental and climate projects should always be converged into a unified vision. → 3.3.1
- 4 **Specifically support effective adaptation to effects of climate change.** The consequences of global warming can no longer be completely stopped. Therefore, the German government should participate in the advancement of scenarios, which show the future impacts of climate change and which regions will become uninhabitable in the future; focused adaptation measures can safeguard development prospects, as also consider future migration patterns while planning the infrastructure and basic services in urban centres, for example. Germany should work to ensure that financial commitments for adaptation measures are increased and permanently honoured. → 3.3.2
- 5 **Promote comprehensive management systems for disaster risks and risks linked to climate change.** The German government should further intensify the resilience of developing countries with respect to natural hazards and in doing so, strengthen the institutional capacities from prevention to early warning, disaster management, and humanitarian aid up to compensation funds and a resilient reconstruction. → 3.3.2
- 6 **Acknowledge the loopholes with regard to rights and protection for people displaced due to climate change and develop solutions for the same.** If adaptation also does not help any longer, people are forced to leave their homes. Most of the affected people stay in their own country as internally displaced persons. The German government should support regional solutions for this, as also endorse the introduction of climate passports for those people, who would otherwise become stateless. It should work at the international level for the developing of *guidelines on displacement due to climate change and disaster* and investigate as to how individual rights can be strengthened. → 3.3.3
- 7 **Combine climate, migration, and peace policy.** The German government should make better use of international institutions such as the *Task Force on Displacement* (TFD) established on the basis of the Paris Agreement on climate change to research the correlations between climate change, conflict and displacement and develop solutions for these problems. → 3.3.3

Climate change is increasingly having an influence on global migration and displacement (→ **Chap. 2.5**). Extreme weather events drive away more and more people. The global warming is exacerbating environmental problems such as water scarcity, extreme weather events and the extinction of species, jeopardising agricultural production and negatively affecting the livelihoods of many people. It can also exacerbate tensions and land-use conflicts and, together with other factors, become a driver of displacement and irregular migration.

This trend is likely to continue. The World Bank predicted in 2018 that by 2050, more than 140 million people – as a result of global warming – will leave their homes and become internally displaced persons, if additional climate change mitigation measures are not taken: 86 million in sub-Saharan Africa, 40 million in South Asia and 17 million in Latin America. However, according to the World Bank, 80 per cent of these displacements can be avoided by pushing climate change mitigation measures.⁴¹³

Climate change requires systematic rethinking and quick action. It reveals an international equity problem, because industrialised countries and emerging countries are mainly responsible for man-made atmospheric warming.⁴¹⁴ However, it is mainly the poor countries that suffer from the negative effects.⁴¹⁵ Germany and other rich nations as well as emerging economies have a responsibility and in 2015 made a commitment in Paris to consistently focus on climate-neutral economic development and to significantly reduce their ecological footprint. The measures described in the previous chapters for greater security, stability and improvement of people's livelihoods promise sustainable success only with consistent global climate change mitigation measures. Additionally, Germany is supposed to

help the most vulnerable countries to adapt to changing climatic conditions, manage losses and damages that are already suffered, and protect against future climate risks. Lastly, Germany can work together with these countries to trigger innovations for climate-neutral and environment-friendly development. That way, the emissions and thus, the effects of climate change are limited in the long term by means of climate-neutral development models.

The German government should increase its involvement in the following three areas:

1. Promoting environmental and climate protection worldwide
2. Reducing climate change impacts and promoting adaptation
3. Recognising climate-induced displacement and supporting affected people

3.3.1 Promoting environmental and climate protection worldwide

An ambitious global plan for environment protection and climate change mitigation is the most powerful and efficient tool to prevent the consequences of climate change from becoming even more devastating and the number of persons displaced due to change in climate environment from increasing. 188 states and the EU are contractual partners of the Paris Convention of 2015, with the objective of limiting the rise in global temperature to well below two degrees, ideally to 1.5 degrees as compared to pre-industrial levels. In order to achieve this goal, they must economise on a climate-neutral basis in the second half of the century. This means refraining from releasing more climate-affecting gases into the atmosphere than natural reservoirs on the planet can extract from the atmosphere, or compensating for unavoidable emissions through other measures.⁴¹⁶

To achieve this, the main polluters in particular must make and increase their respective contributions for emission reduction (*Nationally Determined Contributions, NDCs*). New perspectives are offered by the *European Green Deal*, an action and investment plan, with which the EU member states aim to promote

⁴¹³ World Bank (2018b) *Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration*, p. xv.

⁴¹⁴ See *Our World in Data: Cumulative CO₂ Emissions*: <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cumulative-co-emissions?tab=chart>.

⁴¹⁵ IPCC (2018) *Global Warming of 1.5 °C – An IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty*; cf. UN (2007) *Climate Change Around The World: A View From The UN Regional Commissions: Green Our World!*; <https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/climate-change-around-world-view-un-regional-commissions>; Burke, M., Hsiang, S. und Miguel, E. (2015) *Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production*.

⁴¹⁶ See BMU (2017) *Climate Conferences*.

energy efficiency and an economy that is low in emissions and more oriented towards recycling; they also aim to reduce environmental pollution and protect biodiversity.⁴¹⁷

The German government is striving on an international level to ensure that the parties to the Paris Climate Agreement perform their NDC obligations. Through BMU and BMZ, Germany played a key role in establishing the NDC Partnership and supported partner countries in implementing and further developing their respective obligations.⁴¹⁸

The BMU will additionally support climate change mitigation projects in emerging economies and developing countries with highly ambitious climate change mitigation targets.⁴¹⁹ The BMZ is meanwhile increasingly engaging the private sector and the civil society in its projects.⁴²⁰ Moreover, the German government has also massively expanded its investments in programmes to protect natural resources, forests and other ecosystems as well as biodiversity in recent years.

However, the investments that have been made worldwide so far will not be sufficient to achieve the goal of climate neutrality within three decades. Germany and Europe must significantly strengthen the measures for the reduction of emission in order to achieve values that are consistent with the global 1.5-degree Paris target. Even the minimal 2-degree target is only possible if all – industrial, emerging economies and developing countries together become climate-neutral by 2050.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁷ European Commission (2021b) A European Green Deal: Striving to Be the First Climate-Neutral Continent.

⁴¹⁸ BMZ: NDC partnership: <https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/klimaschutz/NDC-Partnerschaft/index.html>; BMZ and BMU (2021) Globale Partnerschaft zur Umsetzung der nationalen Klimabeiträge (NDCs).

⁴¹⁹ BMU (2020b) NAMA Facility responds to a global green recovery.

⁴²⁰ BMZ: Schutz des Klimas ist Überlebensfrage der Menschheit: Allianz für Entwicklung und Klima: <https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/klimaschutz/Allianz fuer Entwicklung und Klima/index.html>; Allianz für Entwicklung und Klima: <https://allianz-entwicklung-klima.de>.

⁴²¹ MCC: That's how fast the carbon clock is ticking: <https://www.mcc-berlin.net/forschung/co2-budget.html>; IPCC (2015) Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; IPCC (2018).

What should we do?

1) Take responsibility as major emitters. It would be an important signal to the partners and signatories of the Paris Agreement if the EU were to become climate neutral by 2050. To achieve this, the EU should raise its previous target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55 per cent by 2030 compared to 1990 to at least 65 per cent, and accelerate the energy revolution accordingly as part of the transformation to a low-carbon society.⁴²²

2) Promote climate-neutral development in the Global South. Germany and Europe should support the climate and environment-friendly development and restructuring of the economies in the developing countries even more massively than is already the case. Since the process of climate change can only be slowed down if developing countries and emerging economies also shape their future development in an environment-friendly and climate-neutral way. To do this, they need access to the necessary technologies as well as financial support for investments. Climate-neutral innovations have the potential to create new economic sectors and jobs. It is a question of justice to enable poorer countries to undergo this modernisation, which is already well underway in the wealthy countries. Especially poor countries, for whom fossil fuels have been an important economic factor so far, need support in restructuring their economies.

The most important instrument to help developing countries for a climate-friendly development is the support in implementation and further development of their own climate objectives. The cooperation in terms of the above-mentioned NDC partnership should therefore be developed considerably and follow the principle to take the Global South into account for all climate change mitigation measures. The German government should develop a mechanism whereby climate protection investments in Germany are the basis for additionally providing a significant share of funding for climate mitigation action measures in developing countries and emerging economies (climate matching).

⁴²² Cf. UBA (2020a) EU climate targets: 60 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 is possible; UBA (2020b): Raising the EU GHG Emission Reduction Target.

This is supposed to support the NDC obligations of the partner countries.

3) Use the synergy effects of renewable energies. For the promotion of climate-friendly development in the Global South, the expansion of renewable energies should have a prominent role. Especially the sun and wind are abundantly available in most countries. A global energy revolution is thus possible.⁴²³ An efficient, affordable and reliable, and especially sustainable energy supply from renewable sources can also contribute to reducing root causes of displacement and migration in several ways.⁴²⁴ Decentralised energy solutions based on renewable energy offer rural areas in Africa or South Asia that have not yet been connected to the network, the opportunity for economic development, build local value-added chains (including reliable cold chains), and access information via the Internet. Access to energy is also a prerequisite for progress in health care and education. This not only improves living conditions, but also generates jobs and reduces poverty.

In light of these synergy effects, the German government should continue and increase its efforts for a global energy revolution. In addition to the cooperation within the framework of the NDC partnership, it can also tie in with existing initiatives, such as the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the *Energising Development* (EnDev) programme, which is largely funded by the BMZ and involves several countries and donor states⁴²⁵, or the *South East Asia Energy Transition Partnership* (ETP), in which the BMU supports countries with ambitious climate targets in their energy revolution by means of the *International Climate Initiative* (ICI).⁴²⁶

⁴²³ Scheffran, J. and Froese, R. (2016) Enabling Environments for Sustainable Energy Transitions: The Diffusion of Technology, Innovation and Investment in Low-Carbon Societies.

⁴²⁴ Stöcker, C. (2020) Zukunft der Energieversorgung: Wir starren auf den falschen Frosch; Mebratu, D. and Swilling, M. (2019) Transformational Infrastructure for Development of a Wellbeing Economy in Africa.

⁴²⁵ See EnDev: <https://endev.info>; BMZ: Energy and climate: <https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/klimaschutz/Energie-und-Klima/index.html>; BMZ: Cooperation in Action: Energising Development: Access to Energy for Millions of People: https://www.bmz.de/en/issues/klimaschutz/energy-and-climate/bausteine/bausteinOrdner_11_projektbeispiele/beispiel_01_endev/index.html.

⁴²⁶ BMU: Clean, Affordable, and Secure Energy System in Southeast Asia (CASE): https://www.international-climate-initiative.com/de/details/project/saubere-bezahlbare-und-sichere-energie-fuer-suedostasien-case-20_I_380-3127.

4) Support environment and climate-friendly urban development. German and European development cooperation should become more actively involved helping to shape the urbanisation impetus in developing countries (→ **Chap. 3.2.1**) in the most climate-friendly way possible. This means that: Strengthening innovation potentials for economic development and improving the living conditions in cities, especially to avoid heat islands and create carbon-neutral digital infrastructure for transport, electricity and buildings. This recommendation also serves several objectives at the same time: A sustainable energy supply for all improves the living conditions of the people. At the same time, it decouples urban growth from greenhouse gas emissions.

5) Always consider the environment in climate projects. Programmes and projects to protect the climate and reduce greenhouse gas emissions often go hand in hand with the conservation of biodiversity or the protection of ecosystems. The goals of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and those of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity should be converged into a unified vision at the benefit of all the sectors concerned. Not only does the living environment of many species remain intact when forests and wetlands are protected, These plant ecosystems also store CO₂ and thus reduce the greenhouse effect. Moreover, they also help maintain the global water cycle and prevent erosion, landslides and other disasters. There is an urgent need to continue engagement in this area and to raise awareness of these linkages and synergies among the public and especially among strategy developers in governments and organisations in order to prevent some of the drivers of displacement and irregular migration from arising in the first place.⁴²⁷

The German government already contributes significantly to the protection of forests through various measures. Within the framework of the GNU initiative (Germany-Norway-United Kingdom), Germany is one

⁴²⁷ Hansjürgens, B., Schröter-Schlaack, C., Berghöfer, A. et al. (2017) Ökosystembasierte Klimapolitik für Deutschland; IPCC (2018); Kern, V. (2020) Auf dem Holzweg: Holznutzung in Europa. 21. Dezember 2020: klimareporter: <https://www.klimareporter.de/erdsystem/auf-dem-holzweg/>; WBGU (2020) Landwende im Anthropozän: Von der Konkurrenz zur Integration; Werf, G. van der, Morton, D., DeFries, R. et al. (2009) CO₂ Emissions From Forest Loss, p. 737.

of the three largest donor countries in the area of forest protection.⁴²⁸ The commission highly recommends the German government to continue this commitment. This also includes securing the (communal) land property rights and supporting the management by indigenous peoples and local communities that contribute to the protection and conservation of forest landscapes (→ **Box 24**).

Box 24

Taking steps against climate change by protecting the forests

According to estimates of the World Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), ten million hectares of forest have been cut down annually worldwide since 2015 alone – an area equivalent to almost a third of Germany. With a deforestation rate of 4.4 million hectares per year, the largest net loss of forest area is recorded in Africa. In South America, almost three million hectares are lost every year, mainly in Brazil. In Asia, around 2.2 million hectares per year, Indonesia being the main focus here.⁴²⁹

Forests are important CO₂-sinks. Estimates suggest that the burning and rotting of biomass from deforested or degraded forest areas contributes to around 20 per cent of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.⁴³⁰ At the same time, forests provide food, building material, fuel and medicinal plants for many people and are a key element of the economy. Particular importance is attached to the protection of tropical forests, as they are an essential factor in stabilising the world's climate. The soils are rapidly depleted in places where they are cleared for agriculture. Apart from that, they also harbour a variety of endemic animal and plant species. Their protection is therefore an important objective in the global sustainability policy (SDG 15).

3.3.2 Reducing climate change impacts and promoting adaptation

Climate change is already a reality and exacerbates the existing imbalances, for the Global South is particularly affected by the consequences. Due to the physical inertia of the climate system, droughts and heat waves, the delay or absence of the rainy season and devastating storms will continue to increase even if there is a massive reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions in the shortest possible time. This makes additional climate change adaptation measures urgently necessary in addition to climate protection, for people to be able to remain in their homes. Migration may be an important and suitable adaptation measure, be it circular or seasonal migration, for example, when farmers take on additional work in the city at certain times of the year, or on a permanent basis. The transition from migration as a free decision to (internal) displacement, when there is no longer any choice to secure one's own existence, is gradual. Support is also often needed for migration as an adaptation measure.

As part of adaptation, investments in comprehensive disaster risk management are urgently needed, especially in countries with high exposure to extreme weather events. These are increasing due to climate change and lead to fatalities, crop failures, destruction of settlements, infrastructure and ecosystems, as well as short- or long-term displacement. Risk management includes a wide range of measures. Integrating preventive approaches in spatial planning and building resilient infrastructure are just as much a part of this as early warning systems, disaster management, humanitarian aid, compensation and reconstruction.

There is no lack of programmes and projects for the adaptation to climate-induced changes and protection against losses. To name a few: The United Nations have established an *Adaptation Fund* under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to support projects and measures for increased resilience and adaptive capacity in poor countries.⁴³¹ The *Green Climate Fund* (GCF) provides grants, loans,

⁴²⁸ BMZ: Forest and climate: <https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/klimaschutz/Wald-und-Klima/index.html>.

⁴²⁹ FAO (2020) Global Forest Resources Assessment 2020: Key Findings.

⁴³⁰ Werf, G. van der, Morton, D., DeFries, R. et al. (2009).

⁴³¹ See Adaptation Fund: <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/privacy-policy/>; Germany is currently by far the largest donor to the fund and has already paid in more than EUR 455 million, see World Bank: Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs): <https://fiftrustee.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/dfi/fiftrustee/fund-detail/adapt>.

capital, guarantees and technical assistance to developing countries for projects that are particularly suitable for the transition to low-emission and climate-smart development.⁴³²

The contractual Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change created the *Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage*, WIM 2013. It is supposed to address the possibilities of financial support in case of losses and damages. Expert groups on disaster risk management and climate-induced displacement were established under the WIM (Task Force on Displacement, → **Box 27**).⁴³³

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction works to develop strategies and establish early warning systems to improve preparedness for future extreme events and limit damage in the event of a disaster.⁴³⁴ The international humanitarian system is also changing and becoming increasingly proactive in preventing imminent harm and protecting human lives.⁴³⁵ Various European and national programmes serve to improve protection and adaptation measures, for example in the water and agriculture sectors.⁴³⁶

What should we do?

1) Support effective adaptation to the unavoidable consequences of climate change in a targeted manner.

A strategic and forward-looking approach is necessary for climate adaptation to be effective and sustainable in reducing displacement due to climate change. This approach takes into account the following developments: estimated impacts of climate change, future uninhabitability of regions, targeted adaptation measures in regions with development prospects, and foreseeable migrations to urban centres or more fertile land areas, where the infrastructure and social services can already be oriented towards this immigration. Coastal cities

should be given special attention, as they have a crucial function as a hinge when it comes to displacement and migration (→ **Chap. 3.2.1**) and are particularly vulnerable to cyclones, tidal waves or flooding and directly affected by sea-level rise.⁴³⁷ For this approach, in addition to improved forecasting capacity, strengthening and networking of national and local institutions is of central importance so that they can implement adaptation in a targeted manner. Sufficient financial resources are also needed. The German government should work to ensure that financial commitments for adaptation are permanently honoured and increased further to meet increasing needs. In doing so, it must be ensured that poor countries receive subsidies for their adaptation according to their economic performance capability in order to avoid over-indebtedness.

In some especially vulnerable regions, approaches have already been developed to tackle adaptation, including migration, in a holistic, targeted and coordinated way. These include, for example, the *Great Green Wall* project for Sahel (→ **Box 25**), the adaptation initiative of the AU⁴³⁸ or the adaptation programme of the Pacific Island countries.⁴³⁹ These approaches should be strengthened in the areas of planning, networking and implementation.

2) Promote comprehensive disaster risk management systems.

Natural disasters can destroy whole swathes of land and jeopardise the development of countries. In order to avoid people from having to leave their homes in the short or long term due to earthquakes or extreme weather events and becoming displaced persons, preventive measures must be taken on to ensure that damage and losses are kept to a minimum. Furthermore, quick and effective help must be provided in an emergency. This includes the multifaceted approaches of disaster preparedness, reliable early warning systems, effective disaster management, foresighted humanitarian aid and rapid reconstruction that learns from experience.

⁴³² See Green Climate Fund: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/>.

⁴³³ See UNFCCC: The Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage: <https://unfccc.int/wim-excom/>

⁴³⁴ UNDRR (2021) What is the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction?

⁴³⁵ See for example the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement IFRC (2020) World Disasters Report 2020: Come Heat Or High Water. Tackling the Humanitarian Impacts of the Climate Crisis Together.

⁴³⁶ The BMZ website provides an insight: <https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/klimaschutz/index.html>.

⁴³⁷ See, for example, World Bank (2018b), p. xxvii–xxviii.

⁴³⁸ See Africa Adaptation Initiative: <https://africaadaptationinitiative.org/>.

⁴³⁹ See Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change Programme: <https://www.sprep.org/pacc>.

Box 25


Africa's Great Green Wall for the Sahel

A green belt stretching across the continent from Senegal to Djibouti is expected to mitigate the effects of climate change and keep desertification at bay (→ Fig. 13). It is planned that by 2030, 100 million hectares of once fertile, but long since degraded land, will be planted with trees. The greenery on this area is expected to store 250 million tonnes of carbon dioxide by then. That way, possibly up to ten million rural jobs will be generated.⁴⁴⁰ The project is supposed to not only contribute to reducing the displacement, but also offer young people an alternative to being recruited by jihadis and terrorist groups like Boko Haram.

During 2007, the countries of the region, under the leadership of the AU, set out to implement the idea from the 1980s. Today, more than 20 African states and various international partners are involved. Senegal has planted twelve million drought-resistant trees. In terms of the initiative, Burkina Faso was able to restore three million hectares of degraded soils, Nigeria and Niger could restore five million hectares each and Ethiopia contributed in restoring 15 million hectares.⁴⁴¹

In order to speed up the process, the global community decided at the Paris environmental summit in early 2021 to push it forward with a programme worth around a hefty EUR 14 billion.⁴⁴²

Fig. 13: **Almost 8,000 kilometres through Africa – the Great Green Wall**



Source: map based on both <https://www.derstandard.de/story/2000123302735/die-afrikanische-mauer-gegen-den-klimawandel> and Magrin, G. und Mugelé, R. (2020) La boucle de l'Anthropocène au Sahel: nature et sociétés face aux grands projets environnementaux

The local population should be included in the planning and implementation of adaptation measures. It can contribute by sharing the knowledge on which regional factors degrade their livelihoods or which measures are necessary to support them in the event of extreme weather events or the long-term consequences of climate change. Lastly, the diaspora can help increase the resilience of countries of origin to the impacts of climate change by imparting knowledge, innovations, technologies and money.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴⁰ See The Great Green Wall: <https://www.greatgreenwall.org/about-great-green-wall>.

⁴⁴¹ See The Great Green Wall: Results: <https://www.greatgreenwall.org/results>.

⁴⁴² One Planet Summit (2021) One Planet Summit Biodiversity: Action Commitments for Biodiversity.

⁴⁴³ Scheffran, J., Marmer, E. and Sow, P. (2012) Migration as a Contribution to Resilience and Innovation in Climate Adaptation.

Many of the most affected countries are not in a position to overcome these challenges by themselves. In this regard, Germany is already helping in many ways: with knowledge and technology transfer, for example, for adapted early warning systems, dike building and planning processes, in strengthening and networking the responsible institutions and non-state actors (for example Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies), and with funding. All this can and should be further enhanced and the autonomy of the partner governments should be strengthened.

Furthermore, Germany and the EU should participate together with governments of partner countries and in multilateral organisations in the establishment of compensation funds for natural disasters. The goal must be to quickly compensate for the loss and damage suffered and to start reconstruction as soon as possible.

3) Expand the engagement for mitigating the risks of climate change by means of insurances and compensation mechanisms. Apart from social protection systems (→ **Chap. 3.2.3**), property insurances and compensation can stabilise the prospect of staying in regions that have particularly been hit hard by climate change. Agriculture has been the primary focus of efforts so far: That way, farmers whose seeds do not grow because of no rains, can at least obtain new seeds with the help of simple, digital insurance models. If extreme weather destroys fields or entire regions, crop failure insurance – as is already being tested in some countries – can protect farmers from losing their livelihoods.⁴⁴⁴

The German government should furthermore invest in the development of such instruments, for destroyed housing, for instance. In addition to state and multi-

lateral hedging funds, it should participate in other international initiatives and above all, cooperate with the private digital, financial and insurance industries.⁴⁴⁵ Existing financing instruments, such as the GCF, could also be opened up more to climate risk management support measures and loss and damage approaches. Even the current initiatives for debt relief or maintaining the debt sustainability of the poorest countries that are most affected by climate change, whose debt repayment is impaired by the weather-related disasters and thus becomes hopeless, can also contribute in mitigating effects of climate change.⁴⁴⁶

3.3.3 Recognising climate-induced displacement and supporting affected people

If adaptation measures and compensation payments are not sufficient to sustain people's livelihoods, and if governments are not able to provide and support people quickly, the risk of affected people feeling forced to leave their homes increases. People who are displaced due to natural disasters or climate change remain in their country for the most part, thus becoming internally displaced persons temporarily or for the long term. However, when they leave their home country, they are not considered refugees in the sense of the Geneva Refugee Convention (GRC) and therefore do not enjoy a similar status (→ **Chap. 1.2**). For such cases, options to create an international legal protection framework should be explored.

⁴⁴⁴ In the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, the first crop insurance programmes are already being used. The German agency for international cooperation (GIZ) and its partners there work with the so-called RIICE technology, which can calculate expected crop yields with a certainty of around 90 per cent using satellite information. First harvest losses, even before they occur, can be predicted and insurers can start compensating farmers before the non-harvesting of the crop, see GIZ: Rural development. Southeast Asia: Satellite data for rice cultivation: https://www.giz.de/de/mit_der_giz_arbeiten/43933.html. There are similar programmes in Africa (*African Risk Capacity*) and Asia as well, see ILO's Impact Insurance Facility: <http://www.impactinsurance.org>; BMZ: Climate risk insurance: <https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/klimaschutz/Klimarisikoversicherungen/index.html>.

⁴⁴⁵ Through the BMZ, the German government already contributes significantly to the *InsuResilience Global Partnership* (IGP) for risk financing and insurance approaches. Germany is the largest supporter of the IGP with around EUR 550 million and now has over 90 members. Germany will invest a further EUR 120 million in bilateral support for climate risk finance and insurance in 2021. Multilateral engagement will also be intensified further. The IGP is active in 78 countries with 26 programmes. It aims to insure 500 million vulnerable people against climate risks by 2025 and is expected to mobilise further supporters under the German G7 Presidency in 2022. See BMZ: Climate risk insurance: <https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/klimaschutz/Klimarisikoversicherungen/index.html>; Federal Government (2015) G7 Presidency 2015: Final Report by the Federal Government on the G7 Presidency 2015.

⁴⁴⁶ See UN Climate Change Conference UK 2021: <https://ukcop26.org/uk-to-host-global-summit-on-climate-and-development/>; cf. Kaiser, J. (2020) Debt relief in response to loss and damage caused by climate change: Deutsche Klimafinanzierung.

Some German development cooperation projects are already dealing with climate-induced migration and displacement.⁴⁴⁷ A good example can be found in Bangladesh (→ **Box 26**).

Box 26

How cities in Bangladesh deal with climate change-induced internal migration

Bangladesh is one of countries that is most vulnerable to climate change. 40 out of 64 districts are affected. An estimated six million people have already migrated from their home region due to floods and cyclones in the coastal area and droughts in the north. They are usually drawn to the nearest towns, where they find accommodation in poor settlements. In the divisional capitals of Khulna and Rajshahi, the proportion of displaced people due to climate change is particularly high in the slum population.

The BMZ and the EU are funding a project to improve the living situation of people who have migrated as a result of climate change in selected settlements in the partner cities of Barishal, Khulna, Rajshahi, Satkhira and Sirajganj through needs-based measures. The project promotes measures in four fields of action:

- > Fight against poverty and improvement of the living situation in the slums in cooperation with the municipalities
- > Vocational qualification and training programmes so that residents in slums can connect to the urban job market
- > Improving access to microfinance for the slum population
- > Improving access to social services for those who are not able to provide for themselves independently

This project has a pilot character. Its experiences not only flow in national policies in Bangladesh, but also set innovative trends in the discussion on how to deal with climate migration in the Global South.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁷ GIZ: Human mobility in the context of climate change: <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/67177.html>.

⁴⁴⁸ See GIZ: Urban Management of Internal Migration due to Climate Change (UMIMCC) / Urban Management of Migration and Livelihoods (UMML): <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/31936.html>.

In 2010, the parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change agreed upon in Cancún, Mexico, that governments should address disaster and climate change-induced displacement in order to understand the same in a better way and to work together more effectively with this regard. In 2015, the Task Force on Displacement (TFD), a task force of the WIM, was set up. It aims to develop integrated approaches to avert or minimise displacement that takes place as a result of the adverse effects of climate change (→ **Box 27**). Especially the Platform on Disaster Displacement, (PDD) that was established in 2016 is supposed to support states in implementing the protection programmes in the case of cross-border displacement.⁴⁴⁹

Finally, the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR)⁴⁵⁰ signed in 2018, recognise climate change as a cause of displacement. It is however largely up to the countries concerned to decide as to how they are going to deal with persons displaced due to climate change. The AU Kampala Convention on the protection of internally displaced persons grants them the right to protection and care if they have had to leave their homes due to a natural disaster.⁴⁵¹ The following recommendations are linked to these and similar initiatives.

What should we do?

1) Acknowledge the loopholes with regard to rights and protection for people displaced due to climate change and develop solutions for the same. When people are affected by long-term climate change or threatened by acute disasters to an extent that they are forced to leave their homes, this should be recognised as adaptation to the impacts of climate change.⁴⁵² Their rights and options for action must be strengthened, also to avoid irregular and risky migration. First and

⁴⁴⁹ See Platform on Disaster Displacement: <https://disasterdisplacement.org/>.

⁴⁵⁰ For both pacts, → **Chap. 1.2, Box 2**.

⁴⁵¹ bpb (2009) Afrikanische Union: Konvention zum Schutz von Binnenvertriebenen; Afrikanische Union (2009) Kampala Convention. African Union Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.

⁴⁵² Black, R., Adger, N., Arnell, N. et al. (2011) Migration and Global Environmental Change – Future Challenges and Opportunities.


Box 27

The approach of the Task Force on Displacement

The Task Force on Displacement is complementary to the work of existing bodies and expert groups within and outside the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which takes an integrative approach in mitigating and addressing displacement due to climate change. The Task Force emphasises the need to address migration, displacement and planned relocation as a result of climate change in a comprehensive and far-sighted manner, and especially advocates for: first, improved data collection with regard to climate-induced displacement and its impacts; second, appropriate policy-related and institutional overall conditions to reduce or manage climate-induced displacement; and third, intensive sharing of knowledge on promising approaches of action.

On this basis, the task force is now working on the implementation of these recommendations in a second phase. Figure 14 shows the various fields of action (external frame) with the respective organisations involved (the shapes that look like pieces of cake).⁴⁵³

Fig. 14: Various aspects must be considered while handling displacement due to the climate change



Source: UNFCCC (2019) Task Force on Displacement

⁴⁵³ UNFCCC: Task Force on Displacement: <https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/constituted-bodies/WIMExCom/TFD#eq-4>. There, you will also find the recommendations of the TFD introduced in 2018, which have guided its work since then, see TFD (2018) Report of the Task Force on Displacement.

foremost, these are internally displaced persons for whom access to basic services such as shelter, health care and education should be ensured. (→ **Chap. 3.4.2**).

The German government should advocate for regulated forms of migration and sufficient support within the framework of the PDD in order to close the protection loophole for the persons displaced due to climate change who have to cross the borders of their home country but are not recognised as refugees. In doing so, the great diversity of displacement due to climate change must be taken into account: It ranges from short-term displacement due to a natural disaster to (seasonal) recurring migration to permanent resettlement,⁴⁵⁴ for example, when the previous home becomes uninhabitable due to rise in sea levels. Specific solutions must be identified, supported and networked for each of these situations.

Possible solutions could be:

- › Using existing experience, the German government could expand the support for regional solutions, especially for vulnerable regions such as East Africa, the Sahel, the Caribbean and the Pacific.⁴⁵⁵ Firstly, this includes advising states to include procedures in their disaster management legislation that specifically address displaced persons from neighbouring countries in the event of cross-border disasters. Secondly, the German government could support developing countries in regional mediation processes to develop procedures and regional agreements to deal with cross-border displacement as a result of climate change.
- › Following the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, GPID; → **Chap. 3.4.2**, the German government could launch an initiative in the UN system to develop guidelines on climate and disaster displacement. Even if these are not binding, they can help to deal with the people concerned.
- › For people whose homes are existentially threatened by climate change, introducing the so-called

“climate passports” could be a solution.⁴⁵⁶ This especially concerns the population of flat island states that are in danger of sinking due to rising sea levels. In the Pacific and Indian Oceans, this would be about 1.2 to 2.2 million people.⁴⁵⁷ The historical model would be the so-called Nansen Passport, which gave hundreds of thousands of stateless people the right to stay in safe states after the First World War and was recognised by 52 states by 1942. Accordingly, a climate passport would grant people who have to be forcibly resettled in other states a status that would grant them legal immigration routes to safer states that recognise the climate passport. A climate passport would open up a life perspective for people who are becoming stateless and therefore deprived of rights as a result of climate change, for example from disappearing island states. It would be a powerful symbol for human rights-based refugee protection. At the intersection of responsibilities for climate change and displacement, proposals for the practical implementation of a climate passport could be agreed upon within the framework of the UNFCCC and discussed with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR.⁴⁵⁸

2) Strengthening the rights of people who face existential hardship due to climate change. The consequences of climate change, such as extreme weather events, are already threatening the livelihoods of many people. Especially smallholder farmers can be deprived of their entire economic base by climate change. National institutions and international organisations should support such victims of global warming to secure their livelihoods. Beyond the insurance solutions and investments in adaptation already described, the legal positions and the possibilities for compensation of victims of climate change should continue to be strengthened.⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁴ Vinke, K., Blocher, J., Becker, M. et al. (2020) Home Lands: Island and Archipelagic States' Policymaking for Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change.

⁴⁵⁵ See GIZ: Human mobility in the context of climate change: <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/67177.html>; BMZ: Migration and climate: <https://www.bmz.de/en/development-policy/climate-change-and-development/migration-and-climate>; Vinke, K., Blocher, J., Becker, M. et al. (2020).

⁴⁵⁶ WBGU (2018) Zeitgerechte Klimapolitik: Vier Initiativen für Fairness; Kälin, W. (2017) Klimaflüchtlinge oder Katastrophenvertriebene? Serdeczny, O. (2017) What Does It Mean to “Address Displacement” Under the UNFCCC?: An Analysis of the Negotiations Process and the Role of Research.

⁴⁵⁷ Nicholls, R., Marinova, N., Lowe, J. et al. (2011) Sea-Level Rise and Its Possible Impacts Given a Beyond 4° World in the Twenty-First Century.

⁴⁵⁸ WBGU (2018).

⁴⁵⁹ WBGU (2018).

So far, it is highly unclear as to what legal claims can be made against polluters, which in this context means primarily against emitters of greenhouse gases. Against this background, discussions are being held on enabling pioneer lawsuits on losses and existential damages of particularly vulnerable people and to support this financially through a fund.⁴⁶⁰ Improved international cooperation in court grants of legal aid and the financing of pioneer lawsuits would only be small building blocks for just compensation of climate-related losses and damages; however, their global symbolic effect should not be underestimated. Such lawsuits contribute to the further development of the law, uncover gaps in protection and thus directly and indirectly accelerate adaptations of legal systems at national and international level to the global challenges of climate change. They turn victims of climate change into autonomous actors.⁴⁶¹

The outlined mechanism, based on the polluter pays principle, could on the one hand help in reducing the causes of climate displacement (rising greenhouse gas emissions) by creating incentives to consider the costs and damages of climate change in advance. On the other hand, if it is successful, the victims of climate change would be enabled to improve their living situation. The development of suitable statutory conditions to deal with climate-related damage can be done in the framework of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM). The creation of an international environmental court could make sense in the long term.⁴⁶²

3) Combine climate, migration and peace policy.

Synergies must be leveraged to prevent the climate crisis from becoming a driver of violent conflicts that lead to further displacement and reciprocally intensifies the interaction of climate change, conflict and displacement.⁴⁶³ The possible cooperative institutional framework conditions are provided by the Nansen Initiative's protection programme for people who are displaced across borders due to natural disasters, which

was adopted by 109 states in 2015. It primarily comprises measures to combat consequences of displacement as a result of climate change and natural disasters and gives different options for humanitarian protection measures. This mostly involves the use of regional solutions to tackle and prevent disasters and strengthen resilience at all levels. Relocation – if it is necessary – must happen without discrimination of individuals or groups. Those affected should be involved and empowered to act independently.⁴⁶⁴

Another basis for action can be found in the comprehensive recommendations on addressing climate-induced migration and displacement (→ **Box 27**) presented in 2018 by the Task Force on Displacement (TFD), and the platform on disaster-induced displacement established to implement them (PDD). Germany and Europe should use their influence in the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism of the UNFCCC (WIM Excom) to strengthen the PDD and implement the TFD proposals.

In addition to the need for global frameworks to address climate-induced migration and displacement, there is still a need to promote and support regional dialogue processes between governments. This could enable regional migration on a voluntary and safe basis – ideally before displacement occurs.

⁴⁶⁰ UNEP (2017) The status of climate change litigation – a global overview; Boom, K. and Richards, J. (2016) Climate Justice. The International Momentum Towards Climate Litigation; WBGU (2018), p. 18 et seq.

⁴⁶¹ WBGU (2018).

⁴⁶² Davies, K., Riddell, T. and Scheffran, J. (2020) Preventing a Warming War: Protection of the Environment and Reducing Climate Conflict Risk as a Challenge of International Law.

⁴⁶³ Scheffran, J. (2017); BICC, HSFK, IFSH et al. (2020).

⁴⁶⁴ See The Nansen Initiative: www.nanseninitiative.org.

3.4 Supporting displaced persons and host countries



RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- 1 Negotiate multi-annual compacts to support host countries.** The German government should, together with the EU as well as other donor countries, negotiate multi-annual compacts for all countries hosting significant numbers of refugees, to implement the goals of the Global Compact For Refugees (GCR) and to ensure access to basic services for refugees. → 3.4.1
- 2 Raise the quota for admission of refugees.** The German government should start an international coalition of states, which is committed to the goal of admitting refugees to the extent of 0.05 per cent of their own population annually as a part of Resettlement programmes, especially women, children, and victims of sexual violence. This corresponds to a number of 40,000 refugees per year for Germany. → 3.4.1
- 3 Strategically coordinate multilateral and bilateral measures of the German government in host countries.** The German government should employ the instruments of foreign policy and development policy in countries of first reception as a part of a strategic overall concept between BMZ and Foreign Office, which is based on a political dialogue with the respective governments. → 3.4.1
- 4 Give greater priority to foreign policy and development policy to reduce internal displacement.** The German government should pay more attention to internal displacement and consider particularly affected countries more in its foreign and security policy, especially with regard to conflict resolution. To this end, the Government should align its help towards permanent solutions in case of long-term internal displacement and also employ development instruments to protect people and to give them prospects to build a viable future in their home countries or return to their countries. → 3.4.2
- 5 Ensure a better data basis and use the data in a differentiated manner.** The German government should advocate for improved and gender-disaggregated collection and analysis of relevant data, in view of the especially poor situation of data on internal displacement. → 3.4.2
- 6 Reform processes and institutions at the UN level.** The German government should support the work of the UN High-Level Panel (HLP) on internal displacement, and work towards transforming the HLP into a longer-term state-led process. → 3.4.2

The figures on refugees and displaced persons (→ **Chap. 1.3, Box 3**) conceal significantly different living conditions. In order to help people in a targeted and effective way, it is first important to know whether they are in immediate need: Where do displaced persons live in temporary accommodation, in which areas do they have a lack of clean water and food? Which areas lack hygienic, sanitary, and medical care, which areas lack education for children, which lack transport facilities, or which lack offices that process asylum applications? In some host locations, there is political instability, external threats, and violence. These conditions have perpetuated for some refugees and internally displaced persons, with no prospect of improvement (→ **Chap. 2.7**). Especially under such poor conditions, refugees, internally displaced persons and the respective host countries need special support.

In many places, UNHCR takes over this task, provides people with the basic necessities, monitors the compliance with international agreements and national laws, and looks for durable solutions as far as possible. The mandate of the UNHCR primarily covers refugees and stateless persons.⁴⁶⁵ UNHCR also contributes to the support of internally displaced persons⁴⁶⁶ through its role in the humanitarian cluster system coordinated by UN.⁴⁶⁷ However, this is mostly limited to emergency response and humanitarian aid; the institutional responsibilities for internally displaced persons remain fragmented.⁴⁶⁸

There are numerous connections between cross-border displacement and internal displacement. Many displaced persons initially stay close to their homes and flee across borders when they cannot find protection there and no longer see any alternative. Studies also show that returning refugees can become internally displaced persons.⁴⁶⁹ There is also evidence of interde-

pendencies between displacement and statelessness: Stateless people are particularly likely to be affected by displacement, and displaced persons are at increased risk of becoming stateless.⁴⁷⁰

Displacement and internal displacement in many ways also increase existing gender discrimination and socio-economic disadvantages faced by women. Violence faced by women often increases due to displacement.⁴⁷¹ Women and children are particularly vulnerable on escape routes and often become victims of various forms of violence multiple times.⁴⁷² They are repeatedly exposed to violence and sexualised assaults in reception centres and refugee camps: Shared sleeping quarters and sanitation facilities, remote water and fire sites, and poor lighting often expose women to assault and rape. This leads to behaviours that are injurious to health such as low food consumption and fluid intake to avoid having to go to shared restrooms that are far away. NGOs and international aid organisations that oversee refugee camps have also been involved in sexual abuse scandals in the last few years.⁴⁷³ The constant danger increases the likelihood of early marriages of girls on escape routes.⁴⁷⁴

Generally, assistance for refugees should not only alleviate acute need, but should also be geared towards finding durable solutions for refugees, which may consist of voluntary return, integration in the host country, resettlement, or complementary pathways to safe admission in third countries.⁴⁷⁵ For internally displaced persons, a durable solution requires that those affected have the same rights as fellow citizens who are not affected by displacement. This means that the access to basic services must also be guaranteed for refugees and internally displaced persons (→ **Chap. 3.2**).

⁴⁶⁵ For statelessness, cf. UNHCR (2017) "This is Our Home": Stateless Minorities and Their Search for Citizenship, p. 2 f.

⁴⁶⁶ The UN Cluster Approach defines clear responsibilities in humanitarian crisis situations. UNHCR is responsible for the management of the *Global Protection, Camp Management and Shelter Cluster*, areas, see UNOCHA: <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/coordination/clusters/what-cluster-approach>.

⁴⁶⁷ See Global Protection Cluster: <https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/about-us/who-we-are/>.

⁴⁶⁸ Cf. Global Protection Cluster: Fact Sheet on Internal Displacement: <https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/gp20/fact-sheet-on-internal-displacement/>.

⁴⁶⁹ IDMC (2020b) The Displacement Continuum. The Relationship Between Internal Displacement and Cross-Border Movement in Seven Countries.

⁴⁷⁰ NRC (2016) Statelessness and Displacement.

⁴⁷¹ Kossert, A. (2020), p. 166. On pages 166-177, Kossert gives a vivid description of the brutal sexual violence that often threatens women during the escape.

⁴⁷² Schouler-Ocak, M. and Abels, C. (2017) Study On Female Refugees: Repräsentative Untersuchung von geflüchteten Frauen in unterschiedlichen Bundesländern in Deutschland, p. 8 f.; Çalışkan, S. (2018), p. 13.

⁴⁷³ Westendorf, J. and Searle, L. (2017) Sexual Exploitation and Abuse In Peace Operations: Trends, Policy Responses and Future Directions, p. 367; Ruzibiza, Y. (2020) 'They Are A Shame To The Community...' Stigma, School Attendance, Solitude and Resilience Among Pregnant Teenagers and Teenage Mothers In Mahama Refugee Camp, Rwanda, p. 5; ZEIT ONLINE (2018) Skandal um Missbrauch in NGOs weitet sich aus.

⁴⁷⁴ Çalışkan (2018), p. 15 f.

⁴⁷⁵ In this context, the GCR draws attention to family reunification, scholarship programs, sponsorship and temporary local integration.

Additionally, the international community must help host countries and host communities of refugees and displaced persons in coping with the tasks so that they are not destabilised economically and/or politically by the reception. In light of the growing challenges, the Commission believes that the German government should focus on two core areas:

1. Supporting refugees and host countries
2. Focussing political attention on internal displacement and helping mitigate its consequences

3.4.1 Supporting refugees and host countries

An extensive analysis of the root causes of displacement must not be limited to the respective countries of origin and to the circumstances that led people to escape to another country. The situation of refugees, who have found protection in a (first) host country, is sometimes so uncertain that it leads to secondary migration movements. Thus, the large-scale immigration of protection seekers in Europe in 2015/16 can also be explained by the rapid deterioration of living conditions and the lack of prospects for Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries. This, among other things, included the realisation that a return to Syria in the near future was becoming unlikely and that neither the children's schooling nor the parents' employment opportunities in the host country were assured. Supporting host countries of refugees is therefore in the interest of these countries, the refugees and the international community.

Right now, a relatively small number of countries receive the bulk of global refugees. As a rule, these are the neighbouring states of the countries of origin (→ **Chap. 1.3**). These countries are achieving great things in humanitarian terms; however, they often face huge challenges in the process of accepting and providing for refugees. They consider it the responsibility of the international community to support the refugees directly. At the beginning of a refugee crisis, this help is provided almost only from humanitarian means. The host countries generally expect that international aid will be continued until a possible return of the refugees. This can make the inclusion of refugees difficult in the national social systems and job markets.

In the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants from September 2016, 193 UN member states specifically committed to protecting the human rights of refugees and providing more sustainable support to host countries. The Global Compact for Refugees (GCR), adopted by 181 states at the UN General Assembly in December 2018, has made these commitments more concrete (→ **Chap. 1.2, Box 2**). The German government provides support at the intersection of humanitarian aid, development cooperation and support for peace building with its own specially developed crisis instruments⁴⁷⁶, which are aimed at strengthening the resilience of refugees and host communities to make an important contribution to achieving the goals of the Refugee Pact. (→ **also Chap. 3.1.1**).⁴⁷⁷

However, the overall support provided to host countries by the international community so far has been inadequate, and the situation of host countries has deteriorated in several respects. For this reason, the German government should continue to actively and increasingly advocate for the international implementation of the agreements in order to support host countries.

In doing so, it should keep in mind that the resettlement of refugees from host countries by third countries has decreased sharply since 2016. In 2019 and 2020, largely due to the Trump administration's order to halt the U.S. resettlement programme and Covid-19-related travel restrictions, the numbers were lower than they

⁴⁷⁶ These instruments include the "Transitional development assistance" and the "Special initiative Tackling the root causes of displacement, (re)integrating refugees" With the special initiative, the German government has been supporting refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities since 2014 in the areas of water and electricity supply, health, education and employment opportunities, psychosocial support for traumatised people and peacebuilding. The aim is to improve the living situation of people both in acute situations and, more importantly, in persistent refugee situations, to alleviate social tensions between refugees and people in the host regions, and to support and stabilise the host countries.

⁴⁷⁷ The flexible crisis response can still be improved according to the results of recent evaluations. DEval, t.b.p.: Effectiveness of German Development Cooperation in Dealing with Conflict-induced Forced Migration Crises: <https://www.deval.org/de/wirksamkeit-deutscher-entwicklungszusammenarbeit-bei-der-bearbeitung-konfliktbedingter-fluchtkrisen.html>; BMZ (2021) Partnership for Prospects; Loewe, M., Zintl, T., Fritzenkötter, J. et al. (2020) Community Effects of Cash-for-Work Programmes in Jordan: Supporting Social Cohesion, More Equitable Gender Roles and Local Economic Development in Contexts of Flight and Migration; Kuhn, J. and Schüttler, K. (2020) Economic Integration Into Host Communities in Times of Crisis. How to Ease the Impact of Covid-19 on Displaced Populations in Low- and Middle-Income Countries.

have been in years: That way, UNHCR was able to place 126,291 people in 2016, just under 64,000 in 2019, and only 22,770 in 2020.⁴⁷⁸ This is a historical low.⁴⁷⁹

Additionally, the German government should note that (with few exceptions)⁴⁸⁰ traditional host countries have also tightened their asylum policies in recent years – on the one hand by restricting legal entries, on the other hand by direct deportations at the external borders, so-called *pushbacks* (→ **Chap. 3.5.2**).

Germany, apart from its strong multilateral engagement, is a significant bilateral partner of important host countries. For support to be effective, it is important that the available resources are used in the contexts where they are needed the most. Such identification of refugees who are especially in need of help could be based on data collected and managed by UNHCR and other aid organisations. These organisations provide information on which host countries need special support.

What should we do?

1) Negotiate multi-year compacts to support host countries. The German government should work to ensure that, together with the EU as well as other donor countries, multi-year compacts are negotiated for all host countries that are confronted with large numbers of refugees and have a need for long-term support in order to implement the goals of the Global Compact for Refugees. The recent experiences, especially from the Jordan Compact of 2016 and the assistance to refugees in Turkey funded by the EU under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT) since 2016, should be drawn upon for the design of support modalities under these compacts. In recent years, significant progress has been made in these countries with regard to schooling, access to medical care and the job market, not only for refugees but also for the local population.

Such compacts should be – where there is a corresponding need – financed for at least five years, and can be extended at least once, provided that a return of the refugees to their countries of origin is not foreseeable. The aim of this commitment to provide support beyond emergency humanitarian aid is to ensure that refugees are no longer dependent on international aid after ten years at the latest and are able to make a living on their own (→ **also see Chap. 3.6**).

2) Raise the quota for admission of refugees. In 2021, the 70th anniversary of the GRC coincides with the inauguration of the new US administration under Joe Biden, who has once again made resettlement a US policy priority and wants to greatly increase the number of resettlements.⁴⁸¹ Canada is also pursuing this goal.⁴⁸² This provides an opportunity for a multilateral push with regard to refugee protection: Germany, together with the USA, Canada and other states, should launch a new international coalition that is committed to the goal of annual refugee resettlement of at least 0.05 per cent of the host country's population. For Germany, this would correspond to 40,000 refugees per year. In collaboration with France, the Benelux countries, the Scandinavian states, Portugal, Ireland and others, a volume of 120,000 resettlement commitments per year would be achievable in the medium term through such a coalition, which would be comparable to the announcements of the new US government. Apart from that, the German government should support and expand sponsorship programmes for refugees and their families. In this regard, Germany has gained experience, among other things, with the federal and state (Länder) reception programmes for Syrian refugees before 2014 and with the pilot project “Neustart im Team” (new start in a team, NesT).⁴⁸³ Other EU countries, including Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy and Spain, have also experimented with such programmes in the last few years.⁴⁸⁴ In view of the increasing numbers of protection seekers worldwide, the German government should reconsider its reservations about the involve-

⁴⁷⁸ UNHCR: Resettlement Data: <https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement-data.html>.

⁴⁷⁹ UNHCR (2020c) UNHCR Warns 2020 Risks Lowest Resettlement Levels in Recent History.

⁴⁸⁰ There have also been improvements when it comes to accessing national systems in large host countries, for example, the new refugee legislation in Ethiopia or accessing the vaccination programme and health services in Jordan.

⁴⁸¹ Hauslohner, A. (2021) Biden Seeks to Restore ‘Badly Damaged’ Refugee Resettlement Program.

⁴⁸² See Government of Canada: <https://t1p.de/rw7l>.

⁴⁸³ See Government of Canada: The Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative: <https://t1p.de/fppo>; Pohlmann, V. and Schwiertz, H. (2019) Private Sponsorship in der Flüchtlingsaufnahme: Standard in Kanada, Trend in Deutschland?

⁴⁸⁴ Bolter, J., Fratzke, S., Kainz, L. et al. (2019) Refugee Sponsorship Programs: A Global State of Play and Opportunities for Investment.

ment of local authorities for the refugee reception: In cooperation with the more than 220 German municipalities that have offered to host refugees so far, it should look for ways to honour and utilise this commitment (→ see also Chap. 3.5.1).

3) Strategically coordinate multilateral and bilateral measures of the German government. The German government should employ the instruments of foreign policy and development policy in countries of first reception as a part of a strategic overall concept between BMZ and Foreign Office, which is based on a political dialogue with the respective governments. On the basis of such a concept, the measures of the German government would be bundled in a better way and their impacts on the living conditions of the refugees would be planned and implemented more clearly. According to the recommendation to improve strategic capacity (→ Chap. 3.1.1), the planning of country programmes of development cooperation should also be oriented even more strongly towards the special needs of the host countries and implemented in closer coordination with humanitarian aid. The consistent implementation of the GAAP concept has a special significance here (→ Chap. 3.1.1 and 3.6).

3.4.2 Focussing political attention on internal displacement and helping mitigate its consequences

Most of the people recorded by UNHCR as refugees and displaced persons are internally displaced persons (IDPs). The proportion of people who have left their homes due to wars, violent conflicts or targeted aggression against certain population groups without crossing an international border has continued to increase over the last ten years. According to IDMC, these were 45.7 million people at the end of 2019. Since 2019, IDMC is additionally reporting data on internal displacement due to natural disasters and climate change. By the end of 2019, these were around 5.1 million people (→ Chap. 1.3 and Fig. 15). It should be remembered that these figures are approximate values, with margins of error in both directions. It is therefore important to have a critical approach to these numbers.

Nevertheless, IDMC's statistics provide the best data that is currently available.⁴⁸⁵

The widespread assumption that disaster-induced internal displacement, contrary to conflict-induced internal displacement, has no political dimension and affects all population groups equally, is wrong in many cases. This form of displacement also affects poor and marginalised groups severely, for example, because they live in areas that are especially vulnerable to extreme weather events or because they lack reserves to bridge periods of shortages (→ Chap. 3.3). Thus, internal displacement exacerbates existing inequalities.

In many cases, internally displaced persons move to cities, thus contributing to increasing urbanisation tendencies and making it necessary to tailor support measures also to urban contexts. (→ Chap. 3.2).⁴⁸⁶


There is generally a lack of political attention to problems arising from internal displacement. This, among other things, is because many affected states deny the existence of internal displacement or conceal its extent, as this reveals their own policy failures and deficits. Statistics on internal displacement always have a political dimension and are often instrumentalised: With low figures, these governments sometimes seek to demonstrate their own ability to act or to prove the abatement of an internal conflict, which was observed in Pakistan, for example, or in Ethiopia until Abiy Ahmed became the prime minister.⁴⁸⁷ High figures, on the other hand, can serve to maintain territorial claims or signal a need

⁴⁸⁵ Bilak, A., Cardona-Fox, G., Ginnetti, J. et al. (2016) GRID 2016: Global Report on Internal Displacement, p. 39; IDMC (2019b) GRID 2019: Methodological Annex, p. 16. For the following countries, IDMC explicitly pointed out in its last annual report (2020a) that the actual figures tend to be higher than those collected: Central African Republic, Kenya, Syria, Pakistan, Turkey, Mozambique.

⁴⁸⁶ IDMC (2018) UnSettlement: Urban Displacement in the 21st Century. Research Agenda and Call for Partners. February 2018. IDMC produces these figures by collecting and verifying (or triangulating) the available sources. Depending on the country, these include reports by non-governmental organisations, government figures, media reports etc. The most important source is IOM's *Displacement Tracking Matrix* (DTM), which collects data on (internal) displacement through a network of *local enumerators* in crisis situations in the field. It needs to be taken into account that the data quality of the DTM methodology varies greatly depending on the country context, see DTM: <https://displacement.iom.int>.

⁴⁸⁷ Cardona-Fox, G. (2020) The Politics of IDP Data: Improving the Use of IDP Data and Evidence; IDMC (2019a) GRID 2019: Global Report on Internal Displacement.

Fig. 15: Development of the number of internally displaced persons, 2010 to 2019 (at the respective end of the year)



Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)⁴⁸⁸

for assistance. This strategy was chosen, for example, by the Azerbaijani government in the mid-2000s for displaced persons from Nagorno-Karabakh.⁴⁸⁹ The data situation is particularly difficult for internally displaced persons who have had to leave their homes as a result of climate change; systematic records of how many of them there are and what their needs are, are only kept in isolated cases.⁴⁹⁰ Conflict-induced internal displacement also occurs frequently (but not only) in low and middle-income countries. Compared to cross-border displacement, wealthy states are often less affected. However, the latter significantly influence the priorities of the international agenda.

Either way: Internally displaced persons are not different from their fellow citizens in legal terms. If they are not registered separately, they remain statistically “invisible”. And although they are often in similar need of protection as cross-border refugees, there is no

international protection regime for them equivalent to that of the GRC, because this would challenge the sovereignty of the states concerned.

However, the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID), published in 1998, have developed the standards of protection for internally displaced persons further by adding a human rights component to what had previously been a purely humanitarian perspective. These guidelines have received broad support from the international community. Meanwhile, there are a variety of national and regional instruments⁴⁹¹ for the protection of internally displaced persons. First and foremost, the Kampala Convention of the AU, which was adopted in 2009 and entered into force in 2012, not only affirms the rights of internally displaced persons, but also specifies the obligations for governments that derive from this. Especially African states which are heavily affected by internal displacement have transposed the Convention into national law. However, the

⁴⁸⁸ IDMC (2020a), p. 2.

⁴⁸⁹ Amnesty International (2017) Azerbaijan: Displaced Then Discriminated Against – the Plight of the Internally Displaced Population.

⁴⁹⁰ Anzellini, V., Desai, B., Fung, V. et al. (2017) IDMC Global Disaster Displacement Risk a Baseline for Future Work, p. 5.

⁴⁹¹ See Global Protection Centre: <https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/global-database-on-idp-laws-and-policies/>.

practical application of these instruments remains deficient.

There is especially a lack of long-term solutions for affected people, as evidenced by the increasing duration of displacement situations (*protracted displacement*, → Chap. 2.1). However, continued displacement perpetuates the disadvantage of affected populations, can exacerbate the supply conditions in the respective region and fuel potential or existing conflicts. Apart from that, continued internal displacement, as described, can lead to cross-border refugee movements.⁴⁹²

In response to fragmented institutional responsibilities, UNHCR redefined its role in internal displacement situations in 2019: The Policy on UNHCR's Engagement in Situations of Internal Displacement, which aims to make UNHCR a more reliable partner in such situations, focuses, among other things, on cooperation with development actors.⁴⁹³

The international community often underestimates the security and developmental impacts of internal displacement and the high costs for the community as a whole that are caused: not least decreasing productivity, declining tax revenues and political instability. Efforts at UN level to strengthen international cooperation within the framework of the Global Compacts for Migration and Displacement do not address the phenomenon of internal displacement. However, a UN High-Level Panel (HLP) on internal displacement was established in December 2019, with a particular focus on developing approaches to address continued situations of internal displacement.⁴⁹⁴ The establishment of this body is a step in the right direction; however, it has not received enough attention so far.

While more and more human rights organisations, development organisations and humanitarian organisations are working on behalf of internally displaced persons, there is a lack of political advocates working at

the international level for the rights of internally displaced persons and for flexible and multi-year funding to support them. At the operational level, the German government advocates for more resources for flexible financing instruments in the crisis and refugee context. In doing so, an integrative approach is taken that not only looks at the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons, but also of the host communities (→ Chap. 3.4.1).

What should we do?

1) Give greater priority to foreign policy and development policy to reduce internal displacement. The German government should pay greater attention to countries that are severely affected by internal displacement. These are often countries like Somalia, Cameroon or the Central African Republic, where “neglected crises” keep displacing people again and again and are often characterised by bad governance (→ Chap. 3.2.1). This makes foreign and development policy cooperation more difficult. Nevertheless, a stronger humanitarian, peacebuilding and development policy-related commitment in close cooperation with civil society can counteract further destabilisation and thus prevent or reduce cross-border displacement that might happen later.⁴⁹⁵ Additionally, special attention should be given to countries such as Sudan, Mali or Colombia, which are both affected by internal displacement and host larger numbers of cross-border refugees from other countries.

2) Put more focus on durable solutions for internally displaced persons. The German government should not limit its engagement to humanitarian aid, it should rather lay more stress on the search for durable solutions for internally displaced persons. The principles it should follow in doing so were outlined by the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) back in 2010.⁴⁹⁶ Thus, the long-term goal of support is not only to ensure the current basic material security of those affected, but also to restore their political, economic, social and cultural rights. In this regard, it

⁴⁹² IDMC (2020b).

⁴⁹³ UNHCR (2019b) Policy on UNHCR's Engagement in Situations of Internal Displacement.

⁴⁹⁴ See UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement: <https://www.un.org/internal-displacement-panel/>. The body is expected to present a final report in September 2021 with recommendations for action in six areas (*Generating political will, Prevention [in the context of conflict and disasters/climate change], Solutions, Innovative Financing, Private Sector Engagement, Data and Evidence*).

⁴⁹⁵ NRC (2019) The World's Most Neglected Displacement Crises.

⁴⁹⁶ The Brookings Institution – University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement (2010) IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons.

is necessary to provide assistance according to actual need rather than on the basis of legal status in order to adequately support both internally displaced persons without official registration and host communities.

Apart from that, the German government should promote that internally displaced persons are included in national development plans in a systematic way. And lastly, it should use all available options to encourage affected states to maintain or restore the rights of internally displaced persons. In this regard, proven approaches have been informal dialogue formats in which governments affected by internal displacement can exchange ideas on solutions, and the strengthening of regional forums such as ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. The UN High-Level Panel on internal displacement, under the heading of “government-led solutions”, also emphasizes the need to recognise affected governments as key actors in the development of durable solutions.

3) Ensure a better data basis and use the data in a differentiated manner. The German government should advocate for improved and gender-disaggregated collection and analysis of data on internal displacement. The United Nations Statistics Division pointed out the need for such data collection in its recommendations of March 2020.⁴⁹⁷ The German government should urge the Statistics Division to pay greater attention to handling sensitive data in a manner that complies with data protection requirements. Moreover, it should ensure that displacement triggered by natural disasters and climate change is covered in addition to crisis and conflict-related internal displacement. As a general rule, data collection should be based on what the internally displaced persons themselves and the populations around them lack in order to move closer to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This requires, on the one hand, the promotion of political will by the governments concerned to allow or support data collection in this area. On the other hand – in accordance with the corresponding demands of the 2030 Agenda – this requires investments in capacity building of national statistical authorities in countries affected by internal displacement. And lastly, data collection

needs to be coordinated at the international level in a better way.


However, absolute figures have limited practical use in this context. The need for assistance varies depending on the country and region. In order to allocate the available resources wisely and develop suitable recommendations for action, a more detailed assessment of the living conditions of internally displaced persons is needed. The “assessment of the severity of displacement” developed by IDMC can serve as a basis for an initial assessment and needs analysis, which uses a thematically differentiated traffic light system to assess how severe the situation of internally displaced persons is in different countries and regions. As a basis for operational work, it often makes sense to collect socioeconomic data about individual groups affected by displacement, such as that offered by the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS).

4) Reform processes and institutions at the UN level.

The German government should support the work of the UN High-Level Panel on internal displacement – and, above all, work to transform this temporary initiative into a longer-term state-led process. However, it is not only processes and programmes that should focus more on internal displacement; there is also an urgent need for reform in the existing institutional structure. For example, the office of the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons should be better funded and staffed. Apart from that, the office of a Special Representative for internally displaced persons, reporting directly to the UN Secretary-General, should be re-established to act as a political advocate for the concerns of internally displaced persons and to address the issue in all its dimensions.

⁴⁹⁷ UN ECOSOC (2019) Report of the Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics.

3.5 Managing German and European refugee and migration policy in a humane and coherent manner



RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- 1 Provide a safe residence to more refugees and open up prospects of staying for persons who are obliged to leave the country but have a tolerated stay permit (“Duldung”).** To this end, the German government should expand the Resettlement programmes, humanitarian admission quotas and the support to private sponsorship programmes for refugees, grant more humanitarian visas, explore the option of asylum application from other countries and mobilise other states for admission of refugees. The German government should offer tolerated persons, who are not likely to be able to return to their home countries in the foreseeable future, safe residency. → [3.4.1](#), [3.5.1](#) and [3.5.3](#)
- 2 Expand existing pathways for labour migration.** To attain this, the German government should enhance support to enterprises to make use of the Skilled Immigration Act, create additional opportunities of entry for persons with lower qualifications, and establish transnational educational and vocational partnerships. → [3.5.1](#)
- 3 Ensure protection at the external borders of the EU and on EU territory.** The German government should work to ensure that protection seekers do not have to live in inhumane conditions on the territory in the EU. In addition, the government should take up sea rescue measures again and advocate for the establishment of an independent control, complaints, and monitoring body at EU level to review also national border protection measures with respect to illegal *pushbacks*. → [3.5.2](#)
- 4 Reform German return policies.** Federal and state governments should bundle the different decision-making and implementation practices regarding voluntary return and deportations to make them more transparent and consistent across the country. In addition, the governments should establish neutral monitoring of deportations and uniform training of the officials conducting them. → [3.5.3](#)
- 5 Promote voluntary return and reintegration.** Data availability and transparency should be improved, and applied research should be expanded. In addition, recognised diaspora associations should be more involved as mediators. → [3.5.3](#)
- 6 Introduce a permanent coordination process for asylum and migration policy.** The German government should synchronise the strategic orientation of the external dimension of German asylum and migration policy in a formalised dialogue with the ministries. Partners for cooperation should be chosen together with civil society and diaspora, private sector and municipal stakeholders in an annual asylum and migration summit. Cooperation initiatives with third countries should be critically reviewed for human right violations. → [3.5.2](#) and [3.5.4](#)
- 7 Conclude substantial migration partnerships.** The partnerships should be based on mutual interests, form the framework for legal migration opportunities (without affecting regional migration options), offer the partner countries incentives for extensive development cooperation and promote the cooperation for the readmission of people. Good cooperation in the area of migration should continue to be rewarded with incentives with a more for more approach. In some areas of cooperation, but not in development cooperation, it can be sensible to establish conditions for certain support measures. → [3.5.4](#)
- 8 Strengthen the international structures in the field of refugee and migration policy.** Germany should expand political support to the processes of the Global Compact for Refugees and Migration and GFMD and strategically invest in these processes with personnel in key positions not only in the ministries but also via secondments. → [3.5.4](#)

In order to constructively shape migration patterns and reduce incentives for irregular migration, not only should legal migration paths be created in an overall partnership approach, but efforts must also be made with regard to return and reintegration. This overall approach is only credible and efficient if it is characterised by a humane treatment of refugees as well as migrants. From the viewpoint of the Commission, efforts by the German government and its partners in the following four core areas are necessary for a humane and coherent refugee and migration policy:

1. Developing legal migration pathways
2. Ensuring compliance with the law at the EU's external borders
3. Promoting voluntary return and reintegration, reforming German return policies
4. Shaping migration policy in partnership and creating alliances

3.5.1 Developing legal migration pathways

For years, the European Commission has requested EU member states to create more legal paths for highly skilled workers (through the EU Blue Card) and for refugees (through resettlement) to reduce incentives for irregular migration. The 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration also stresses the importance of legal migration opportunities. In fact, the scope of labour-related immigration to Germany from third countries has been low so far. At the end of 2020, a total of around 212,000 third-country nationals with a residence title for employment were staying in Germany.⁴⁹⁸ Work-related immigration will become more important at the latest when the baby boomer generation retires.

The precise links between irregular migration and legal migration opportunities have been difficult to grasp empirically, because decisions to migrate are influenced by many factors (→ **Chap. 2**). It is not contested by academics that restrictive visa issuance practices cause

people to seek irregular immigration paths.⁴⁹⁹ The research results are less clear regarding the interrelationships of different forms of migration. Thus, it can be determined that the Western Balkans Regulation, with which Germany has expanded immigration opportunities for less qualified persons from this region, was accompanied by a reduction in asylum applications. There is however a direct correlation in this regard. But other factors may have contributed to this reduction.⁵⁰⁰ There are similar uncertainties regarding expanded family reunion, educational migration, and alternative pathways to protection.⁵⁰¹

However, these uncertainties do not invalidate the assumption that more legal migration opportunities can help reduce irregular migration. The German government should therefore offer legal routes to Germany where it is possible and sensible for humanitarian and labour market reasons, and make existing immigration routes more accessible.

Legal immigration opportunities are not equivalent to permanent immigration. This applies to migrants as well as refugees: Many, but by no means all, migrants want to leave their home country permanently. Others primarily want opportunities for temporary and, if necessary, repeatable residence abroad. The same applies in principle to refugees: They need (restricted) protection as long as the persecution or crisis situation in their countries of origin continues.⁵⁰²

For third-country nationals there are a variety of legal immigration paths into EU member states. They can be roughly divided into three categories depending on the reason for migration, with temporary and permanent immigration options in all categories; the transition from a temporary to a permanent residence title is often smooth.

- › **Admission for humanitarian reasons:** The GRC assumes that refugees must be granted protection for the duration of persecution or displacement (asylum or subsidiary protection). Permanent admission is provided to refugees in the context of

⁴⁹⁸ These include around 66,000 EU Blue Card holders (additionally – and not included in the 212,000 – there were around 45,000 former EU Blue Card holders in Germany who had already been granted an unrestricted settlement permit), around 92,000 qualified professionals (with academic training without meeting the requirements of the EU Blue Card and skilled workers with vocational training) and around 45,000 under the various circumstances of the Employment Regulation (internal source: Central Register of Foreign Nationals/BAMF).

⁴⁹⁹ Carrera, S., Geddes, A., Guild, E. et al. (2018) Pathways Towards Legal Migration Into the EU: Reappraising Concepts, Trajectories and Policies.

⁵⁰⁰ Bither, J. und Ziebarth, A. (2018) Creating Legal Pathways to Reduce Irregular Migration? What we can learn from Germany's "Western Balkan Regulation".

⁵⁰¹ Cooper, R. (2019) Legal Pathways' Effects on Irregular Migration.

⁵⁰² → **Chap. 2.7** on residence titles for refugees.

resettlement or humanitarian quotas.

- › **Residence permits for work or education:** This includes, among other things, residence for the purpose of schooling or vocational training, employment, the search for training, study or job, or seasonal work.
- › **Family reunification:** Parents, spouses and minor children of citizens or people with legal right of residence in the host country can in principle come there legally.

The German government has taken steps in recent years to expand temporary and permanent immigration opportunities to Germany – this is however on a very small scale:

- › In the humanitarian area, the government has increased the commitment to the orderly admission of refugees in need of special protection from other countries of first reception (resettlement) to up to 5,500 persons for 2020.⁵⁰³ In doing so, it is also testing sponsorship models, such as the “Neustart im Team” (NeST) pilot project launched in 2019, in which private individuals can bring protection seekers to Germany if they commit to supporting the refugees financially⁵⁰⁴ for two years and also ideally through their volunteer commitment.⁵⁰⁵
- › Women and men from non-EU countries with vocational qualifications but without a university degree are offered easier opportunities to work in Germany under the Skilled Immigration Act (FEG), which came into force in March 2020. The aim of the law is to support the economy’s need for skilled workers through targeted and increased immigration of suitably qualified persons from

non-EU countries. The FEG has expanded and restructured the basics of education and employment migration: Skilled workers now include both people with qualified vocational training as well as those with academic education. And the previously valid restriction on “bottleneck professions” for third-country nationals who have a vocational qualification recognised in Germany and a job offer in Germany has been lifted.

- › Additionally, a subsequent regulation on the Western Balkan Regulation entered into force at the beginning of 2021, which allowed privileged access to the German job market for citizens of the six Western Balkan states with up to 25,000 employees per year even after 2020.⁵⁰⁶

The German government has been recruiting skilled workers and trainees through various pilot projects for several years; in doing so, it pays particular attention to the WHO Code of Conduct for the recruitment of health professionals in order to meet a shortage of the same in the countries of origin.⁵⁰⁷ Thus, it also gives well educated young people, who have no hope of employment in their home country, the chance to gain professional experience. Examples include the German-Tunisian Mobility Pact, which has brought 200 young Tunisian engineers to Germany, and the BMZ and EU-funded project *Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa* (THAMM). The project is aimed at recruiting skilled workers and trainees from North Africa for bottleneck professions in the German manufacturing industry.⁵⁰⁸ Furthermore, on the basis of the Residence Law, placement agreements can be concluded between the Federal Employment Office and the labour authorities of the countries of origin, and residence permits can be issued on this basis. It is

⁵⁰³ By the end of 2020, just under 1,800 of these admissions could be implemented due to Covid-19; the admissions committed for 2020 are supposed to be implemented operationally by the end of 2021, see BMI (2021a) Humanitäre Aufnahmeprogramme: Resettlement und humanitäre Aufnahmeprogramme bieten einen legalen und sicheren Zugang zu Schutz in einem Drittstaat. For 2021, Germany has announced that it will provide 2,500 admissions. So far, there is an admission order from the BMI for up to 500 Syrian refugees from Turkey per month for 2021, see BMI: Anordnung des Bundesministeriums des Innern, für Bau und Heimat vom 15. Januar 2021 für die Humanitäre Aufnahme gemäß § 23 Absatz 2 Aufenthaltsgesetz zur Aufnahme von Schutzbedürftigen aus der Türkei in Umsetzung der EU-Türkei-Erklärung vom 18. März 2016: <https://t1p.de/h707>. Up to 485 resettlement places will be added apart from the admissions from Turkey, and up to 515 places for newly planned state admission programs of Brandenburg and Berlin and under the current state admission programme of Schleswig-Holstein.

⁵⁰⁴ Payment of the net cold rent or provision of a separate apartment.

⁵⁰⁵ Bolter, J., Fratzke, S., Kainz, L. et al. (2019); Pohlmann, V. and Schwiertz, H. (2019).

⁵⁰⁶ See Federal Employment Office: https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/datei/dok_ba146772.pdf.

⁵⁰⁷ From March to December 2020, agencies abroad issued about 30,000 visas to skilled workers and trainees. In light of the Covid-19 pandemic, this is a remarkable number, see BMI (2021b) Ein Jahr Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz: Trotz Pandemie 30.000 Visa für Fachkräfte und Azubis erteilt.

⁵⁰⁸ GIZ: German-Tunisian Mobility Pact. Gain capacities, create perspectives: <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/19727.html>; GFMD: Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa (THAMM): <http://www.gfmd.org/pfp/ppd/11961>; European Commission (2018) Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa; see European Commission: <https://eutf.akvoapp.org/en/project/8328/>; see European Commission: <https://eutf.akvoapp.org/en/project/8650/#summary>.

also possible to enter the country in order to have the qualification recognised in Germany first and, if necessary, to complete an adaptation qualification.

The reforms and pilot projects represent an expansion of the existing paths of labour migration. While they are a good first step, the impact remains limited. So far, only a few potential migrant workers have taken advantage of the given opportunities, although many, also less qualified ones, are interested in working in Germany. This is because they often have practical difficulties in following the procedures that are provided, they are unable to provide the necessary proof of recognition, or they do not have the necessary language skills.⁵⁰⁹

What should we do?

As a contribution to reducing irregular migration, the German government should strive to make better use of existing legal immigration paths. Apart from that, it should expand these opportunities by significantly expanding humanitarian paths for refugees and those for labour and education migration.

1) Provide a safe residence to more refugees. During the expansion of existing humanitarian pathways, two further steps are suggested in addition to the German government's commitment to an international coalition for resettlement, a German resettlement quota, and an expansion of sponsorship programs for refugees, as recommended in **Chapter 3.4.1**:

First, the German government should expand the **issuance of "humanitarian visas"** for individual humanitarian cases in order to create safe refugee routes. To do that, it should make use of the possibilities for admission under § 22 and § 23 of the Residence Law.⁵¹⁰ In concrete terms, the government should launch a pilot project to allow at least 1,000 particularly vulnerable people from Yemen, for example, to enter Germany by safe routes within one year. The FFO's existing cooperation with IOM in the context of the *Family Assistance*

Programme to support the issuance of visas to family members of beneficiaries of protection in Germany could be expanded even further for this purpose.⁵¹¹ Looking ahead, it should explore options for **submitting the asylum application in third countries outside the EU**⁵¹² so that refugees are not exposed to dangers along migration routes to Europe.

Box 28

Life-saving legal refugee routes for Yezidis

Since the emergence of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in 2003, the terrorist army of the same name has undertaken targeted annihilation campaigns against ethno-religious minorities – including Christian and Shiite Muslim groups as well as the Yezidis. In Shingal, the northern Iraqi home region of the Yezidis, IS attacked some 20 villages and towns between 3rd and 15th August, 2014. The terrorists executed all men and boys over the age of 14, as well as all the elderly, sick and disabled, and buried them in mass graves. They used boys under the age of 14 as child soldiers. Women and girls were separated from each other, many were raped and then sold for sexual and domestic slavery. It is estimated that more than 5,000 Yezidis died in this genocide in a cruel way – the number of unreported cases is probably much higher. Half a million people became refugees overnight. Half of them still live as internally displaced persons in camps or host communities.

Several thousand women and children identified as those in need of special protection were able to leave for Germany, France, and Canada with their families in 2015 and 2016 through humanitarian admission quotas. Germany has taken in a total of around 1,175 survivors in the federal states of Baden-Württemberg (1,000 people), Lower Saxony (70), Schleswig-Holstein (32) and Brandenburg (72), giving them the opportunity for a fresh start. The women and children have a residence status based on § 23 Sec. 1 of the Residence Law.

⁵⁰⁹ SVR (2019); on Germany's attractiveness for skilled workers, see Esipova, N., Pugliese, P. and Ray, J. (2018); Liebig, T. and Mayer, M. (2019) *Wie attraktiv ist Deutschland für ausländische Fachkräfte?*

⁵¹⁰ An example are state admission programmes for Yezidis according to § 23 para. 1 Residence Law → **Box 28**.

⁵¹¹ Deutsche Vertretung in der Türkei (2018): IOM-Familienunterstützungsprogramm.

⁵¹² Switzerland used the option of asylum application from abroad from 1980 to 2013, but discontinued it because it was the only country that was doing it and the demand for it was too high to be handled by the consulates, see Das Schweizer Parlament: Botschafts asyl in der EU: <https://t1p.de/llek>.

Secondly, the German government should use its political clout in international forums and in the EU to advocate for various forms of protection and to **persuade other states to accept refugees**. Germany should make more conscious use of the reputation it has acquired in recent years in refugee policy. Specifically, in the negotiations on the new EU Pact on Asylum and Migration pact, the German government should push to concretise a Commission proposal: Accordingly, member states wishing to establish sponsorship programs for refugees should receive financial aids and support for expansion of capacities building and knowledge sharing. Overall, the German government should contribute in making the potentially good but still very general proposals on resettlement and admission of refugees on humanitarian grounds more concrete and in designing them in a way that is adapted to the possibilities of the host countries.

2) Expand existing pathways for migrant workers. For that, the Commission recommends stepping up the efforts in four areas:

Firstly, the German government should advance the practical **implementation of the Skilled Immigration Act and its skilled worker recruitment strategy**⁵¹³ and support companies in using the law. The main obstacles are the still too lengthy recognition of qualifications and the inadequate offers of language training before the entry. Current surveys show that many skilled workers from non-EU states are still unfamiliar with Germany as a migration destination.⁵¹⁴ Here, the German government needs to do more targeted advertising and more consulting. In doing so, it can build on the experience of the BMZ's "Migration and Diaspora" programme, which includes counselling on regular migration opportunities to Germany, including the new opportunities under the FEG.⁵¹⁵

This requires better coordination with the other actors involved in implementing and counselling on migration paths to Germany. Currently, the FFO is in charge

of communication activities abroad for the FEG, while the BMWi is responsible for the domestic communication campaign for the FEG and for *Make it in Germany*, the German government's official information portal for skilled workers from abroad. Meanwhile, the Cologne Institute for Economic Research (IW) is responsible for the information measures on the FEG on behalf of the BMWi. The coordination of these actors should be more systematic.

In the international competition for skilled workers, Germany has one disadvantage that should not be underestimated: the German language, which, for example, is only spoken and taught to a limited extent internationally in comparison with English. Therefore, it is necessary to expand the capacities of the Goethe-Institut, especially for language qualification in the country of origin as well as for imparting knowledge about living and working in Germany.

Necessary institutional improvements should include an expansion of the counselling infrastructure for skilled workers that are arriving and their accompanying or family members who are immigrating, as well as a continuation of the FFO's training measures on the FEG in the legal and consular departments of German missions abroad. With regard to the design of labour migration, experience from the *Triple-Win*-project so far has taught us that counselling services reach the target persons better and are more likely to have the desired effect if they are developed and implemented in cooperation with the private sector, employment services, trade unions and in cooperation with the countries of origin. Apart from that, the immigrant professional is more likely to remain in the destination country if family members are also integrated.⁵¹⁶

Secondly, the German government should create **additional opportunities for entry for lower-skilled people**. There are very limited and temporary opportunities for them so far.⁵¹⁷ The prerequisite for entry is always that there is a concrete job offer. Additionally, the approval of the Federal Employment Office is generally

⁵¹³ BMWi (2019c) Strategie zur gezielten Gewinnung von Fachkräften aus Drittstaaten: Fachkräftegewinnungs-Strategie.

⁵¹⁴ Goethe-Institut (2020) Fachkräftemobilität verstehen: Eine Analyse der Wanderungsentscheidungen von Fachkräften aus Nicht-EU-Staaten.

⁵¹⁵ The "Migration und Diaspora" programme is implemented by GIZ on behalf of BMZ, see GIZ: <https://t1p.de/1paf>.

⁵¹⁶ OECD (2019a) International Migration Outlook 2019.

⁵¹⁷ A comprehensive discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of various policy options for the expansion of legal immigration options is delivered by the Expert Council of German Foundations for Integration and Migration, see SVR (2019).

required.⁵¹⁸ There are four options for creating new opportunities here: (1) The Western Balkan Regulation, which has existed since 2016 and was reformed in 2021 and is not tied to any qualification requirements, could be extended to other countries according to criteria yet to be defined.⁵¹⁹ (2) The FEG could be extended to low-skilled workers; here, an employment contract with a German company would be a prerequisite. (3) The regulations for seasonal workers could be extended by concluding agreements with eligible countries of origin outside the EU. (4) The German government could use the experience from the guest worker agreements with Central and Eastern European countries in the early 1990s, which allowed workers with completed vocational training from the contractual partner countries to take up a job in Germany for up to 18 months.⁵²⁰

Thirdly, the German government **should create more legal entry opportunities for study purposes**, for education and training, and for family reunion. Study visas are of great importance in view of the large proportion of foreign students who stay in Germany after their studies and find employment here, especially since professional qualifications acquired in Germany yield the highest returns in the job market.⁵²¹

Fourthly, the German government **should expand transnational training partnerships**. Three different models should be used here, which can be combined with each other: the **adaptation qualification** for persons with a completed training abroad (§ 16d Residence Law), the entry for a **full training** in Germany (§ 16a Residence Law) and the **training in the country of origin**.⁵²² The third option is especially promising. Germany has already launched corresponding pilot projects, including the above-mentioned projects in North Africa. The advantage of such partnerships is that Germany can make targeted investments in the train-

ing infrastructure of the partner country concerned and set up qualification programs there for certain professions for which there is a shortage in Germany (and also in the partner country). If the programme is designed appropriately (two-track with one training segment for the German job market and one for the partner country's job market), training can reduce the risk of *brain drain*, the withdrawal of skilled workers in the partner country.⁵²³ Requirements for such a programme include close cooperation and financial participation of the private sector and employers, as well as cooperation with employment services, trade unions, and governments of home and host countries. The German government should therefore go beyond the pilot phase and establish regular programmes with selected partner countries, which are an important component of a comprehensive migration policy.⁵²⁴ The e-learning platform *atingi* could be accompany these efforts digitally. For example, participants could use this platform to acquire vocational and university degrees recognised in Germany, which would avoid the lengthy and often difficult subsequent recognition of such degrees in Germany.⁵²⁵

3) Open up prospects of staying for persons who are obliged to leave the country but have a tolerated stay permit. Tolerated persons for whom it is foreseeable that they will not be able to return to their countries of origin should be given long-term and secure residence prospects in Germany. This can be linked to existing regulations of the Residence Law (§ 25a and b as well as § 26 AufenthG).

Often, tolerated persons do not have proof of their vocational qualification or they only have informal knowledge gained through professional experience. In the latter case, there is already a computer-based process to record this knowledge. These include, for example, the *MySkills* and *Valikom* applications. Especially for employers, a system for assessing qualifications and skills when hiring refugees would be helpful. International experience could be used, for example, from the

⁵¹⁸ SVR (2021) Zuwanderung zum Zweck der Erwerbstätigkeit: Wichtige Regelungen im Überblick.

⁵¹⁹ Bither, J. and Ziebarth, A. (2018).

⁵²⁰ Cf. Werner, H. (1996) Befristete Zuwanderung von ausländischen Arbeitnehmern: Dargestellt unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ost-West-Wanderungen.

⁵²¹ Brücker, H., Rother, N. and Schupp, J. (Publ.) (2018) IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Befragung von Geflüchteten 2016: Studiendesign, Feldergebnisse sowie Analysen zu schulischer wie beruflicher Qualifikation, Sprachkenntnissen sowie kognitiven Potenzialen, p. 80; Brands, F. and Morris-Lange, S. (2015) Zugangstor Hochschule: Career Support for International Students in Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden

⁵²² Azahaf, N. (2020) Wie transnationale Ausbildungspartnerschaften in Deutschland vorangebracht werden können.

⁵²³ WHO (2010) Globaler Verhaltenskodex der WHO für die Internationale Anwerbung von Gesundheitsfachkräften.

⁵²⁴ Hooper, K. (2018) Reimagining Skilled Migration Partnerships to Support Development.

⁵²⁵ See GIZ: Africa Cloud – Eine Initiative für digitales Lernen in Afrika: <https://t1p.de/cbsb>.

pilot project initiated by the Council of Europe for a *European Qualifications Passport for Refugees*.⁵²⁶

If full recognition of degrees is not successful, post-qualification may be considered. For persons with proven formal qualification, further improvements are important in the area of professional recognition, which is a regional or country competence. This is especially true for the expansion of offers for post-qualification procedures provided for by the Professional Qualifications Assessment Act (BQFG). This is also true for the expansion of other procedures under the BQFG, which can replace formal proof through work samples, technical interviews, practical and theoretical examinations, and expert reports.⁵²⁷ Additionally, existing counselling centres in reception centres and in local authorities could be better equipped for the task of informing refugees about employment opportunities and advising them on taking up a job.

However, it is crucial to offer long-term and secure residence prospects in Germany for tolerated persons for whom it is foreseeable that they will not be able to return to their countries of origin. In addition to the aforementioned § 26, the Residence Law already opens up paths to secure residence for well-integrated young people and adolescents (§ 25a) and, irrespective of age, for sustainable integration (§ 25b). However, these regulations have so far helped a rather small number of people to obtain a residence title. Another perspective on a residence title is provided by the new toleration for employment and training (§ 60a and d), which came into force in January 2020. The impacts of this new regulation need to be observed to be able to quantify the effect. If necessary, the conditions could then be further eased – taking integration and regulatory aspects into account. Similarly, it seems reasonable to give rejected asylum seekers the opportunity to obtain a residence title on grounds other than international law, humanitarian reasons, or political reasons – for example, for the purpose of study, training, or gainful employment.⁵²⁸ Till now, this has only been possible if

there is a legal entitlement. Here, the German government should discuss an expansion to include discretionary items.

3.5.2 Ensuring compliance with the law at the EU's external borders

The reduction of the root causes of displacement and irregular migration may not go hand in hand with accepting the most serious human rights violations at the EU's external borders for years in order to reduce the number of protection seekers and irregular migrants in the EU. Since the abolition of the internal borders between the Schengen states, the control of the EU's external borders is called for in order to maintain freedom of movement within the Schengen area. However, the current situation tolerated at the external borders considerably undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the EU, which is committed to the rule of law, demands the observance of human rights worldwide and requires this especially from countries of first reception.

In light of its work order, the Commission on the Root Causes of Displacement highlights four worrying developments:

Firstly, refugees and irregular migrants, after entering EU territory, often have to live in refugee camps under inhumane conditions. However, even beyond the camps, recognised beneficiaries of protection are repeatedly exposed to extreme material suffering through no fault of their own. On several occasions, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that certain Contracting Parties are not fulfilling their obligation to ensure decent living conditions for refugees and irregular migrants.⁵²⁹ EU member states are well aware that it violates the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) for people to be left homeless and without adequate access to clean drinking water and sanitation. Minors are particularly vulnerable and

⁵²⁶ See Council of Europe: *European Qualifications Passport for Refugees*: <https://t1p.de/h97x>; for the Swiss model with potential assessments, job coaches, and integration lump sums, see Gnesa, E. (2018) *Verbesserung der Integration von Flüchtlingen und vorläufig Aufgenommenen in den Arbeitsmarkt*.

⁵²⁷ Neundorf, K. (2020) *Recognition of foreign professional qualifications*.

⁵²⁸ Brands, F. and Morris-Lange, S. (2015).

⁵²⁹ For example, ECHR, No. 30696/09, ruling dated 21st January 2011 – M.S.S. against Belgium and Greece; ECHR, No. 14165/16, ruling dated 13th June 2019 – Sh.D. inter alia, against Greece; ECHR, No. 28820/13, ruling dated 2nd July 2020 – N.H. inter alia, against France; also see 2013/33/EU Directive of the European Parliament and European Council dated 26th June 2013 for determination of standards for the admission of persons who apply for international protection (amended version), L 180/96.

must not be exposed to such situations.⁵³⁰ The living conditions for refugees and irregular migrants lead to secondary migration to other EU member states and under certain circumstances, may even result in the courts of these states prohibiting a return.⁵³¹

Secondly, so-called pushbacks have been taking place for years: Refugees and irregular migrants are pushed back from the Schengen area, sometimes by using disproportionate force, for example, in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Croatia, Poland, Spain and Hungary.⁵³² Additionally, there is concrete evidence that Frontex units – also involving the German Federal Police – were involved in *pushbacks* at the Greek maritime borders. Such actions may violate the prohibition of *refoulement*, the prohibition of collective expulsion under the ECtHR (*refoulement*, → **Chap. 1.2**) and, according to consistent case-law of the ECtHR, also the prohibition of subjecting individuals to inhuman or degrading treatment. Additionally, significant infringements of procedural law can be observed. In Greece, for example, there are reports of non-compliance with the European law provisions of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), such as high barriers to accessing the asylum procedure, arbitrary detentions, and violations of procedural requirements.⁵³³ The excessive length of asylum procedures also appears to be a cause for concern.⁵³⁴

Thirdly, people have been dying for years in unseaworthy boats on the sea escape routes to Europe – despite state and private sea rescue measures. In 2021, the UN

Human Rights Committee noted that states may be obligated to provide rescue at sea not only on the basis of the law of the sea, but also on the basis of human rights guarantees under certain circumstances.⁵³⁵ On humanitarian grounds, the criminalisation of sea rescue operations in the legal systems of member states appears to be particularly problematic.⁵³⁶

Fourthly, it is worrying that the ongoing externalisation of European migration policy may lead to further violations of the law. Some cooperation agreements of the EU or individual member states with third countries are intended to prevent refugees and irregular migrants from leaving countries of first reception and transit and entering the territory of the EU. This can lead to cooperation partners violating the prohibition of *refoulement* and collective expulsion, preventing departure from the national territory or triggering chain deportations and subjecting individuals to conditions that violate human rights.⁵³⁷ Examples for such problematic cooperations are agreements with Libya⁵³⁸, and in view of the persistence of armed conflicts within the state, also with Sudan⁵³⁹. Cooperations with third countries can, under certain circumstances, establish international legal responsibility of the EU and its member states for serious human rights violations. This can be the case if these cooperations include support and training

⁵³⁰ See Schmalz, D. (2020) Am Ende der Kraft.

⁵³¹ For example, OVG NRW, rulings dated 21st January 2021, Ref. 11 A 1564/20.A: http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/ovgs/ovg_nrw/j2021/11_A_1564_20_A_Urteil_20210121.html; OVG NRW, ruling dated 21st January 2021, Ref. 11 A 2982/20.A: http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/ovgs/ovg_nrw/j2021/11_A_2982_20_A_Urteil_20210121.html.

⁵³² For an overview of the existing practices, see Strik, T. (2019) Pushback Policies and Practice in Council of Europe Member States: Report to the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons by Rapporteur; for events at Greece's land and sea borders in 2020, see HRW (2020), Open Letter to Members of the Hellenic Parliament Calling for an Investigation Into Border Abuses; also see Radjenovic, A. (2021) Pushbacks at the EU's External Borders; UNHCR (2021b) UNHCR Warns Asylum Under Attack at Europe's Borders, Urges End to Pushbacks and Violence Against Refugees.

⁵³³ See De Brauw, Blackstone, Westbroek (2020) Complaint to the European Commission Concerning Infringements of EU Law by Greece: On Behalf of Wemove Europe and Oxfam International; for detention practices in other EU member states, see Bast, J., from Harbou, F. and Wessels, J. (2020) Human Rights Challenges to European Migration Policy.

⁵³⁴ Konstantinou, A., Drakopoulou, A., Kagiou, E. et al. (2019) Country Report: Greece: 2019 Update, p. 54.

⁵³⁵ UN ICCPR (2021) Views Adopted by the Committee Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 3042/2017, § 7.8.

⁵³⁶ This is not “smuggling of migrants” as defined in Art. 3 (a) of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC); this is also the position of the European Commission, see European Commission (2020c) Commission Recommendation On Cooperation Among Member States Concerning Operations Carried Out by Vessels Owned or Operated by Private Entities for the Purpose of Search and Rescue Activities, § 5.

⁵³⁷ In the case of chain deportations, persons concerned are not deported directly to a persecutor state, but to a third state where they are exposed to the risk of being further deported to the persecutor state, see Bast, J., von Harbou, F. and Wessels, J. (2020), p. 15, p. 22 et seq.

⁵³⁸ “Migrants and refugees suffer unimaginable horrors during their transit through and stay in Libya. From the moment they step onto Libyan soil, they become vulnerable to unlawful killings, torture and other ill-treatment, arbitrary detention and unlawful deprivation of liberty, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, slavery and forced labour, extortion and exploitation by both State and non-State actors.” See UNHCR (2018) Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the Human Rights Situation of Migrants and Refugees in Libya, p. 4; UNHCR (2020d) United Nations Support Mission in Libya, Report of the Secretary-General, §§ 58–62; Council of Europe und Commissioner for Human Rights (2020) A Distress Call for Human Rights. The Widening Gap in Migrant Protection in the Mediterranean. Follow-up Report to the 2019 Recommendation, p. 23.

⁵³⁹ UNHCR (2020e) Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan.

measures for state authorities in border management, even though such border management involves significant structural human rights violations over a longer period of time, especially concrete threats to the life and limb of refugees and irregular migrants.⁵⁴⁰ Some observers also see these co-operations as an attempt to bypass legal competences and responsibilities that are linked to the territorial sovereignty of the EU member states. The vast number of actors involved (member states, third countries, EU agencies) has made it difficult to clarify responsibility for breaches of the law.⁵⁴¹

The EU institutions have initiated measures to address breaches of the law at their external borders. According to its legal basis, Frontex itself is obliged to respect human rights. The agency is responsible for monitoring all operations to ensure that these standards are complied with. There are further pertinent measures, such as the deployment of internal fundamental rights observers in cooperation with the European Union's Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). However, these observers have not yet started work as of March 2021. In connection with the *pushback* allegations against Frontex, various proceedings have been initiated.⁵⁴²

Furthermore, the European Commission's proposal for a New Pact on Migration and Asylum provides for steps to counter the shortcomings described above. It proposes to establish an independent monitoring and surveillance mechanism at the external borders in order to ensure that refugees and irregular migrants are identified under the newly established screening procedure in compliance with national, EU and international law.⁵⁴³ However, the implementation is still a responsibility of the member states, which means that in the event of infringements, the European Commission can ultimately take action only through infringement proceedings.

⁵⁴⁰ Bast, J., von Harbou, F. and Wessels, J. (2020), S. 25. Currently, a case is pending before the ECHR to clarify the extent to which Italy is responsible under the ECHR for supporting the Libyan coast guard and coordinating rescue operations.

⁵⁴¹ Bast, J., von Harbou, F. and Wessels, J. (2020), S. 24.

⁵⁴² In the spring of 2021, these include the opening of investigations into Frontex by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the establishment of a *Frontex Scrutiny Working Group* in the EU Parliament, the EU Ombudsman's investigations into, among other things, the complaints mechanism, and the Frontex Management Board's report (2021) *Fundamental Rights and Legal Operational Aspects of Operations in the Aegean Sea: Final Report of the Frontex Management Board Working Group*.

⁵⁴³ Identification, health and security checks, as well as fingerprinting and registration in the Eurodac database.

Furthermore, the package aims to strengthen protection standards for unaccompanied minors and to take action for ensuring a better distribution within the framework of a solidarity mechanism. These are important steps in the right direction. The German government should support them within the framework of the trio presidency of the Council of the EU together with Portugal and Slovenia. Furthermore, additional measures seem to be necessary.

What should we do?

The states at the external borders face enormous humanitarian, social and organisational challenges. The unbalanced burden-sharing within the EU prevents these challenges from being tackled in a sustainable way. The affected states must not be left alone by the other EU member states. Germany should continue to strengthen its commitment to a human rights-based migration policy in an approach of shared responsibility of all EU member states, continue to provide sustainable support to the affected states and contribute to an equal burden-sharing. In this context, the German government should therefore pursue the following goals:

1) Work to ensure that protection seekers on the territory of the EU do not have to live in degrading and inhuman conditions. EU member states must especially not allow asylum seekers to live homeless and without access to clean drinking water and sanitary facilities. Bare necessities such as food, water, hygiene, accommodation and medical care must be satisfied. Especially minors, who are particularly vulnerable, and other vulnerable persons must not be exposed to such situations. Additionally, the other human rights requirements for the admission of persons in need of protection, which, among other things, result from the EU Reception Conditions Directive, must not be overlooked.

The current accommodation in refugee camps must be strictly countered and efforts must be made to eliminate the inhumane conditions. Various steps are required for this. In the short term, the EU member states can put an end to the unacceptable conditions in the camps by exceptionally exercising the so-called

right of self-entry⁵⁴⁴ under the Dublin III Regulation, i.e. by admitting the persons concerned themselves and guaranteeing conditions that comply with human rights.

In the medium and long term, it is necessary to strengthen and improve the systems of admission and asylum of the member states concerned. Asylum seekers are entitled to fair asylum procedures within a reasonable time complying with rule of law requirements. This should be ensured through the continuous and increased involvement of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). Apart from that, there is also the option of targeted financial and logistical support for the member states concerned. In addition, the exchange of expertise at technical level between the responsible authorities of various member states must be strengthened.

However, the long term goal must be to establish a binding pan-European allocation mechanism in order to avoid overburdening individual member states (→ [Chap. 1.2](#)).

2) Resume sea rescue measures for humanitarian reasons. In order to prevent deaths on the escape routes across the Mediterranean Sea, Germany should advocate for a EU-wide decriminalisation of sea rescue. However, the Commission on the Root Causes of Displacement explicitly stresses that sea rescue is first and foremost a governmental task and that sufficient government capacities must be made available. Therefore, the EU member states should once again coordinate sea rescue operations throughout the central Mediterranean Sea and have state-owned ships ready to detect castaways, which was the case until the end of 2018 within the framework of the European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia).

A coalition of states to be initiated by Germany and France should agree to take in all persons that are rescued on the sea routes to Europe and brought to

European or non-European reception centres within twelve weeks, until a legally binding pan-European distribution takes place. Asylum procedures and – in cases where there is no right to protection – repatriation procedures, as proposed by the Commission in [Chapter 3.5.3](#) as a central part of a humane migration policy, must follow as quickly as possible. Along with an expansion of legal migration paths (→ [Chap. 3.5.1](#)) the result of such action would be a way to reduce irregular migration.

3) Advocate for the establishment of an independent control, complaints and monitoring body at EU level.

Measures and proposals in this regard are currently limited to the establishment of European control mechanisms for Frontex, on the one hand, and to the establishment of national monitoring for actions by national border control authorities, on the other hand. There is, however, no European monitoring (beyond the existing Frontex measures) of national border protection activities, especially with regard to *pushbacks*. However, since it is time and time again disputed as to what precisely happened at the EU's external borders, since contradictory reports are found and since Frontex has to rely on close cooperation with national authorities, an independent mechanism at EU level is required to also establish legal responsibility. This body must document violations of the law, be able to conduct investigations on the territory of EU member states and impose clear accountability obligations on them, especially in their national border management activities. It should also be responsible for reviewing the compliance with procedural rules for the asylum procedures, the design of asylum procedures, as well as detention situations and admission conditions as laid down in obligations under international and European law.⁵⁴⁵

4) Scrutinise formal or informal cooperation with third countries. Cooperation with third countries with questionable human rights and constitutional records can be an important instrument of development policy, dialogue on the rule of law and democracy promotion. However, the design must be such that the

⁵⁴⁴ According to the right of self-entry under the Dublin III Regulation (Reg.), member states that are not actually responsible for an application for protection may still admit the persons concerned themselves within the limits of their own capacities. However, a permanent exercise the right of self-entry under the Dublin III Reg. for a large number of cases would not be in line with the allocation of responsibility under the Dublin III Reg.

⁵⁴⁵ Also see European Parliament (2021b) Implementation of Article 43 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection (2020/2047[INI]), § 16.

do-no-harm-principle is respected (→ Chap. 3.1). It is essential for this principle to be ensured in the migration partnerships envisaged by the EU asylum and migration package. However, it is still legally questionable to conclude agreements which encourage third countries to prevent people from migrating to Europe and thus expose protection seekers to the risk of serious violations of human rights. A critical review may reveal conflicts of objectives between security policy, foreign policy, and development policy and could lead to a fundamental policy change for some cooperations. For example, misuse of items for training and equipment assistance as well as violations of international law constitute verifiable criteria, the existence of which will make it unavoidable to refrain from cooperation with the partner country concerned. An effective implementation requires regular monitoring of compliance with human rights requirements in partner countries. This approach would not only increase the credibility of the German policy, but also prevent dependencies on unreliable partners and prevent Germany from incurring state responsibility under international law.

3.5.3 Promoting voluntary return and reintegration, reforming German return policies

Voluntary return is a central element of global agreements. Enabling return is one of the three so-called durable solutions that UNHCR seeks for refugees, in addition to integration in countries of first reception and targeted resettlement to other willing host countries.⁵⁴⁶ The UN refugee and migration pacts highlight return in safety and dignity as a central part of migration policy.⁵⁴⁷ The importance of orderly reintegration is also clear in view of the figures: According to UNHCR, close to 320,000 refugees worldwide returned voluntarily to their countries of origin in 2019, of which almost

a third to South Sudan and Syria each, especially from neighbouring countries.⁵⁴⁸

At the same time, there is barely any other issue where high costs and difficult-to-achieve goals are as evident as they are in involuntary returns and deportations. European governments (including Germany), EU and UN institutions repeatedly highlight the great importance of the return of migrants without a legal right of residence. People whose asylum application is rejected are obliged to leave the country. If they do not leave voluntarily within a set period of time and there are no impediments, for example illness, or a tolerated stay permit (*Duldung*), the foreigners' authority can deport them.

Since 2015, the EU has been engaged in an intensive discussion on how the obligation to leave the country for irregular arrivals without a right to protection should be enforced, for example via so-called hotspots in Italy and Greece, possibly also outside the EU borders, where there should be possibilities for a quick repatriation after rapid identification and examination of the protection claim. These proposals did not yet bring the desired success: There are neither fast fair asylum procedures at the external borders nor an effective strategy for the necessary return.

In Germany, more than 280,000 people are obliged to leave the country, of which almost 50,000 are without tolerated stay permit⁵⁴⁹ (→ Fig. 16 for composition). Voluntary and involuntary returns work relatively well to EU member states and to countries with which the EU has agreed visa-free travel in return for readmission agreements. These countries have an interest in cooperating on readmission, and persons who are required to leave have an incentive to leave because they can come back relatively easily. The situation is worse for returns, both voluntary and involuntary, to countries whose citizens have few opportunities for legal mobility and where hardly any EU visas are issued. This is also reflected in figures: Two-thirds of all people that Germany deported in 2019 (more than 15,000 out


⁵⁴⁶ See UNHCR: Solutions: <https://www.unhcr.org/solutions.html>

⁵⁴⁷ One of the four objectives of the UN refugees compact is to support conditions "in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity." see UNHCR: <https://www.unhcr.org/dach/de/was-wir-tun/globaler-pakt>. The UN migration compact has also set international "cooperation in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration" as a goal, see UN General Assembly (2018b) Draft Outcome Document of the Conference. Mitteilung des Präsidenten der Generalversammlung. Zwischenstaatliche Konferenz zur Annahme des Globalen Paktes für eine sichere, geordnete und reguläre Migration, p. 27

⁵⁴⁸ UNHCR (2020a), p. 50; also see UNHCR Operational Portal: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions.

⁵⁴⁹ Central Register of Foreign Nationals, "residents, persons who are obliged to leave the country, and tolerated foreigners by nationality" effective date January 31, 2021 (internal source: Central Register of Foreign Nationals/BAMF).

Fig. 16: Persons obliged to leave the country without tolerated stay permit, status as of January 2021



Source: Central Register of Foreign Nationals/BAMF (status as of 31 January 2021, internal source); Overview of the visa requirement or non-requirement at the time of entry in Germany: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/service/visa-und-aufenthalt/staatenliste-zur-visumpflicht/207820>

of a total of 22,000) were deported or transferred to visafree countries and EU member states, mainly Italy, Albania, France, Georgia and Serbia. In contrast, there were relatively few deportations to the Middle East and Africa: Germany carried out about 400 deportations each to Afghanistan and Nigeria, and only 30 to Iraq in 2019.⁵⁵⁰ Even though media discourse often focuses on these countries of origin, they account for only a small percentage of deportations.

The various government ministries play a key role in shaping the return and reintegration of migrants. Germany influences what types of support are available to people after their return by means of development cooperation. The Foreign Office formalises relations with countries of origin. The interior policy actors work out what incentives Germany offers for voluntary return, how many people should be forced to leave Germany,

⁵⁵⁰ Deutscher Bundestag (2021) Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Dr. André Hahn, Gökay Akbulut, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE: Abschiebungen und Ausreisen 2019, p. 2 et seq.

and who should be deported as a matter of priority, for example, criminals, or people from a particular country or region. However, this is not decided by the federal government, but primarily by the federal states (Länder).

What should we do?

1) Continue to support voluntary return. The Residence Law stipulates that voluntary return should have priority over forced return since it is simultaneously more humane, less politically sensitive and less expensive. For this, the German government invests in programmes to promote voluntary return.⁵⁵¹ These programmes should be continued.

⁵⁵¹ The “REAG/GARP” assistance programme, which is funded by the BMI and the competent state ministries, supports nationals of selected states in organising their return and reintegration, both financially and by means of counselling. In addition to that, “StarthilfePlus” supports the new start in selected countries of origin with benefits in kind and in cash. Additionally, there are numerous programmes at the state and municipal level as well as funding of the European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN).

Cash payments to encourage returns can be an important building block for reintegration if it helps bridge the initial period in the country of origin. However, cash assistance should only be used selectively: If there is a risk that they will trigger jealousy effects in the country of origin or even attract further migrants from there, they will end up doing more harm than good. Thus, where possible, support programmes should primarily provide in-kind aid to returnees and their communities, which is currently the standard practice in many programmes.⁵⁵²

Return counselling is an important pillar of voluntary return. However, the quality of counselling varies widely across the country.⁵⁵³ For this reason, the federal government and federal states should make their financial contributions conditional on compliance with nationwide quality standards.

Nevertheless, the expectations should remain realistic: Financial support for voluntary return alone probably increases the number of returnees only to a limited extent. Studies show that even high amounts of payment to encourage return are often of little interest as an incentive to people from poor and unsafe countries. Since most of the persons in Germany who are obliged to leave the country come from unsafe countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, the effect of additional investment in the voluntary return of this group is likely to be smaller than that of other persons who are obliged to leave the country, for example, from Balkan countries.⁵⁵⁴ Therefore, voluntary departure is also comparatively rare for countries in Africa, just as it is for countries in the Near and Middle East.

2) Continue to invest in reintegration support. The BMZ's "Perspektive Heimat" programme with its main pillar "Programme Migration for Development" is an important instrument of the German government to reintegrate returnees and to create prospects for them

in their country of origin.⁵⁵⁵ Some people criticise the programme's benefits as too low compared to the effort involved. However, this criticism is often based on exaggerated expectations of what reintegration assistance can actually accomplish. The success of such programmes not just depends on whether they are designed and implemented sustainably. Individual factors of the returnees such as age, gender, education, professional experience, networks, vulnerability and the willingness to reintegrate also play an important role. There are also external factors that were often the reason for emigration, such as the safety situation in the country of return, economic development or lack of access to infrastructure and services. The attitude and behaviour of the local population towards returnees is also important, especially when a larger number of persons returns at once. The programme has little impact on these factors.⁵⁵⁶ The criticism of "Perspektive Heimat" also often fails to recognise that the target group of the programme is not only returnees themselves, but also internally displaced persons and local people who may have a migration intent – the programme is supposed to offer them alternatives to irregular migration.

The BMZ should therefore continue to follow the integrative approach in reintegration assistance and offer assistance not only to returnees but also to other people in the country of origin in order to reduce jealousy effects. This approach is an important further development of traditional return assistance. The German agency for international cooperation, GIZ should also work more closely with people who have already returned, as they often enjoy a higher level of trust within the population than official agencies.⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵² For example, the BMZ's "Perspektive Heimat" programme as well as in other bilateral GIZ projects in various countries that GIZ has opened up for returnees, see BMZ (2019).

⁵⁵³ Rietig, V. and Günnewig, M. (2020a), p. 20 et seq.

⁵⁵⁴ Rietig, V. und Günnewig, M. (2020a), p. 20; Kuschminder, K. (2017) Taking Stock of Assisted Voluntary Return from Europe: Decision Making, Reintegration and Sustainable Return – Time for a Paradigm Shift, p. 6. A key reason why so many people voluntarily returned to Balkan countries in 2016 and 2017 was the Western Balkans Regulation that was adopted in 2016, which provided the prospect of legal migration opportunities for citizens, see MEDAM (2020a) Westbalkanregelung: Arbeit, kein Asyl.

⁵⁵⁵ BMZ: The BMZ's "Perspektive Heimat" programme: https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/Sonderinitiative-Fluchtursachen-bekaempfen-Fluechtlinge-reintegrieren/deutsche_politik/perspektive_heimat/.

⁵⁵⁶ Black, R., Collyer, M. and Somerville, W. (2011) Pay-to-Go Schemes and Other Noncoercive Return Programs: Is Scale Possible?; Carling, J., Bolognani, M., Erdal, M. et al. (2015) Possibilities and Realities of Return Migration; Koser, K. and Kuschminder, K. (2015); Rietig, V. and Günnewig, M. (2020a); Rietig, V. and Günnewig, M. (2020b) Rückkehr: Sieben Thesen auf dem Prüfstand; Rietig, V. (2019b); Rietig, V. and Dominguez-Villegas, R. (2015) Stopping the Revolving Door: Reception and Reintegration Services for Central American Deportees; Cassarino, J. (2004) Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited, p. 253–279.

⁵⁵⁷ Ruiz Soto, A., Dominguez-Villegas, R., Argueta, L. et al. (2019) Sustainable Reintegration: Strategies to Support Migrants Returning to Mexico and Central America; Rietig, V. and Dominguez-Villegas, R. (2015).

The BMZ should continue to coordinate closely with other institutions that are active in return policies, especially with the BMI and its subordinate authorities, with the FFO and, if necessary, the foreigners' authorities, in order to bridge the politically conditioned – but in practice often unreasonable – separation between return and reintegration measures.

3) Open up prospects of staying for persons who are obliged to leave the country but have a tolerated stay permit (“Duldung”). The German government should work towards reducing the number of persons who are obliged to leave the country. This requires a strategy that is based on two pillars: return on the one hand and regularisation on the other. Tolerated persons for whom it is foreseeable that they will not be able to return to their countries of origin should be given long-term and secure residence prospects in Germany. (→ Chap. 3.5.1).

4) Establish neutral monitoring of deportations and uniform training. Deporting persons who are obliged to leave the country is a legitimate instrument of migration policy. However, transparency is necessary in order not to lose this legitimacy. The German federal government should address this challenge in two ways together with the responsible federal states' offices:

- › *Firstly*, the **monitoring** of deportations must be intensified. An independent and neutral body should be able to monitor the entire deportation process and take action in case of abuse. Possible cases of disproportionate use of force during deportations must be investigated consistently.
- › *Secondly*, the federal government and the federal states should ensure that all officers who carry out deportations receive **uniform and high-quality** training. The existing training of the Federal Police, which teaches a proportionate use of physical force as well as de-escalation techniques under the motto “Keine Abschiebung um jeden Preis” (No ‘at any cost’ deportations), could be used as a model.

5) Bundle responsibilities in return policies. The Federal and state governments should combine responsibilities for the promotion of voluntary return and for deportations so that the currently different decision-making and implementation practices become more consistent and transparent across the country. Germany should urgently work towards making the

relevant decisions and processes more uniform, fairer and easier to monitor across the nation, especially because return policies and enforcement are sensitive in terms of human rights and politically. Germany could also speak with one voice with countries of origin more than it has done so far if responsibilities were spread across fewer actors.

6) Improve data availability and transparency and expand research on return and reintegration. Basic data about the return of migrants and refugees currently does not exist or is hardly publicly accessible.⁵⁵⁸ If data is not accessible, this can quickly fuel a distorted public debate in Germany. Therefore, the German government should urgently invest in the necessary resources to obtain accurate data and publish it regularly. The government should also promote the exchange of data between the governmental and non-governmental organisations involved.

Additionally, the German government should also promote applied research on return and reintegration in Germany. Research projects for the future should, for example, analyse what role former returnees can play in reintegration and whether, and to what extent, deportees reintegrate more poorly than voluntary returnees.

Apart from that, the German government should measure the results of its reintegration measures in a more systematic way. This could be done, for example, with the help of a reintegration index, as has been discussed in scientific communities for some years.⁵⁵⁹ Germany can meaningfully develop its reintegration measures only through follow-up and evaluation.

7) Involving the diaspora as intermediaries. In order to reach potential returnees with information on vol-

⁵⁵⁸ For example, the number of people who leave the country each year with the help of voluntary return programmes. There is also a lack of key information on deportations, such as why deportations often fail, how often do deportees file complaints, and which groups of people are deported or return.

⁵⁵⁹ This divides reintegration into three dimensions – economic, sociocultural and safety-related. Five indicators are assigned to each dimension in order to measure as to how far a person's reintegration into society has progressed and what aid is working. In the area of economic reintegration, for instance, this includes whether the person is employed or has debts. In sociocultural reintegration, the question is “Does the person have support through networks?” and in the safety-related domain, “Does the person feel safe?”, see Koser, K. and Kuschminder, K. (2015).

untary return options, the government should increasingly involve diaspora associations, as they can serve as trusted intermediaries between potential returnees and counselling centres. Not only do the representatives of the diaspora speak the same language, they also know the mentality and concerns of the potential returnees.

A study of the European Migration Network (EMN) has shown that many EU member states have difficulties in reaching target groups for voluntary return. Thus, diaspora actors are well suited to pass on information about existing return and reintegration programmes in a way that interested parties trust the information, while this is much more difficult for governmental agencies.⁵⁶⁰ The German government could also go a step further and involve them in needs assessments, conception, design and implementation of return and reintegration programmes.⁵⁶¹

3.5.4 Shaping migration policy in partnership and creating alliances

Effective and sustainable management of asylum and migration policy tasks cannot be achieved on a national level. While unilateral state measures such as closing the borders are often effective in the short term, the effect cannot be sustained in the long term given the interconnectedness of countries of origin, transit countries, and destination countries. Stable regional and international cooperation based on a fair balance of interests between the states involved is therefore a central basis for effective, sustainable and legitimate migration and asylum policies.

When it comes to designing the asylum and migration policy based on partnerships, Germany is active at three levels: bilaterally, at the European level, and multilaterally.

The first level for partnership cooperation is provided by national migration policy. Each government can

set its own priorities and cooperate bilaterally with countries of origin and transit. Germany has many years of diverse experience in bilateral cooperation with countries of origin, especially in development and increasingly on legal migration. There are numerous recent examples, such as the training cooperation with Tunisia, the recruitment of health workers in Vietnam, or the promotion of voluntary return and mobility with Georgia. Such approaches that are focused on longevity and confidence-building are at the core of an effective and sustainable external migration policy.

A prerequisite for effective bilateral migration cooperation is the interaction of ministries. Ideally, all relevant ministries coordinate the government's migration and refugee-related goals as part of a Whole of Government-approach, so that those responsible for domestic, foreign, safety, economic, and development policy meet regularly. The Whole-Society-approach also involves civil society (including the diaspora), the private sector, and regional and local actors. Such an approach also allows that the pursuit of a coherent policy is not limited to technocratic efficiency, but is oriented towards human and refugee rights and takes into account the interests of all ministries equally (→ **Box 29**).

Germany already has experience with interministerial coordination, for example, through the more intensive departmental coordination during the years of strong immigration in 2015/16. These include the state secretary rounds on various topics, the "Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts and Building Peace" coordinating group at departmental management level, or the interministerial Working Group for Early Crisis Detection (→ **Chap. 3.1.1**). These approaches perform valuable coordination work when necessary, but they are not sufficient to deal with the increasingly complex external dimension of migration policy. The German government should therefore adopt a Whole of Government-approach in which ministries and agencies concerned with asylum and migration policy issues regularly coordinate the external dimension of German refugee and migration policy.

⁵⁶⁰ EMN (2020) Policies and Practices on Outreach and Information Provision for the Return of Migrants in EU Member States and Norway.

⁵⁶¹ The "AfrikaPlus #homeishome" pilot project, which the African diaspora organisation The African Network of Germany (TANG e.V.) is implementing on behalf of the German government, is an attempt in this direction. Depending on the evaluation results, such pilot projects could be developed further and extended to other countries in Africa, to Asia and Latin America, see <http://tang-ev.de>.

Box 29**Successful Whole of Government-approach of Switzerland**

A positive example of an effective Whole of Government-approach through a close ministerial coordination and policy coordination is provided by Switzerland. In order to ensure the interaction of the various actors, the Swiss Federal Council has been pursuing a Whole of Government-approach since 2011 with the “Interdepartmental Structure on Migration Foreign Policy” (IMZ). This institutionalises cooperation between the various federal agencies (including the State Secretariat for Migration, the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation). According to previous evaluations, this Whole of Government-approach has proven its worth in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.⁵⁶²

In view of the high amounts of migration movements to Europe, the Swiss Federal Council also decided in the early 2000s to strengthen cooperation with the countries of origin and transit within the framework of so-called migration partnerships, which have been established by law since 2008.⁵⁶³ These include regional strategies for the protection of human rights, on-site aid, prevention of irregular migration, return and reintegration, as well as capacity building and development. The declared aim is to develop solutions for these different areas, which are coherent and effective for the long term.

Migration partnerships should be based on the principle of reciprocity, be flexible and create relationships of trust. Therefore, the Federal Council has formulated four clear prerequisites for its development: substantial migration policy interests on the part of Switzerland, a mutual willingness to intensify cooperation in the area of migration, a significant level of relations between the two countries, and an acceptable degree of stability and good governance in the partner country.⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁶² Haering, B., Neukomm, S., Kaiser, N. et al. (2016) Evaluation der interdepartementalen Struktur zur Migrationsausserpolitik: Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement EJPD, Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA; Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft: <https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/internationales/internat-zusarbeit/bilateral/migrationspartnerschaften.html>.

⁵⁶³ Siegel, M., Marchand, K. and McGregor, E. (2015) Independent Evaluation of Swiss Migration Partnerships: Final Report.

⁵⁶⁴ Gnesa, E. (2020) Veränderungen in der europäischen und schweizerischen Migrations- und Flüchtlingspolitik seit 2015: Jahrbuch für Migrationsrecht 2019/2020, p. 29 et seq.

The second level of action for working in partnership with countries of origin and transit is European cooperation on asylum and migration policy. Partnerships have always played a central role in the concepts adopted by the member states. However, there is a large gap between the political declaration of intent of the European Commission and the willingness of the EU member states to implement them, which can again be seen in the recent negotiations on the EU migration and asylum package.

The last 15 years of EU migration policy have been marked by a trend: All proposals and initiatives of the EU Commission are based on the principles formulated in 2005 in the “Global Approach to Migration and Mobility” (GAMM), including the “mobility partnerships” proposed there.⁵⁶⁵ However, many voices inside and outside Europe criticise that previous partnerships have primarily served the interests of EU states and migration control, and often focus on the readmission of citizens to partner countries. This reflects the asymmetrical power relations between the EU states and the partner countries and offers the partner countries too little incentive to implement the agreements consistently and permanently.

The EU Commission’s proposal for a New Pact on Migration and Asylum presented in September 2020 also explicitly confirms partnerships with countries of origin and transit as a central field of action, but once again the old pattern becomes apparent: Even though the proposals are far-reaching, they are not very concrete. It will become clear whether the goal of “partnerships at eye level” can be achieved in the course of further negotiations on the Commission’s proposal.

The third field of action concerns multilateral cooperation. Germany has supported relevant international organisations, especially UNHCR, IOM and ILO, and has signed numerous international conventions and contracts, with the exception of the UN Migrant Workers Convention, which aim to strengthen the rights of migrant workers and their families.⁵⁶⁶ Apart

⁵⁶⁵ Angenendt, S. (2012) Migration, Mobilität und Entwicklung: EU-Mobilitätspartnerschaften als Instrument der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit.

⁵⁶⁶ UN (1990) Human Rights: 13. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

from that, the German government is committed to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and to breathing life into the UN Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees (GCM and GCR) agreed upon in 2018. Furthermore, it supports migration policy consultations such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).

These organisations and initiatives are struggling when faced with the current crisis of multilateralism. It is important to strengthen them. By virtue of its financial and political commitment to international cooperation on refugee and migration policy, the German government is a respected actor with high expectations. However, a unified stand of the government and sufficient human resources are required to fulfil these expectations.

What should we do?

1) Introduce a permanent coordination process for asylum and migration policy. The German government should establish a coordination process between all relevant departments which goes beyond the current coordination within the ministries, which is primarily geared towards crisis management, and focuses on the development of a medium and long-term strategy in the area of displacement and migration. (→ **Chap. 3.1.1**). This process should lead to an annual asylum and migration summit. Here, the participants should discuss the strategic orientation of the external dimension of the German asylum and migration policy. As part of this process, the government should establish regular exchanges with civil society, including the diaspora, the private sector and local actors, and thus create the internal political conditions for successful partnerships. All participants should jointly determine possible partners – countries, regions or even cities -, with which Germany wants to deepen practical migration policy cooperation.

Diaspora and migrant organisations are important partners in this continuous coordination process: Based on their expert knowledge, they have a special potential in a mediating role in migration issues

between Germany and their countries of origin.⁵⁶⁷ The government should therefore identify selected diaspora and migrant umbrella organisations that have expertise in the field of development policy, migration policy and reducing the root causes of displacement and irregular migration and involve them in the process of strategy development and implementation of measures.

2) Conclude substantial migration partnerships. In close coordination with its EU partners and in line with the European Commission's proposal for a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, the German government should launch a migration partnership offensive and agree on substantial partnerships. Despite all the necessary differences between the individual partnerships, uniformity in terms of German immigration law must be maintained. The selection should be based on the Swiss example and fulfil clear criteria: In addition to Germany's interest in the cooperation, the partner country should be ready and able to do so and there should be sufficient links with the country concerned.

The partnerships should be based on mutual interest and on a careful analysis of the interests of the partner countries. They should provide the framework for temporary as well as permanent legal migration opportunities and possibly visa freedom, offer incentives to partner countries for comprehensive development cooperation and, last but not least, also promote cooperation in the readmission process of citizens who are obliged to leave the country (→ **Chap. 3.5.1 to 3.5.3**). This migration policy cooperation is expected to serve the overall objective of contributing to more stable political conditions and good governance. Cooperation with problematic governments in terms of human rights, which strengthens the regime but does not help the people there, must be precluded.

3) Decouple development cooperation from cooperation in migration management. A critical point is that in the last few years, the promotion of development measures has been linked more and more

⁵⁶⁷ Cf. new National Action Plan on Integration by the Federal Government and study by the Expert Council on Integration and Migration (SVR): SVR (2020):

to a willingness on the part of partner countries to cooperate in migration control. The more-for-more approach rewards good migration cooperation of a country with incentives, the less-for-less approach punishes refusal with sanctions. Germany is currently using both positive incentives and sanction possibilities, especially the tool of issuing fewer entry visas, to budge countries of origin to take back their nationals.

Incentives should be seen as positive overall. On the other hand, there is little point in reducing development funds to countries that fail to meet migration management targets. Not only does this have a negative impact on development, it also promises less success if partner countries then turn to other donor countries. New donors like China, Russia or the Gulf States stand ready. However, apart from development cooperation, for example in trade relations or in migration cooperation itself, it can make sense to impose conditions for certain services – but even in this regard, it only makes sense if these conditions are not at the expense of development.⁵⁶⁸ Developmental setbacks would be counterproductive in terms of reducing the root causes of displacement and irregular migration.

4) Strengthen the international structures under the refugee and migration policy. In light of the crisis of multilateralism, it will become even more important for effective policies in the future to get like-minded partners to act together and to forge alliances on asylum and migration policy through international cooperation. A starting point for this could be a strategic cooperation with the new US government (→ **Chap. 3.4.1**). The SDGs, which are binding for all states, provide the framework for orientation: They demand many improvements that contribute to reducing the root causes of displacement and irregular migration. The Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration agreed upon by a large number of states in 2018 are now being implemented and intergovernmental consultation forums, especially the GFMD, have gained importance in practical terms for sharing good approaches in refugee and migration policies. This also applies to the ICMPD, which Germany joined in 2020.

All these processes cannot be taken for granted. They require a strong political involvement for them to be successful and sustainable. The German government should therefore continue to make its contributions to the relevant UN institutions and international organisations; however, at the same time, it should considerably expand its political support for them and invest strategically in the processes. Two steps are essential for this: Firstly, the government should send more staff to key areas. Secondly, it should also equip the ministries responsible for these international processes in Germany better with regard to organisation and personnel. Without sufficient staff, also in the German liaison offices at the international organisations, Germany cannot sufficiently represent its interests in these international processes and also cannot adequately prepare them for the political decision-makers.

⁵⁶⁸ MEDAM (2020b) European and African Perspectives on Asylum and Migration Policy: Seeking Common Ground, p. 28 et seq.

Spotlight: The contribution of digital technology

Social media and messaging services have become essential for many refugees, migrants in carrying out their intentions for displacement and migration (→ **Chap. 2**). Also, return remittances of the diaspora to relatives back home are being sent increasingly in digital form. In many key areas of asylum and migration policy, the application of biometrics, big data, machine learning, artificial intelligence (AI) or blockchain-based processes is advancing.⁵⁶⁹ Digital identities can help protect people, secure their rights and open up avenues of participation. All in all, information and communication technology (ICT) can make an important contribution towards coping with displacement and migration-related tasks – and towards creating prospects of staying.

Chapter 3 has identified existing approaches in individual fields of action for reducing the root causes of displacement and irregular migration with the use of new technologies:

- > AI-based analyses of large amounts of data, merged from various national and international sources, can help to predict potential conflicts and migratory movements in a better way (→ **Chap. 3.1.1**).
- > Digitalised administrative and participatory procedures (*e-governance*) form the basis for better public services in the countries of origin of refugees and migrants. This can help in determining the population's need for basic services more precisely and thus plan according to need. At the same time, the use of ICT gives more people in less developed countries access to education, health care, financial services and innovations for agriculture. Finally, digital platforms make it possible to target benefits or social services to people in need. (→ **Chap. 3.2**).

- > A digital infrastructure for mobility, electricity and buildings supports climate-friendly urban development. Digital insurance models can cover climate change-related failures and damage and thus improve prospects for people to build a viable future in their home countries. (→ **Chap. 3.3**).

The following approaches are relevant to support displaced persons and host countries and to make displacement and migration policy humane and coherent (→ **Chap. 3.4 and 3.5**).⁵⁷⁰

Digital identities: The World Bank estimates that more than one billion people worldwide do not have identification.⁵⁷¹ The UN Sustainable Development Goals call for ensuring that all people have a legal identity by 2030, especially through registration at birth (SDG 16.9).⁵⁷² The Global Compact for Migration (GCM) states that all migrants should have proof of their legal identity and sufficient documentation. This is because they secure their rights in both the home and host countries.⁵⁷³ Legal identity is often a prerequisite for using healthcare services provided by the government. Many private digital services also require them: Only those who provide electronic or physical documents can, for example, load their driver's license onto their cell phone, buy a SIM card, participate in online banking, or use administrative services. This applies both in the home country and abroad.

Digital identity in the context of displacement and migration includes biographical and protection-related information, as well as the displacement and migration history of the persons concerned. Since millions of refugees and migrants are unable to produce legal identities in the form of personal identity documents, the most important humanitarian actors have moved to “reconstruct” people's identities using biometric data such as fingerprints,

⁵⁶⁹ A blockchain is an expandable list (or a record) of datasets. Each dataset builds a block. The blocks are “chained” together using cryptographic procedures. The block contents are protected by hash values and time stamp procedures against manipulation by a single central office. Blockchains are arranged repetitively in distributed systems so that manipulations can be recognised by a blockchain feature. In this way, the blockchain data can be made accessible to a large group of people without the risk of incomprehensible changes being made to it. Cf. Bither, J. and Ziebarth, A. (2020) KI, digitale Identitäten, Biometrie, Blockchain: Eine Einführung in die Nutzung von Technologie im Migrationsmanagement, p. 6

⁵⁷⁰ Cf. *ibid.*

⁵⁷¹ Desay, V., Witt, K., Chandra, K. et al. (2017) Counting the Uncounted: 1.1 Billion People Without IDs.

⁵⁷² Indicator 17.19.2 of the SDGs is also intended to contribute to the implementation of this goal: “Proportion of countries that (a) have conducted at least one population and housing census in the last 10 years; and (b) have achieved 100 per cent birth registration and 80 per cent death registration”, see UN Legal Identity Agenda: <https://unstats.un.org/legal-identity-agenda/>.

⁵⁷³ UN General Assembly (2018c) Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, p. 10 f.

iris scans, or facial recognition. This reconstruction of an identity is subject to, for example at UNHCR, tough integrity criteria. This digital identity then usually becomes a prerequisite for access to food and medical care, among other things.⁵⁷⁴

Digitalisation can thus contribute in providing faster and more targeted care services for the growing number of displaced people or people in vulnerable situations, curb abuses in the distribution of aid, and implement aid programmes. In doing so, it should be noted that the major international actors, such as UNHCR and WFP, operate to some extent in an unregulated space in terms of data protection law, as they are not subject to any jurisdiction such as that in the EU on the basis of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).⁵⁷⁵ However, the UN – even if not formally bound by such legal regulations – strives for a high level of protection and follows the principle of knowing as little information as possible and sharing as little information as possible.⁵⁷⁶

With the *Identification for Development* (ID4D) initiative, the World Bank has been advancing electronic registration since 2014 so that people can have access to services and exercise their rights.⁵⁷⁷ With the eIDAS Regulation,⁵⁷⁸ the EU has created an instrument to recognise and use digital identities across national borders. The regulation is however only valid within the EU and thus does not extend to digital identities established or verified by states outside the EU or by international organisations such as UNHCR, WFP and IOM. However, the identities of refugees which are “reconstructed” by UNHCR on the basis of biometric data are used transnationally, for example during resettlement. However, digital identities in the

humanitarian sector are not based on uniform standards and methods and are therefore often incompatible.

More and more countries are introducing national digital identity platforms.⁵⁷⁹ However, these can be used not only to include people, for example, refugees and internally displaced persons, but also to exclude them, for example, if they belong to religious or other minorities that the government concerned oppresses. This risk is acute in the case of regionally based identity systems, where host countries can potentially access data in the civil registries of the countries of origin. Such developments are questionable from a human rights perspective, can create new reasons for displacement or exacerbate existing ones and therefore require political attention.

Visa issuance and border surveillance: Many countries of destination for refugees and migrants already work with electronic procedures to support visa issuance and monitoring. In doing so, the use of machine learning and AI is also being tested in order to automate decisions. For example, Canada has been using Artificial Intelligence in a pilot trial since 2020 to automatically pre-sort visa applications from China and India. However, decisions on applications are still made by the immigration authorities.

The Eurodac system, which records the fingerprints of asylum seekers and compares them across the EU, the Schengen and the European Visa Information System is one of the systems that is used to monitor the EU’s external borders.⁵⁸⁰ Such systems are linked to databases on asylum, migration or visas and tied to biometric data of individuals. Apart from that, Frontex, the European border management agency, monitors movements at the EU’s external borders and records irregular border crossings. As a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, it is expected that the checking of health and vaccination data at border crossings will also become more important.

Support for asylum procedures: As part of its digitalisation strategy, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees BAMF is examining the extent to which the use of digital technologies can speed up asylum procedures and make them more efficient. Among other things, the BAMF uses AI-based software that – with the help of automatic language analysis – compares accents and word choice of asylum seekers with the typical dialects

⁵⁷⁴ Steinacker, K. und Schimmel, V. (2021) Know Your Customer – Wie Digitalisierung humanitäre Hilfe verändert.

⁵⁷⁵ ICRC und Kuner, C. (2020) Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action: <https://www.icrc.org/en/data-protection-humanitarian-action-handbook>.

⁵⁷⁶ WFP, for example, stores all personal data in its own SCOPE system that is hosted in the UN-operated International Data Centre and thus protected by United Nations privileges and immunities and is subject to the highest security standards. Thus, practical handling of data is based on encryption, anonymisation as well as pseudonymisation (*hashing*) of data records depending on their sensitivity. In conjunction with access control protocols, it is ensured that only approved employees have access to sensitive data and that none of this data is stored in an environment outside of immediate control or is not protected by the privileges and immunities of the organisation. WFP does not disclose any personal data of the beneficiaries. Such principles also apply to other UN agencies.

⁵⁷⁷ World Bank Group (2019) ID4D Identification for Development.

⁵⁷⁸ European Parliament and European Union (2014) Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.

⁵⁷⁹ Cf. DIGITALE ID: DIGITALE Identität: Digitale Identität für Bürger, Organisationen und Behörden in Städten, Regionen und Bundesländern im europäischen Raum: <https://digitale.id/id-trends/>.

⁵⁸⁰ See EU-LISA: <https://www.eulisa.europa.eu/About-Us/Who-We-Are>.

and speech patterns of certain geographical regions in order to verify the information about the country of origin of those who cannot present valid identification documents. It is also possible to analyse cell phone data in many ways. For example, reading metadata from mobile data carriers can provide information on the origin of the applicant. Some countries are using blockchain technology to improve the coordination of institutions involved in asylum procedures and to avoid duplicate registrations. Currently, Switzerland is testing an algorithm that assigns places of residences to recognised refugees and asylum seekers with good prospects of staying permanently in places where they have good prospects of finding employment (→ **Chap. 3.5.1**).⁵⁸¹

The maxim when using such technologies and data processing systems must always be that these technologies and systems only visa and asylum procedures through automation and as a technical aid, for example, for clarifying the identity of asylum seekers – and that the decision itself is not digitalised. A human being must be responsible for taking the decision. In Germany, the decision-makers at the BAMF make the final decision on whether an asylum application is justified and protection status can be granted after examining the individual case and after a professional assessment of all the available proof.

New forms of employment: In some sectors, digital technologies enable new forms of work, which are mobile and span large distances.⁵⁸² This opens up employment opportunities and prospects of staying for well-educated jobseekers in less developed countries, for people in displacement (→ **Chap. 3.4**) as well as for returnees.⁵⁸³ Companies or start-ups such as *Andela*, *Findworka* or *Think-IT* use remote working agreements to connect software development or data science specialists in African countries with clients across Europe or the USA.⁵⁸⁴ The new *African-European Digital Innovation Bridge* is designed to help entrepreneurs in Africa to connect with each other and with the EU's digital domestic market in a better

way.⁵⁸⁵ *Digital Explorers*, an EU-supported pilot project, is building networks between ICT markets that were not connected before, such as Lithuania and Nigeria.⁵⁸⁶

This development has the potential to influence migration behaviour in the long term. Digitalisation offers people, regardless of their location and origin, the opportunity to contribute to global value-added chains online, especially if it succeeds in creating digital work opportunities for lower-skilled people locally, for example, by rating pictures or doing other routine tasks online. What can be difficult is that this so-called *gig economy*, in which freelancers take on new individual assignments, is often informal and poorly paid.⁵⁸⁷ Mobile working also offers migrants and refugees new employment and income opportunities, for example, in the field of identification and categorisation of data, which still requires human input. This kind of work could also be done by people in refugee camps. A recent example for this is the pilot programme of the non-profit organisation REFUNITE, which enables refugees in Uganda to earn money by “training” algorithms for AI.⁵⁸⁸ The prerequisite in any case is the availability of a digital infrastructure.

However, the rapid spread of digital technologies also harbours risks. People who cannot use them run the risk of being left behind; it can accelerate and deepen inequalities. However, governments can especially misuse the new technologies to monitor and persecute opposition figures. Therefore, it is important to know who has the power of control over data, how this power is monitored and how personal freedoms and human rights can be protected considering the technological development. In this context, policymakers must consider using new technologies in migration and refugee policy, because protecting data privacy can be essential for refugees who are escaping from political persecution. The use of

⁵⁸¹ Bither, J. and Ziebarth, A. (2020).

⁵⁸² Cf. OECD (2020c) Towards 2035 Strategic Foresight: Making Migration and Integration Policies Future Ready.

⁵⁸³ One example is a project in Iraq financed through the BMZ's special initiative – “Tackling the root causes of displacement, reintegrating refugees”, see GIZ: Startups and Coding – Young Iraqis conquer innovative Technologies: <https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/83225.html>.

⁵⁸⁴ Odunowo, O. (2020) Inside Nigeria's Technical Talent Landscape in the Last Ten Years.

⁵⁸⁵ See GIZ: German EU Council Presidency: D4D in the German EU Council Presidency: <https://toolkit-digitalisierung.de/partner/multilateral/d4d-hub/the-german-eu-council-presidency/>. The *African-European Digital Innovation Bridge* builds on the BMZ's tech entrepreneurship initiative “Make-IT”, which promotes digital innovations for sustainable and inclusive development in the partner countries of German development cooperation, see GIZ: Make-IT Initiative: <https://toolkit-digitalisierung.de/make-it-initiative/>.

⁵⁸⁶ See Digital Explorers: An Ongoing Journey to Connect ICT Markets: <https://digitalexplorers.eu/about/>.

⁵⁸⁷ Hilbig, S. (2020) Crowdwork: Eine Chance für den Globalen Süden? The Federal Government works as a strategic cooperation partner with the *Fairwork Foundation*, which advocates for fair working conditions in the platform or *gig economy* for workers in developing countries, see GIZ: Fairwork – Fair working conditions on digital platforms: <https://toolkit-digitalisierung.de/fairwork-faire-arbeitsbedingungen-auf-digitalen-plattformen/>.

⁵⁸⁸ See REFUNITE: <https://refunite.org/about/>.

such technologies should not only be evaluated from a migration policy perspective, but it must also be linked to fundamental legal considerations, especially when such technologies are being shared with states that violate civil and human rights.

The German government promotes the use of digital technologies to make the most of their potential in development cooperation, humanitarian aid and support for displaced persons. In order to limit the risks, the ministries dealing with the issues must exchange information systematically and in an institutionalised manner: about the legal standards, the criteria for cooperation with third countries in the digital sphere and cooperation with the private sector. In the course of this, the German government should make an effort to reach an agreement on especially three issues:

- > **Promote digital competence.** Digital identities, access to mobile bank accounts and online education as well as new forms of employment can make significant contributions to improving livelihoods in poor countries and provide prospects for local people (→ **Chap. 3.2**). Apart from that, they can also help migrants and refugees. However, both require users that have the necessary digital literacy and that their right to informational self-determination, their ownership of the data, control over the data and access to the same are secured.

In all applications of digital technologies in the area of displacement and migration that it supports, the German government should therefore work to strengthen the ability to act for those who are affected. This includes, on the one hand, providing information about data protection and the risks of misuse of data, and, on the other hand, maintaining transparency in automated decision-making processes and, where necessary, providing access to legal remedies.

- > **Promoting public and private collaboration through the EU's new *Digital for Development Hub (D4D)*.** The responsibilities of the public sector and the private sector need to be clarified and regulated in view of the rapid development in digital technologies. After all, recording digital identities, building biometric databases or electronic banking systems can be interesting business models. The *Digital for Development Hub (D4D)* initiated by the German government and established by the EU in December 2020 could be used for coordination at European level. This network aims to bring together tech companies, financial institutions


and civil society organisations from EU member states with corresponding actors from partner countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood to coordinate digital cooperation and investment.⁵⁸⁹

- > **Strengthen data security and data protection in the context of migration and displacement.** Data security is particularly important in asylum and migration policy. Numerous practical and legal questions remain unanswered. The clarification to these questions should be promoted by the German government, for example with the support of the *Big Data for Migration Alliance (BD4M)*. It was launched in 2018 by IOM's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) and the EU Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD) to discuss the ethical use and analysis of big data sources on migration.⁵⁹⁰

⁵⁸⁹ See D4D Hub: <https://toolkit-digitalisierung.de/partner/multilateral/d4d-hub/>.

⁵⁹⁰ Furthermore, in the area of data protection, the German government is generally committed to the *EU-AU Data Flagship*, which was launched together with the AU during the German EU Council Presidency. The objective is to collect, store and utilise data in a way that is appropriate in terms of data protection law and ecology, based on a human-centred approach. That way, the African digital market should be linked with the EU digital market by taking up the new EU digital strategy, the European fundamental right to data protection and projects such as "GAIA-X"; see GMDAC and IOM: Capacity Building: <https://gmdac.iom.int/capacity-building-search/>; European Commission: Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography: https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/migration-demography_en.

3.6 Ensuring sufficient, multi-annual, flexible and targeted funding



RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- 1 Pursue the ODA goal and introduce additional budgetary resources primarily for prevention.** The German government should advocate also internationally to reach the target level of 0.7 per cent of the Gross National Income for Official Development Assistance (ODA) in all OECD countries. A growth in the budget should be focused on crisis prevention, reducing the fragility and curb the structural causes of displacement and irregular migration. (→ 3.6).
- 2 Sustainably strengthen selected current and potential countries of origin.** In its cooperation across ministries, the German government should specifically support the prioritised countries of origin (for example, the five main countries of origin of refugees, other “Nexus partners and peace partners” of the BMZ as well as other complementary bilateral partners) to reduce the structural causes of conflicts, displacement, and irregular migration. → 3.2, 3.3 and 3.6
- 3 Support host countries stronger and in a more targeted manner.** Most of the refugees remain in the neighbouring countries, which, in the process, especially bear the burden. The German government should specifically support these first host countries financially by way of multi-annual compacts. → 3.4.1 and 3.6
- 4 Enable long-term and flexible financial support and increase interministerial planning.** The German government should introduce a new consolidated budget line, which covers displaced persons comprehensively and over the long-term, and make use of the recommendations of the HDP nexus for coordination in budget planning and implementation across ministries. → 3.6
- 5 Make the effect measurable.** The engagement of the German government across ministries should be evaluated right from the beginning. Accordingly, measures should be continually adapted to increase the effectiveness and efficiency → 3.6
- 6 Increase the coherence of the measures taken by the EU and EU member states.** The German government should promote the programming of resources related to displacement and migration in the area of humanitarian aid, stabilisation, and development cooperation to achieve an integrated EU policy response. → 3.6
- 7 Assume a strategic role as a global shaper and mobilise new donors.** The German government should attract at least ten donor countries as new supporters for financing international aid organisations. → 3.6

The increase in the numbers of refugees, internally displaced persons and irregular migrants has prompted the international community to develop new assistance schemes and instruments and to enter into new agreements, especially the Global Compacts for Refugees and for Migration (→ **Chap. 1.2, Box 2**). Additionally, in recent years, it has provided significantly increased funding for the most serious crises, especially for the rising immediate humanitarian needs. However, it has also become clear in recent years that overcoming persistent displacement crises as well as mitigating the root causes of displacement and irregular migration will continue to be permanent tasks.

The financial resources made available worldwide to reduce the root causes of displacement and irregular migration and to control fragility and violent conflict were already insufficient before the Covid-19 pandemic. It is expected that the consequences of the pandemic will require additional funding for crisis prevention, humanitarian aid and development (for that, also see **Chap. 2, Spotlight – Covid-19**). However, so far, there has been little progress on international financial burden-sharing, a key objective of the Global Compact for Refugees. The financial burden continues to be taken by a small number of donor countries. The dependency of many UN organisations on a few countries has increased even more since 2019.⁵⁹¹ The international community will need to provide more funding and more effective financing instruments to meet the challenges ahead. Also Germany will not be able to escape this need, even though it is already the second most important donor for official development cooperation.⁵⁹²

⁵⁹¹ In 2010, for example, UNHCR was funded by the USA (38 per cent) and European countries (EU, Norway, Switzerland: 35 per cent). In 2019, UNHCR's dependence on these two sources was even greater: USA (40 per cent) and Europe (37 per cent). During this time, Germany became the second most important bilateral donor worldwide. Only 15 states fund UNHCR with at least 20 million US dollars per year (Germany funded 390 million US dollars in 2019). The remaining around 180 states are currently not involved or are involved to a very small extent. Germany's contribution has increased sharply from 2010 to 2019, while the contributions of other countries, such as Japan, have decreased. Emerging economies are not meeting the obligations that they too have committed to with the compact, neither in terms of admission (for example, through resettlement places) nor in terms of financing. Sweden alone pays more than all emerging economies – Argentina, China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia – combined, see UNHCR: Government Partners: <https://www.unhcr.org/donors.html>.

⁵⁹² See BMZ: Geber im Vergleich: ODA-Zahlen: https://www.bmz.de/de/ministerium/zahlen_fakten/oda/geber/index.html. According to OECD criteria, these services are defined as public development cooperation. They are mainly from the budgets of the BMZ and FFO; however, they are also from the budgets of the BMU, BMF and other ministries.

Humanitarian aid will always remain an important element of crisis response. In principle, however, the costs of conflict prevention and strengthening the resilience are lower than the costs of dealing with its consequences, which includes displacement. Thus, resources that serve to address the root causes of displacement and irregular migration and prevent an escalation of social tensions in existing displacement contexts must be understood as an investment in the future.⁵⁹³ The design and dimensioning of budget items must reflect this fundamental development. This is the only way to reduce administrative obstacles and provide the necessary longer-term support.

The German government's efforts since 2015, with which Germany has responded to the challenges posed by displacement and irregular migration with new policy concepts and instruments, provided substantial additional funding for flexible, crisis-specific instruments, and strengthened strategic and operational interministerial action (→ **Chap. 3.1.1 and 3.4.1**), have been recognised internationally and by the UN.⁵⁹⁴ The Commission agrees with this. These reform efforts are based on the insight that global development, crisis prevention and stability must be strengthened in a sustainable and long-term manner. This is because it has become clear that the traditional instruments of humanitarian aid and refugee protection alone are not sufficient to address the increasing long-term challenges in persistent displacement contexts. Germany is sending a clear message of global responsibility by strengthening European and international institutions at the same time.

⁵⁹³ UN und World Bank (2018) Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, p. 38, present an economic efficiency calculation (*business case*) for the prevention of conflicts: "Looking at a series of case studies, Chalmers (2007) similarly estimates the cost-effectiveness ratio of prevention to lie somewhere between 1:2 and 1:7. These figures suggest that, over the medium to long term, donors would save between US\$2 and US\$7 for each US\$1 invested in prevention-related activities. The cost-effectiveness of prevention, however, becomes even clearer if the actual costs to conflict-affected countries and their neighbours are considered. Looking at data from Rwanda between 1995 and 2014, the Institute for Economics and Peace finds the cost-effectiveness ratio of peacebuilding to be 1:16. This means that US\$1 invested in efforts to build peace and prevent the recurrence of violence in Rwanda has saved US\$16 in costs over the past two decades (IEP 2017)."

⁵⁹⁴ See Gagnon, J. and Rodrigues, M. (2020); see also on Germany's support for the Global Compact for Refugees, for example UNHCR (2020a).

However, many donor countries still frequently rely on short-term humanitarian assistance instead of medium and longer-term concepts agreed upon with development organisations⁵⁹⁵ – even though the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 2016 decided on improved coordination of humanitarian aid, development cooperation and peacebuilding. Additionally, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) adopted the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP nexus; → **Chap. 3.1.1**) recommendation in 2019 at Germany’s initiative among other things, which contains concrete proposals for coordination as well as joint analysis and coordinated planning.⁵⁹⁶

What should we do?

The Commission calls on the German government to scale up its funding for the mitigation of the root causes of displacement and irregular migration and to support states that are particularly affected, and strongly encourages it to merge funding instruments and procedures and make them more effective. This especially includes a stable basis for financial planning and reliability for all partners involved. The Commission is aware that the Covid-19 pandemic will place an additional burden on public budgets in all policy fields in the future.

The Commission is convinced that by increasing its strategic capability, the German government can both deploy financial resources in a more focused and coherent manner and strengthen its role as a global shaper at European and international level.

The Commission recommends focusing on the following seven priority areas:

1. Pursue the ODA goal and introduce additional budgetary resources primarily for prevention. The German government should continue to vigorously pursue the goal of spending at least 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) on Official Development

Assistance (ODA) as defined by the OECD criteria⁵⁹⁷ and urge internationally to reach the 0.7 per cent goal in all OECD countries. As yet, Germany has reached this target only in 2016 (and probably also in 2020 in the course of the pandemic).⁵⁹⁸ A growth in the budget should focus on crisis prevention, reducing fragility and curb the structural root causes of displacement and irregular migration.⁵⁹⁹

2. Sustainably strengthen current and potential countries of origin. Interministerial support for current and potential countries of origin should focus on two groups of countries: Countries in the first group are those where humanitarian needs are particularly high and immediate emergencies are driving people into displacement and irregular migration. These are, for example, the five main countries of origin from which more than two thirds of the world’s refugees come.⁶⁰⁰ This group also includes the BMZ’s “Nexus partners and peace partners”⁶⁰¹, with whom the German government works in the field of crisis prevention. The second group includes developing countries that are not affected by an acute conflict situation. These countries should be supported on the basis of their needs, for example, in building effective institutions, improving basic services and adapting to climate change, in order to increase their stability and crisis prevention capacity and thus prevent further migration. (→ **Chap. 3.2 and 3.3**). Countries on the list of bilateral partners with whom long-term joint development goals are being pursued, are eligible for this.⁶⁰² The governments of these partner countries must make a substantial contribution of their own in this regard.

⁵⁹⁷ See BMZ: Guideline “Was ist Official Development Assistance (ODA)?”: https://www.bmz.de/de/ministerium/zahlen_fakten/oda/hintergrund/leitfaden/index.html.

⁵⁹⁸ BMZ (2017b) Neue OECD-Zahlen: Deutsche ODA-Quote steigt bedingt durch die Flüchtlingsausgaben im Inland erstmals auf 0,7 Prozent.

⁵⁹⁹ UN und World Bank (2018):

⁶⁰⁰ Syria, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, see UNHCR (2020b), p. 12.

⁶⁰¹ Currently: Iraq, Yemen, DR Congo, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, Chad and Central African Republic, see BMZ: List of countries for BMZ’s bilateral official development cooperation: https://www.bmz.de/de/laender_regionen/laenderliste/laenderliste.pdf.

⁶⁰² Currently: Afghanistan, Egypt, Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Jordan, Cambodia, Cameroon, Kenya, Colombia, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Rwanda, Zambia, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Uzbekistan, see BMZ: List of countries for BMZ’s bilateral official development cooperation: https://www.bmz.de/de/laender_regionen/laenderliste/laenderliste.pdf.

⁵⁹⁵ OECD (2019b) Financing for Refugee Situations; Gagnon, J. and Rodrigues, M. (2020).

⁵⁹⁶ OECD (2019c) DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus.

3. Support host countries stronger and in a targeted manner. Most refugees stay in their home region or in neighbouring countries. These areas have to bear special burdens and should therefore be supported financially in the long term. This support should complement development support that is primarily directed at the host country's own population, as this is the only way that host countries and regions can provide for refugees and internally displaced persons and create prospects without exacerbating social tensions. The compacts proposed in **Chapter 3.4.1** should be used for such funding, the period of which is five years and can be extended. Development-oriented resilience programmes and the establishment of social protection systems (**→ Chap. 3.2.3**) are suitable approaches in the view of the Commission.

4. Enable long-term and flexible financial support and increase interministerial planning. Mitigating the root causes of displacement and irregular migration is an ongoing task and cannot succeed if it is only financed in the short term. The German government should financially expand the budget lines provided for humanitarian aid and development policy support with the aim of stabilisation, crisis prevention and crisis management as well as reconstruction. Furthermore, it should design the basis for financial planning to be permanent and more flexible in order to create reliability for those affected and partners on the one hand and on the other hand, to enable flexible responses to ever-changing challenges. In perspective, it should examine how the existing and new development-oriented financing instruments for displacement and migration can be bundled to improve the impact and efficiency of measures. In concrete terms, a new consolidated budget item should be introduced for this purpose, which covers support for refugees, displaced persons and host regions; as well as migration and voluntary return in one comprehensive and long-term approach ("360-degree approach").

The German government should make use of the recommendations of the HDP nexus as a starting point and guideline for coordination in budget planning and implementation across ministries. In doing so, the focus should be on reduced appropriation and earmarking, simplified reporting requirements and substantial support for local actors and structures. FFO and BMZ have built on the recommendations of

the 2018 Spending Review of the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF)⁶⁰³ in the area of their budget lines for humanitarian aid and crisis prevention, reconstruction and infrastructure and have gained experience in ten countries with the instrument of "Joint Analysis and Coordinated Planning" (GAAP) (on HDP nexus and GAAP **→ Chap. 3.1.1**). This interministerial coordination in the use of funds should be systematically advanced in the future along the HDP nexus principles. In order to increase efficiency, resources should be used more for crisis prevention than for crisis response. In the Commission's view, this mode of coordination should serve as a model for cooperation between FFO and BMZ and other ministries beyond the titles mentioned. In the future, climate adaptation measures should be linked more closely with measures to reduce displacement and irregular migration in terms of an expanded humanitarian-development-peace-climate concept (on climate change mitigation and adaptation **→ Chap. 3.3**).

5. Make the effect measurable. The German government's interministerial engagement in the priority countries should be evaluated from the beginning in order to gain reliable findings on its effectiveness. This should allow for an ongoing adaptation of measures to increase effectiveness and efficiency. At the same time, these evaluations can facilitate political consensus for a preventive, adequately funded policy to combat the root causes of displacement and irregular migration.

6. Increase coherence of the measures taken by the EU and EU member states. The German government should – in close coordination with European partners – promote the programming of resources related to displacement and migration in the area of humanitarian aid, stabilisation, and development cooperation to achieve an integrated EU policy response. This coordination should take place in cooperation with the development finance institutions. In this context, the Commission welcomes the efforts of the European Commission to strengthen the coherence of measures that are funded by the EU and EU member states in the recipient countries in a joint programming⁶⁰⁴ approach

⁶⁰³ BMF (2018) Final Report: Politikbereich „Humanitäre Hilfe und Übergangshilfe einschließlich der Schnittstellen Krisenprävention, Krisenreaktion, Stabilisierung und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit“.

⁶⁰⁴ See European Commission: Joint programming of development cooperation: <https://kurzelinks.de/mx6v>.

(“Team Europe”⁶⁰⁵). The measures of individual EU member states can complement each other thematically and geographically.

7. Assume a strategic role as a global shaper and mobilise new donors. Internationally, the German government should advocate for flexible and better funding for programmes for the longer term in order to reduce the causes of displacement and irregular migration as well as for refugee protection. In this context, the German government should urge the 2019 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recommendation on the HDP nexus to be implemented. Especially amid the Covid-19 pandemic, international organisations working in the crisis context continue to need reliable support, both strategically and financially. Flexible, multi-annual funds for international aid organisations are also important building blocks for implementing the Global Compacts on Displacement and Migration and for achieving the SDGs.

In order to advance the implementation of the Global Compacts, the German government should use its role as a major donor and host country for refugees to mobilise new donors. The goal should be to win at least ten donor countries as new supporters for the financing of international aid organisations. The German government should advocate for this diplomatically at the multilateral as well as on bilateral levels and especially address the emerging economies. Sufficient staffing at German representations abroad is important for this.

Germany should – also in order to relieve the burden on its own contributions – advocate to expand and combine already existing and new financing instruments (such as concessional loans⁶⁰⁶, private funding, philanthropic funds and cash transfers)⁶⁰⁷. By occupying strategically important positions at the World Bank and other development banks or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), there are further opportunities to shape the policy dialogue with countries of origin and host countries in upcoming financing projects (or

negotiations on debt restructuring) such that the use of such funds also includes the mitigation of the root causes of displacement. Improved staffing of German liaison offices to these institutions and UN agencies can complement the policy and implementation-oriented dialogue in support of this agenda.

In the Commission’s view, the experience gained and the successes achieved in mitigating the root causes of displacement as well as the response to the high influx of refugees in 2015/16 put the German government in a promising position to promote its stance and approach. On this basis, Germany can make the best possible contribution to mitigating the root causes of displacement and irregular migration on a global level. Germany should continue and expand its instruments of humanitarian aid, stabilisation and development cooperation. Simultaneously, Germany can provide new impetus in the areas of prevention and early action in combination with a long-term approach and flexibility. However, the Commission believes that only a well-coordinated strategic interaction of measures at the national, EU and international levels will ensure the best possible effectiveness of the financial resources that have been made available. The “Council for Peace, Security and Development” proposed by the Commission (→ **Chap. 3.1.1**) should play a decisive role in the process of coordinating the use of funds as well as selecting the countries of origin and host countries to be supported in the sense of a strategic and coordinated overall concept of cause reduction.

⁶⁰⁵ See European Union: Joint Programming & Joint Implementation: <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming>.

⁶⁰⁶ (Interest) subsidised loans for poor countries (with long maturities), see OECD: Concessional Loans: <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5901>.

⁶⁰⁷ Angenendt, S., Biehler, N., Kipp, D. et al. (2019) Growing Needs, Insufficient Resources: How to Fund International Refugee Protection?

Charting the right course: Required decisions in the upcoming legislative term

4



4. Charting the right course: Required decisions in the upcoming legislative term

Mitigating the root causes of displacement and irregular migration and supporting people who leave their home countries because of hardship and a lack of prospects is an **ongoing task** for the international community that can only be tackled in **global solidarity**.

The Commission's mandate was to submit proposals to the German government and the German parliament (Bundestag) for mitigating the root causes of displacement. Some measures may have an impact in the short or medium term. Others will require patience and perseverance. But all measures have to be initiated now. To do that, the **German government** and the **Bundestag** depend on the support of **civil society**, the **federal states (Länder)** and **municipalities**.

The recommendations put forward in this report focus on the **international dimension** of displacement and irregular migration. Implementing the recommendations will require close collaboration with the European Union, with partners and with countries of origin and host countries worldwide, as well as with regional and international organisations.

The German government should campaign resolutely for a **fair global order** so that differences in prosperity are reduced and the prospects of people worldwide to build themselves a viable future in their home countries are improved. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations provide the framework for this.

But concrete steps will need to be taken in Germany, too. By making far-reaching changes both at home in Germany and in the European Union we can help to reduce the root causes of displacement and irregular migration. Some examples of what can be done to help are: ambitious climate action in order to achieve the Paris climate targets, fair trade relations with developing countries and, in the interest of crisis prevention, restrictive arms exports.

In Chapter 3, the Commission made numerous recommendations which, in their entirety, can help to reduce the causes of displacement and irregular migration, protect refugees and internally displaced persons more effectively and support host countries. The following **15 recommendations**, in particular, should be part of the **negotiations to form a new government** in autumn 2021 so they can already be implemented during the next legislative term. All of these recommendations are directed at the German government and at the German parliament (Bundestag), the institution that is responsible for the financial and legal framework.

1

The government should set up a **Council for Peace, Security and Development** as an interministerial decision-making body at the federal level, with a view to enhancing its own strategic capability and increasing its contribution to global crisis prevention, and so as to play a more active role in shaping collaborative international initiatives aimed at resolving ongoing conflicts. By consulting external experts, the Council shall ensure that scientific and civil society expertise and independent positions are taken into account, and also that transparency is created. More information → [Chapter 3.1.1](#)

2

In its partner countries, the German government should support **strong state institutions that aim to protect people's rights and meet their needs** so as to ensure the provision of basic services for the population and improve investment conditions, which will help create new job and employment opportunities. This is the basis for good living conditions and development prospects. In its development cooperation activities, Germany – together with non-governmental organisations and political foundations – should put special emphasis on strengthening democratic institutions and opportunities for participation. In light of the fact that authoritarian governance is on the rise in many countries, collaboration with civil society should be expanded. In addition, cooperation with regional organisations such as the African Union should be strengthened. More information → [Chapters 3.2.1 and 3.1.2](#)

- 3 The German government should consistently involve **women** as independent actors in all of its strategies and measures and protect women's rights in order to successfully reduce the root causes of displacement and irregular migration. Self-determination, equal rights and higher levels of female participation have a positive impact on crisis prevention, peacebuilding and sustainable development. This requires that women have access to quality health care including family planning, education, and opportunities for employment and participation. Germany should also campaign systematically for the protection of women against discrimination and violence, and for women's rights. Displaced women require particular support and protection. More information → [Chapters 3.1.2, 3.2 and 3.4](#)
- 4 In order to reduce poverty in a sustainable way, the German government should push for the establishment of adaptive **social protection systems** in the partner countries of German development cooperation and, in particular, in fragile contexts. A joint effort with international partners could provide up to one billion additional people with access to at least one social protection service within the next five years. The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for such protection. The German government should focus its support primarily on establishing and expanding social protection systems in the countries of origin and host countries of displaced persons and irregular migrants. More information → [Chapter 3.2.3](#)
- 5 The German government should massively scale up its support for the **expansion of basic health care structures** and formulate a long-term approach in this context, in order to help achieve the SDG of sustainable universal health coverage. Access to such structures must also be ensured for displaced persons, stateless persons and irregular migrants. The fight against the Covid-19 pandemic has made the importance of health care more evident than ever. The German government should step up its efforts, together with the World Health Organization and the European Union, to bring about faster and more equitable access to vaccines and medicines in developing countries. More information → [Chapter 3.2.2](#)
- 6 The German government should make **quality basic and secondary education** a top priority of its development cooperation in order to improve life and career opportunities through quality education for girls and boys alike. Funding in the education sector needs to reflect this priority and must not be reduced as part of the "BMZ 2030" reform process. This also applies when, in development cooperation, a focus is rightly placed on vocational training and the creation of skilled jobs. Digital education opportunities should be expanded and digital literacy strengthened. For more information on basic and secondary education → [Chapter 3.2.2](#) For more information on vocational training → [Chapter 3.2.5](#)
- 7 In addition to pushing climate change mitigation action in Germany and Europe, the German government should **provide massive support for countries of the Global South to assist them in the climate-smart transformation of their economies**, with a view to mitigating climate change as a driver of displacement and irregular migration, and strengthening countries in their sustainable development and modernisation efforts. It should develop a mechanism whereby climate protection investments in Germany are the basis for additionally providing a significant share of funding for climate mitigation action measures in developing countries and emerging economies ("climate matching"). The aim of these measures should be to promote the further development and implementation of countries' own climate targets and, in particular, support the expansion of renewables. More information → [Chapter 3.3.1](#)
- 8 The German government should step up more targeted support for ways to **adapt to climate change** so as to stop the impacts of climate change from forcing people to leave their homes. This means looking ahead and supporting regions where adaptation is necessary and still possible, as well as regions that are likely to become the future destinations of climate-induced migration and displacement. Coastal cities, for instance, are frequently destinations of domestic migration whilst themselves being particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. More information → [Chapter 3.3.2](#)

- 9** The German government should step up its support for sustainable **urban development** in developing countries in order to improve the living conditions in poor urban districts and create viable prospects for refugees and internally displaced persons outside of refugee camps. The only way it will be possible to improve the living conditions of particularly vulnerable people, ensure good governance, and still protect the environment and the climate is if rapid urbanisation, especially in less developed countries, is managed appropriately. More information → [Chapter 3.2.1](#)
- 10** The German government should place more political emphasis on the situation of **internally displaced persons** and affected countries, with the aim of creating prospects for the people concerned. In contexts of protracted internal displacement, in particular, it should focus its support on promoting long-term solutions and also use development policy instruments to that end. Therefore, the German government should support the work of the UN High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement set up in 2019 and lobby for an appropriate follow-up process. More information → [Chapter 3.4.2](#)
- 11** The German government should support **host countries** that are particularly affected by refugee movements, particularly in crisis regions, in order to create prospects for a sustainable future for the people and the host communities. Such support should be agreed upon for a five-year period and should be plannable, significant and verifiable; it should also go beyond humanitarian aid. The pertinent compacts should be concluded in close collaboration with international partners within the framework of the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees, and be extendable in case of need. More information → [Chapter 3.4.1](#)
- 12** The German government should initiate an **Alliance for Resettlement** with a view to ensuring that at least the members of that alliance permanently take in a certain quota of recognised refugees. Alongside Germany, possible members could include other EU countries, the United States, Canada and Japan. Each member state should resettle at least the number of refugees per year that corresponds to a share of 0.05 per cent of the country's own population so as to increase resettlement figures, which are currently at an all-time low. For Germany, this means committing to the resettlement of 40,000 people per year. Highly vulnerable persons, in particular women, children and victims of sexualised violence from the world's biggest humanitarian crisis regions, should be given first consideration. Moreover, the German government should create safe routes for refugees so as to provide swift support for people in acute crisis situations and expand the **issuing of humanitarian visas** for this purpose. Specifically, the government should let a significant number of particularly vulnerable people, for instance from Yemen, travel to Germany via safe routes under a pilot project. In addition, the German government should explore possibilities for asylum applications from third countries outside the EU. More information → [Chapters 3.4.1 and 3.5.1](#)
- 13** The German government, together with other EU member states, must work towards ensuring **compliance with the applicable law at the EU's external borders** so that violations of human rights obligations cease. Two tasks are highly important in this regard: preventing push-backs, and ensuring minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers within the EU. It is not enough to call on developing countries and authoritarian states to respect human rights; Germany and Europe themselves have to consistently ensure respect for human rights. More information → [Chapter 3.5.2](#)

- 14** The German government should conclude **substantial migration partnerships** with relevant countries of origin in order to create more safe migration routes and jointly manage migration. Such partnerships could combine concrete offers for labour migration and possibly visa-free travel on the one hand with realistic agreements for the return of people who are required to leave on the other. Voluntary return should always take precedence. For the purpose of making a strategic selection of countries, discussions should be held during annual summits on asylum and migration in coordination with the partners who are involved in integrating refugees, i.e. civil society including diaspora organisations, the private sector, the federal states (Länder) and local authorities. This aspect should also be included in the ongoing negotiations on the implementation of the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum with EU partners. More information → [Chapters 3.5.3 and 3.5.4](#)
- 15** The German government should step up its efforts to come up with **German strategies** on mitigating the root causes of displacement and irregular migration **that are coherently coordinated between the federal ministries**, and should make available sufficient **human resources** for mainstreaming these strategies more effectively in European and international discussions. The German government should increase funding and improve its own strategic capabilities by improving the coherence of its **financing**. The financing of measures that reduce the causes of displacement and irregular migration should be based on robust multi-annual plans in order to provide reliability for the people affected and for partners. This should also enable flexible responses to evolving challenges. More information → [Chapter 3.6](#)

Appendix



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acc. to	according to
ACT-A	Access to Covid-19 Tools Accelerator
ACP States	Association of 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries → see also: OACPS
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AfDB	African Development Bank
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
AI	Artificial Intelligence
and/or	and/or
approx.	approximately
ARSA	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
Art.	Article
AsylG	Asylum Law
AU	African Union
AufenthG	Residence Law
BAMF	Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BDI	Federation of German Industries
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
BMEL	Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture
BMF	Federal Ministry of Finance
BMI	Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community
BMU	Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety
BMVg	Federal Ministry of Defence
BMWi	Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy
BMZ	Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development
bpb	Federal Agency for Civic Education
BQFG	Professional Qualifications Assessment Act
CASE	Clean, Affordable, and Secure Energy System in Southeast Asia
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
Cf./cf.	Refer/refer
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
Chap.	Chapter

COMAR	Mexican Asylum Department
CO₂	Carbon dioxide
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEval	German Institute for Development Evaluation
DGAP	German Council on Foreign Relations
DGVN	United Nations Association of Germany
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSF	German Foundation for Peace Research
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
D4D	Digital for Development Hub
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
eIDAS	electronic Identification, Authentication and Trust Services
EKD	Evangelical Church of Germany
EMN	European Migration Network
EnDev	Energising Development
et al.	et alii (and others)
etc.	et cetera
et seq.	following (pages)
ETP	Energy Transition Partnership
EU	European Union
EU-LISA	European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
Eurodac	European Dactyloscopy (EU-wide biometric database for comparison of fingerprint data of asylum seekers)
Eurostat	European Statistical Office
FATF	Financial Action Task Force (on Money Laundering)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FEG	Skilled Worker Immigration Act
FFO	Federal Foreign Office
Fig.	Figure
f.	following (page)
FRiT	EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey
Frontex	European Border and Coast Guard Agency (“Frontières extérieures”, External Borders)
GAAP	Joint Analysis and Coordinated Planning

GAMM	Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
GBC	German Bishops' Conference
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GCM	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration; also: UN migration compact
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees; also: UN refugees compact)
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GMDAC	Global Migration Data Analysis Centre
GNI	Gross National Income
GNU	Germany-Norway-United Kingdom
GPID	Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
GRC	Geneva Refugee Convention
GRID	Global Report on Internal Displacement (annual report by IDMC on global internal displacement)
GVG	Association for Insurance Science and Insurance Design
HDI	Human Development Index
HDP Nexus	Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus
HEP	Help Extension Programme (Ethiopian health care extension programme)
HLP	High-Level Panel
HLPE	High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRW	Human Rights Watch
i. a.	among other things
Ibid./ibid.	ibidem
Publ./publ.	Editor/edited by
IAB	Institute for Employment Research
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee (Standing Inter-Agency Committee of the United Nations)
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICI	International Climate Initiative
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally displaced person
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IFSH	Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg

IGP	InsuResilience Global Partnership
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMC	International Medical Corps
IMF	International Monetary Fund → also see: IWF
in particular	in particular
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPBES	Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (global biodiversity committee)
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPI	International Press Institute
IRENA	International Renewable Energy Agency
IS	Islamic State
IWF	International Monetary Fund → see also: IMF
JIPS	Joint IDP Profiling Service
KAF	Konrad Adenauer Foundation
KNOMAD	Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development
SME	Small and medium-sized enterprises
lit.	litera (alphabet)
LGBTTIQ	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, transsexual, intersex and queer
MCC	Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC) gGmbH
MEDAM	Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration
MENA	Middle East-North Africa
MSC	Munich Security Conference
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAVTTTC	National Vocational & Technical Training Commission
NDCs	Nationally Determined Contributions
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIM	National Institution for Migration
No.	Number
NeSt	Project “Neustart im Team” (Project “new start in a team”)
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OACPS	Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (previously ACP States) → see also: ACP
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIE	World Organisation for Animal Health
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

OVG NRW	Higher Administrative Court for North Rhine-Westphalia
p.	Page
para./paras.	paragraph/paragraphs
PCIA	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
PDD	Platform on Disaster Displacement
PME	“Migration for Development” programme
PRIF	Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
RAI	Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems
Ref.	Reference number
REFUNITE	Refugees United; non-governmental organisation
Reg.	Regulation
RIICE	Remote Sensing-Based Information and Insurance for Crop in Emerging Economies
s. a.	see above
Sec.	Section
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEGOB	Mexican Secretariat for Home Affairs
SOEP	Socio-economic panel
SPF	Social Protection Floors
SSG/R	Security Sector Governance and Reform
SVR	Expert Council of German Foundations for Integration and Migration
SWP	German Institute for International and Security Affairs
TANG	The African Network of Germany
TFD	Task Force on Displacement
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
THAMM	Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa (Project to support regular labour migration and labour mobility between North Africa and Europe)
TVET SSP	Pakistan Technical and Vocational Education & Training Reform – Sector Support Programme (Program to support vocational training reform in Pakistan)
UBA	German Environment Agency
UIC	University of Illinois Chicago
UN	United Nations
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDRR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UN ECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UN ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNO	United Nations Organisation
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRWA	The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSD	United Nations Statistics Division
USP-2030	Global partnership for universal social protection
VGGT	Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security
WBGU	German Advisory Council on Global Change
WFP	UN World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts
WIM ExCom	Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism of the UNFCCC
WTO	World Trade Organisation
w. y.	without year
YOUNGO	Youth NGOs – UNFCCC NGO Constituency Group → see also: UNFCCC
ZIF	Centre for International Peace Operations

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